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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation approaches the manifestations of ideology in U.S. Strategic 
Communication. The discussion approaches Strategic Communication by 
relating it to the Enlightenment narratives and suggesting these narratives 
maintain similar social and political functions. 
 
This dissertation aims to address the key contents and mechanisms of Strategic 
Communication by covering the perspectives of (i) communication as leadership 
as well as (ii) communication as discourse, i.e. practice and contents. Throughout 
the empirical part of the dissertation, the communication theoretical discussion is 
supported by a methodological framework that bridges Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) and functional language theory. According to the principles of 
CDA, Strategic Communication is treated as ideological, hegemonic discourse 
that impacts social order. The primary method of analysis is transitivity analysis, 
which is concerned with how language and its patterns construe reality. This 
analysis is complemented with a discussion on the rituals of production and 
interpretation, which can be treated as visual extensions of textual transitivity. 
The concept of agency is the key object of analysis. 
 
From the perspective of leadership, Strategic Communication is essentially a 
leadership model through which the organization defines itself, its aims and 
legitimacy. This dissertation arrives to the conclusion that Strategic 
Communication is used not only as a concept for managing Public Relations and 
information operations. It is an essential asset in the inter-organization 
management of its members. The current developments indicate that the concept 
is developing towards even heavier measures of control. 
 
From the perspective of language and discourse, the key narratives of Strategic 
Communication are advocated with the intrinsic values of democracy and 
technological progress as the prerequisites of ethics and justice. The transitivity 
patterns reveal highly polarized agency. The agency of the Self is typically 
outsourced to technology. Further, the transitivity patterns demonstrate how the 
effects-centric paradigm of warfare has created a lexicon that is ideologically 
exclusive. It has led to the development of two mutually exclusive sets of 
vocabulary, where the descriptions of legitimate action exclude Others by 
default. These ideological discourses have become naturalized in the official 
vocabulary of strategic planning and leadership. Finally, the analysis of the 
images of the captures and deaths of Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden and 
Muammar Gaddafi bring the discussion back to the themes of the Enlightenment 
by demonstrating how democracy is framed to serve political purposes. The 
images of democracy are essentially images of violence. Contrary to the official, 
instrumental and humanitarian narratives of Strategic Communication, it is the 
grammar of expressive, violent rituals that serve as the instrument of unity. 
 
Keywords: Strategic Communication, discourse analysis, asymmetry, Grand 
Narrative 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
Tämä väitöskirja tarkastelee ideologian ilmenemismuotoja Yhdysvaltain 
strategisessa kommunikaatiossa. Tutkimus asettaa strategisen kommunikaation 
narratiivin rinnan valistusnarratiivin kanssa ja osoittaa, että niillä on samanlaiset 
sosiaaliset ja poliittiset funktiot.  
 
Tämä tutkimus pyrkii vastaamaan kysymykseen strategisen kommunikaation 
yhdinsisällöistä ja -mekanismeista lähestymällä strategista kommunikaatiota niin 
johtamisprosessina kuin diskurssina, eli käytäntöjen ja sisältöjen näkökulmista. 
Tutkimuksen empiirisessä osuudessa viestintäteoreettista diskussiota tuetaan 
metodologisella kehyksellä, jossa yhdistetään kriittisen diskurssianalyysin 
tutkimusote ja funktionaalisen kieliteorian metodologiaa. Kriittisen diskurssi-
analyysin periaatteiden mukaisesti strateginen kommunikaatio ymmärretään tässä 
ideologiseksi, hegemoniseksi diskurssiksi, jolla on sosiaalisia vaikutuksia. 
Tutkimuksen ensisijainen metodi on transitiivisuusanalyysi, jonka avulla 
tutkimus pyrkii kuvaamaan sitä, kuinka kieli ja sen rakenteet heijastavat ja 
rakentavat todellisuutta. Teoriakehystä täydennetään keskustelulla viestinnän 
rituaaleista. Metodologia keskittyy toimijuuden analyysiin. 
 
Johtamisen näkökulmasta strateginen kommunikaatio on ennen kaikkea 
johtamismalli, jonka avulla organisaatio määrittelee itsensä, päämääränsä ja 
legitimiteettinsä. Strateginen kommunikaatio ei ole vain työkalu julkissuhteiden 
ja informaatio-operaatioiden toimeenpanossa, vaan sillä on tärkeä rooli 
organisaation jäsenten hallinnassa ja kontrolloinnissa. Konseptin tämänhetkinen 
kehityssuunta viestii siitä, että sitä viedään kohti vielä raskaampia hallinnan 
keinoja. 
 
Strategisen kommunikaation ydinnarratiivia kannatellaan demokratian ja 
teknologiakehityksen itseisarvojen avulla. Näiden diskurssien 
transitiivisuusrakenteet paljastavat hyvin polarisoituneet toimijuussuhteet. Oma 
toimijuus on tyypillisesti ulkoistettu teknologialle. Lisäksi transitiivisuus-
rakenteet osoittavat, että vaikutuskeskeinen sodankäynnin paradigma on luonut 
kaksi toisensa poissulkevaa sanastoa, joissa legitiimin toimijuuden kuvaukset on 
sidottu länsimaalaisuuteen. Nämä ideologiset diskurssit ovat sulautuneet 
strategisen suunnittelun ja johtamisen viralliseen sanastoon.  
 
Viimeisenä näitä diskursseja peilataan Saddam Husseinin, Osama bin Ladenin ja 
Muammar Gaddafin kiinniotto- ja kuolinkuvien analyysissa. Tämä palauttaa 
keskustelun valistusteemoihin osoittamalla, kuinka demokratianarratiiveja 
kehystetään palvelemaan poliittisia tarkoitusperiä. Demokratian kuvat ovat 
väkivallan kuvia. Toisin kuin viralliset, instrumentaaliset ja humanitaariset 
strategisen kommunikaation narratiivit esittävät, yhteisyyden todellisia 
instrumentteja ovat ekspressiiviset väkivallan rituaalit. 
 
Avainsanat: strateginen kommunikaatio, diskurssianalyysi, epäsymmetria, 
Grand Narrative 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 will start with the theme that has pleased me the least during the 
process of writing this dissertation.  Among us Finnish military 
scientists, there is an ongoing debate about the status of military 
science: what makes research military science? At first, after entering 
the field from another research tradition, this question seemed absurd. As a 
student of English and linguistics, I never asked myself what made my 
research part of the humanities. As a linguist, I was used to having to visit 
the medical school library, or that of the department of psychology, when 
writing standard course papers on lexical processing at the department of 
English. Next, we would discuss gender-stereotypes in sociolinguistics 
seminars, clause patterns in syntax class, and end the day with a reading of 
the Canterbury Tales or pamphlets on the French Revolution. All this 
served one and only purpose: to mold us into well-rounded graduates of the 
arts who have the resources to become experts in their chosen line of 
research. The same drill is happening at the National Defence University. 
Calculating bullet trajectories and learning leadership skills are just one 
aspect of studying military sciences. To me, military science provides the 
context, just like in the arts before this, to make my research meaningful.  
I 
 
In a department seminar in December 2012, I was sitting next to a fellow 
student Juha Jokitalo, who, in the middle of the discussion, pointed at 
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) and noted 
that clearly military science is in the pre-paradigmatic stage. This is both 
problematic and liberating, but I have quite enjoyed the opportunity to get 
to do linguistic research from within the science and not, as I had always 
been doing before, from the outside.  This dissertation is a compilation of 
approaches that all shake hands in the context of Military Science. This is 
precisely my outlook: this is a context and a frame, distinguished by its 
perspective. How can this research help us understand the phenomena of 
warfare and conflict? From my perspective, the study of war and military is 
essentially the study of humanity, which brings many traditions of 
humanities and social science to the field of research. This is the epiphany 
of the Comprehensive Approach as well: bringing together all key 
knowledge in order to prevail. Tactics, strategy, etc, need the contribution 
of the so-called civil sciences, as military (or security) policy does not 
develop in a vacuum outside social practice. 
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 My personal wish is to make my contribution in the form of a framework 
for linguistic analysis. Without language, there is no strategy and without 
strategy there is little left of warfare. Perhaps it is precisely language that 
makes the difference between warfare and mere violence. Warfare has 
always needed linguistic rituals in order to be "real" - declarations of war 
and independence, orders, prohibitions and legitimations are just a few 
examples. Warfare is ideological, and ideology needs language to become 
actualized. Language is used not only to represent reality, but to affirm it, 
and this makes the research of language and communication paramount in 
the study of warfare. 
 
From the very beginning of my studies at the National Defence University I 
have been repeating that my aim is to bring the research of language and 
discourse permanently to the field of military studies. This research 
orientation was started by Jari Rantapelkonen, whose 2006 dissertation 
methodology combined language, narratives, hermeneutics and 
phenomenology in the fields of International Relations and Military 
Science. Strategy and leadership are essentially language and narration, and 
dismissing the use of language as a window to the sense-making processes 
of public military discourse would seem absurd. My background in English 
linguistics as well as English language and culture also means that, despite 
the many surprised questions concerning the perceived distance of my 
background (language) and current research orientation (warfare and 
leadership), my shift from language to military studies is not, after all, a 
dramatic one. It has required a certain reflection on myself as a researcher. 
Am I a linguist or a 'military scientist', if there is such thing? The truth is 
that I feel I am both, but the ultimate aim is to apply the methods and 
perspectives of linguistics to generate perspectives within Military Science. 
Strategic Communication is a natural theme to grasp. It is a critical asset 
whose importance is demonstrated by the rapid doctrinization processes of 
different communication strategies. This dissertation also suggests that 
communication is, in fact, at the very core of all strategic, tactical and 
operational processes and in this sense the very infrastructure of leadership. 
 
Strategic Communication, like many other concepts (such as the Effects 
Based Operations and the Comprehensive Approach) are models that are 
refined, processed and adopted by the international community. Because of 
the current nature of warfare as international cooperation, American 
doctrine, or at least the perception it is based on, tends to live on in the 
military organizations, such as NATO, that are influenced by it. This is also 
the answer to the question I have been asked several times: "Why do you 
only study American communication? Should you not be fair and also 
study what the terrorists say?". The aim of this dissertation is not to point 
fingers specifically at American military doctrine, but to understand its 
purpose and aims: why Strategic Communication has emerged, what are 
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 the reasons to its current attributes, and how is it justified and rationalized 
as a form of social practice by its users and developers. Due to the 
proliferation of the doctrines and concepts of U.S. origin, moral stances 
must be discussed amidst the phenomena. This, I believe, does not 
necessarily require a discussion on how the 'enemy' communicates and 
represents the world. The analysis of American Strategic Communication is 
an analysis of the Self in the politically motivated discourses and the 
consequent narratives that are here understood as verbalized hegemony and 
social practice. 
 
1.1 Orientation of research: Strategic Communication as an object of 
study 
 
The key to every man is his thought. Sturdy and defying though 
he look, he has a helm which he obeys, which is the idea after 
which all his facts are classified. He can only be reformed by 
showing him a new idea which commands his own. - Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, Circles 
 
In this dissertation I argue that Strategic Communication, meaning the 
current U.S. military communication doctrine, mirrors the American 
ideology of enlightened values that are perceived and represented as 
ecumenical and transnational. I will argue that this ideology is woven into 
the grammar and practices of communication in the military-political 
discourses. Also, I will argue that despite recognizing the modern demands 
for communication, it fails to be much more than a propaganda model. This 
dissertation addresses the essential practical and philosophical principles 
and paradoxes of Strategic Communication by discussing the themes of 
how communication is understood as a medium of power, and what kind of 
an understanding of the Self it is based on. This discussion is contrasted 
with the Western Enlightenment narrative and the practices of negotiating 
social Otherness. The window to this interpretation is discourse practices. 
 
The focus is on the U.S. doctrine of Strategic Communication. As such, 
this dissertation contributes to the study of communication and influence at 
the Finnish National Defence University. The research and analysis of 
military communication typically approaches the concept of 
communication from the perspective of organization and management. This 
perspective is not ignored in this dissertation either, but the main focus is 
on the representation Strategic Communication delivers: the contents of 
communication rather than the form of it. Communication as a form of 
management is understood as an element that influences the contents of 
Strategic Communication and reflects a certain power position. 
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 Before this study, the contributions to the study of communication at the 
Finnish National Defence University have included research and analysis 
of psychological operations, information operation, perception 
management and now that the term has emerged from the traditions of the 
previous, Strategic Communication. In terms of doctrine, these have all had 
their own forms and functions in practice, but essentially we are talking 
about the evolution of military communication. On the other hand, 21st 
century Strategic Communication draws from the world of public relations 
and media studies, which adds even more complexity in selecting an 
applicable approach to analyzing its true essence. In past research 
conducted at the Finnish National Defence University, communication has 
been discussed in the context of postmodern philosophy and as narratives 
observed and analyzed hermeneutically and phenomenologically (Huhtinen 
& Rantapelkonen, 2002; Rantapelkonen, 2006), and as a paradigm of 
operational art (Sirén, Huhtinen & Toivettula, 2011). Another approach has 
been the study of (strategic) communication as an organization process. 
 
Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen (2002: 109) conclude that "[i]nformation 
warfare is image warfare", where all participating actors must be able to 
create an image and use it as a weapon. This essentially summarizes the 
principle of Strategic Communication. In Sirén, Huhtinen & Toivettula 
(2011) and Sirén (2013), Strategic Communication as a non-kinetic 
capability, the importance of which is equally, if not more, important than 
that of kinetic capabilities in warfare. This is a view that the Pentagon 
shares: Strategic Communication, as a critical capability that should be of 
specific emphasis, has been ordered to be integrated into all operations 
processes (US Joint Forces Command, 2010). These views make Strategic 
Communication not only the essential infrastructure of warfare, but the 
cognitive structure of military planning. This links it to leadership. The 
relationship between leadership and Strategic Communication could thus 
be characterized as instrumental from the perspective of strategy and 
tactics, but in this dissertation the relationship is also understood as 
interdependence. Strategic Communication is more than a tool in the chain 
of command and control: it is a reflection of the intertwined social, 
cognitive and discursive-semiotic characteristics and motivations of the 
organization that produces it. This "triangle" will be further addressed in 
the Methods Chapter, but what is worth emphasizing already at this point is 
the role of cognition. Cognition is what theoretically bridges language and 
practice.  Fundamentally, this dissertation is a study of naming and labeling 
- a simplifying and yet enlightening outlook to Strategic Communication. 
Here, Strategic Communication is approached poststructurally as linguistic 
structure, where 'things' and phenomena are given meaning and thereby a 
certain identity. As argued by Hansen (2006: 18), language is both social 
and political: social, as it is a collection of social codes and conventions, 
and political as it can be seen as a system and site for producing and 
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 reproducing certain identities and subjectivities. This means that what 
makes language social and political is the fact that it is always a naming 
and categorization process. As stated by Lakoff (1990: 5), 
 
Categorization is not a matter to be taken lightly. There is 
nothing more basic than categorization to our thought, 
perception, action, and speech. Every time we see something as a 
kind of thing, for example, a tree, we are categorizing. 
 
This is to say that naming and labeling is an innate need in order to make 
sense of the world. This is why it is a dangerous phenomenon to 
manipulate and exploit. It is also the reason why functional language theory 
is the method for analyzing the mechanics of language in this dissertation: 
it locates language "as one among a wider class of systems called 
"semiotic" systems - systems of meaning." (Halliday, 2009a: 60). 
 
This dissertation aims to initiate an approach to studying communication in 
the field of military science by engaging in a critical analysis of multimodal 
representations. The empirical data in this research varies from text and 
(transcribed) speech about the practices of warfare to images of violence. 
These multimodal artifacts are a selection, however limited, of the contents 
of Strategic Communication. They aim to demonstrate what kinds of forms 
Strategic Communication may take, how it manifests differently in 
different contexts, and what kind of meanings it conveys to the audience. 
Because of its name-giving and meaning-negotiating capability, language is 
also a form of violence. Indeed, the concepts of violence and language are 
discussed as interdependent phenomena in the chapters that follow. 
 
When I was preparing to write this dissertation, I was reading Howard 
Zinn's A People's History of the United States. His take on history-writing 
is that of critical observation.  
 
My viewpoint, in telling the history of the United States, is 
different: that we must not accept the memory of states as our 
own. Nations are not communities and never have been. The 
history of any country, presented as the history of a family, 
conceals fierce conflicts of interest (sometimes exploding, most 
often repressed) between conquerors and the conquered, masters 
and slaves, capitalists and workers, dominators and dominated 
in race and sex. And in such a world of conflict, a world of 
victims and executioners, it is the job of thinking people, as 
Albert Camus suggested, not to be on the side of the 
executioners. (Zinn, 2005). 
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 Needless to say, the approach of this dissertation is critical. Strategic 
Communication is an instrument of power, and it should be analyzed as 
such. This ties the approach to the context of critical discourse studies 
(CDS). According to Teun A. van Dijk (2009), the starting point to this 
type of analysis boils down to recognizing power and dominance: 
 
CDS scholars are typically interested in the way discourse 
(re)produces social domination, that is, the power abuse of one 
group over others, and how dominated groups may discursively 
resist such abuse. 
 
CDS is not just any social or political research, as is the case in 
all the social and political sciences, but is premised on the fact 
that some forms of text and talk may be unjust. One of the tasks 
of CDS is to formulate the norms that define such `discursive 
injustice'. CDS aims to expose and help to combat such injustice. 
It is problem-oriented rather than discipline- or theory-oriented. 
Such a research policy presupposes an ethical assessment, 
implying that discourse as social interaction may be illegitimate 
according to some fundamental norms, for instance those of 
international human and social rights. At the same time, critical 
analysis should be aware of the fact that such norms and rights 
change historically, and that some definitions of `international' 
may well mean `Western'. 
 
Fairclough (1992: 73) presents discourse as a three-dimensional model. 
Social practice is the framework within which he locates discursive 
practice (the production, distribution and consumption of discourses), 
which contains the element of text. This model relates discursive practices 
to social order. Here, discursive practices are understood as a verbal 
manifestation of social practice, meaning that by observing discursive 
practices through text, we can also analyze social practice. In this research 
this means that I will address both discourses and social practice and 
attempt to understand their dialogicality. 
 
But American Strategic Communication is more than domestic policy or 
national reflection of social order. With the global war on terrorism, the 
audience has become increasingly diffused. Strategic Communication 
reaches the Helmand locals as well as the population of Finland - obviously 
in different forms and intensities, but the "core values" and the "key 
message" remain the same. A communication effort of this scale is not 
merely a national phenomenon, but a global effort that engages 
communities, societies and organizations into forming an opinion of what 
is being communicated. This calls for a critical approach to analyzing the 
language of such exercise of power - Critical Discourse Analysis. As 
6 
 argued by Sirén, Huhtinen & Toivettula (2011), communication is a 
capability - a weapon. A weapon is an instrument of violence, even if it is 
non-kinetic. The non-kinetic capability of information as a weapon is based 
on its meaning-making and naming capability. Derrida (1997: 107-108) 
illustrates this with the concept of "the battle of the proper names" in his 
discussion on Levi-Strauss's "Writing Lesson": 
 
The entire "Writing Lesson" is recounted in the tones of violence 
repressed or deferred, a violence sometimes veiled, but always 
oppressive and heavy. Its weight is felt in various places and 
various moments of the narrative: in Levi-Strauss's account as in 
the relationships of among individuals and among groups, 
cultures or within the same community. What can a relationship 
to writing signify in these diverse instances of violence?  
 
According to Derrida (1997: 112), the first violence is to give a name: 
"such is the originary violence of language which consists in inscribing 
within a difference, in classifying, in suspending the vocative absolute." 
The violence of language is in its social and political dimension. Also Carl 
Schmitt considers the relationship of language and violence in the 
processes of naming and meaning-making: 
 
With regard to these decisive political concepts, it depends on 
who interprets, defines and uses them; who concretely decides 
what peace is, what disarmament, what intervention, what public 
order and security are. One of the most important manifestations 
of humanity's legal and spiritual life is the fact that whoever has 
true power is able to determine the content of concepts and 
words. (Schmitt quoted in Mouffe, 2005). 
 
It is also evident that as a multidisciplinary study, this dissertation cannot 
address certain themes in full depth. This is the case, for instance, with the 
discussion of the Enlightenment. Strategic Communication and 
Enlightenment rhetorics, as argued in Chapter 2, are both political projects 
that have much in common. Therefore, the Enlightenment is discussed 
from the perspective of what significance it has in the tradition of political 
narration. It is important to highlight the division this discussion makes 
between the Enlightenment as a multifaceted philosophy and the 
Enlightenment as social practice. As the focus of this research is on 
language, the discussion of the Enlightenment is limited to the themes of 
the Enlightenment narratives and their ideological practices. This is also 
consistent with the chosen analytical framework, CDA, which, as laid out 
in the methods chapter, requires the analyst to approach hegemonic actors 
from the outside. Also, it keeps the scope of the analysis on the narratives. 
This methodological choice obviously narrows down the general discussion 
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 of the Enlightenment as a philosophy to what is significant about it in the 
interpretation of Strategic Communication as modern political narration. 
This is what should be understood as the theoretical focus and the 
contribution to the field of Military Science: the conceptualization and 
theoretical analysis of a specific narrative and its elements.  
 
This is to argue that Strategic Communication should be observed from the 
critical perspective. However, one may ask what the link between Critical 
Discourse Analysis and the study of leadership in the field of Military 
Science is. This link is established next. 
 
1.2 The Linguistic Turn 
 
As laid out in the previous sections, the theoretical and especially the 
methodological choices and perspectives in this dissertation are 
fundamentally founded on linguistics and communication theory. One may 
question the link between linguistics as a method and leadership as the field 
this dissertation claims to contribute to: is this study linguistics or 
leadership research? The answer to this question can be found in the past 
decade of organization research. In Military Science, the study of 
leadership is essentially the study of organization and organizing. In 
organization studies the increasing trend has been to study organizations as 
discursive constructions. Like social sciences in general, organization 
research has been transformed by the 'linguistic' or 'discursive turn', which 
made discourses and narratives the object of analysis and interpretation in 
the organizational setting (see Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Cooren, 2004; 
Vaara, 2010). As Taylor & Robichaud (2004) argue, conversation and text 
are sites of language-organization: conversation is "the site where 
organizing occurs and where agency and text are generated", whereas text 
"reflects the sensemaking practices and habits of interpretation". According 
to Grand & Marshak (2011), discourse and organization dynamics are 
mutually implicated: "discourses are both integral to and constructive of 
organizational dynamics and change." Further, they argue that studying 
discourses in organizations are used to negotiate meaning among 
organization stakeholders of different views and interests. This negotiation 
of meaning leads to the emergence of dominant meanings that becomes 
accepted and privileged discourses (Grand & Marshak, 2011). 
Organizations are thus discursive constructions, because meanings are 
negotiated through language and discourse. Therefore also leadership can 
be studied discursively. Leadership is essentially meaning-making, which 
is well demonstrated by the doctrinal concept of Strategic Communication: 
it specifically points out its aims in sharing meaning (see Department of 
Defense, 2009). Discourse analysis has become standard methodology in 
organization studies, which is a natural development due to the 
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 multidisciplinary nature of Critical Discourse Analysis (discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3). This dissertation thus proposes a linguistic turn in 
Military Science as well. This turn is a realization of the constructive, inter-
subjective paradigm and a response to the need for multidisciplinary 
methodology to serve the diverse field of Military Science.  
 
This dissertation treats Strategic Communication as an ideology (or an 
ideological narrative) that is ultimately a cultural product. It will be argued 
that narrative leadership is an integral part of American political discourse 
and a fundamental component in the building of a nation. As Chapter 2 
concludes, Enlightenment rhetoric served the same function in its day as 
Strategic Communication today. Also Jari Rantapelkonen's (2006) work on 
George W. Bush's narrative leadership during the 'global war on terror' 
indicates that when unity is needed, narratives emerge. However, the basic 
argument in this dissertation is that it is the concept of instrumental warfare 
that is given its definition in the context of morality that has created the 
renaissance of the Enlightenment rhetoric. 
 
Throughout this dissertation, the term 'narrative' is often used side by side 
with the term 'discourse'. Discourse is understood here as speech or text or 
even image beyond the level of a sentence (Mesthrie, Swann, Deumert & 
Leap, 2000: 323) that in itself is a "set of relations" that includes the 
relations of communication of people who communicate with each other 
(Fairclough, 2010: 3): 
 
[W]e cannot answer the question 'what is discourse' except in 
terms of both its 'internal' relations and its 'external' relations 
with other such 'objects'. Discourse is not an entity we can define 
independently: we can only arrive at an understanding of it by 
analysing sets of relations. Having said that, we can say what it 
is in particular that discourse brings into the complex relations 
which constitute social life: meaning, and making meaning. 
 
This is obviously a very broad definition, but as stated, it allows the 
analysis of social reality. Narratives, instead, consist of selected discourses. 
Narratology uses the terms happening, story and narrative to describe the 
structure of the narrative model. Stories contain a selection of happenings, 
and the narrative in turn is the composition of linearized and reorganized 
segments of the stories (Schmid, 2010:  190-191). In this research 
narratives are seen as compilations of selected discourses, and it is 
precisely the selection that is the domain of power. Narratives are 
ideological, because they are never objective or unbiased accounts of 
reality. This is specifically the operational context of Critical Discourse 
Analysis, discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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 The question is whether narratives (understood here as concatenations of 
discourses) can be treated as descriptions of identity, norms and values. 
This is the question that brings us to the debate on the so-called linguistic 
turn. In social sciences, the increased focus on language and its use in 
research, namely the analysis of the subjects from textual and linguistic 
perspectives as "discursively constructed ensembles of texts", is known as 
the linguistic turn (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000). In contrast, the 'old 
paradigm' would treat the cognitions and emotions of individuals as a 
source for studying the patterns of engaging in social interactions (Harré, 
2001: 688). The methodology that defined the old paradigm was based on 
laboratory settings, where the individual was subjected to sets of 
independent variables that could be measured and categorized (Harré, 
2001). The linguistic turn thus means not only the shift from laboratories to 
the social contexts, but the necessity to understand the complexity of social 
interaction and address this complexity methodologically. Obviously the 
linguistic turn parallels with the methodological crises in the fields of 
psychology and communication, which is a theme addressed in the 
empirical part of this study, namely the article Strategic Communication: 
Functions, characteristics and criticism. The linguistic turn is part of the 
overall shift from analyzing reactions to variables (i.e. effects) to 
considering the individual's behavior as an outcome of a vast array of 
factors that cannot be observed in isolation. In communication studies this 
meant that the focus turned from facts to interpretation.  
 
As stated in the article on Strategic Communication and its principles, one 
of the paradoxes addressed in this dissertation is the legacy of the classical 
effects research in Strategic Communication. Because of the prevalent 
focus on effects in many theories and paradigms within military science 
(such as Effects Based Operations, the Compehensive Approach as well as 
Strategic Communication), the approach of this dissertation is to attempt to 
explain the problems recognized in Strategic Communication by comparing 
and contrasting it to other traditions of communication research and 
development. This means that effects-centricness is addressed from the 
perspective of communication theory. As demonstrated by the 
methodological and paradigmatic changes in social sciences since the 
1960s, many of the theoretical and practical problems of classical effects 
research can be generalized in the context of military science. According to 
Pietilä (2005: 127), the shift from classical effects research to the uses-and-
gratifications approach can be summarized by the statement "where the 
former studies what the media do to people, the latter explores what people 
do to media." Many of the so-called paradoxes addressed here have to do 
with this realization. Communication is the domain of meaning-making 
rather than that of conditioning the audience to react in a desired way.  
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 It is not a coincidence that the methodology used here to acknowledge the 
problemacy of communication research is functionalism. I originally 
applied functional language theory in my Master's thesis under the 
instruction of Professor Eija Ventola in 2006-2007. During those two years 
I went through hundreds of transcripts of the U.S. Department of Defense, 
looking for texts that would contain descriptions of the Self as well as the 
enemy. During those two years of working with the analysis and its 
interpretation, I understood what a theoretical challenge Halliday's 
functional language theory was for me. However, even if I noticed it was 
complex and my progress with understanding it was slow, I knew that as a 
theoretical framework it was highly applicable. This is exactly what 
Halliday (2009a: 61) himself has written:    
 
[Systemic Functional Linguistics] tends to neutralize the 
boundary between (theoretical) linguistics and applied 
linguistics. It has been called an "applicable" theory, and its 
evolution has tended to be driven by the ongoing experience of its 
use and by its constant extension to new areas of enquiry and 
action. [...] Every context of application brigs with it new 
demands on the theory; and the lessons gained from facing up to 
these demands feed back into the theory and enrich it. 
  You will often hear the complaint that SFL is too 
complicated: it has too much descriptive apparatus. It is 
complicated - because language is complicated, and there is no 
point in pretending that it is simple. The problem is to recognize 
which aspects of the theory are relevant to a given task; and that 
does entail having some acquaintance with the whole. 
 
SFL was thus not selected for this dissertation, but rather, it was the 
dissertation that formed around the method. The point is not to make a 
comprehensive analysis of all linguistic phenomena within Strategic 
Communication, but to conduct applied research within military science in 
its pre-paradigmatic stage.  This dissertation is not the first study that has a 
narrative or a discursive take on research, but it is written to reinforce the 
theoretical range within the science. As stated by Halliday above, it is 
important to recognize which aspects are relevant in a given task of 
analysis: this dissertation starts with the theoretical and practical 
significances of transitivity and agency, but hopefully in the coming years I 
will be able to build on and expand the theoretical foundation this 
dissertation provides. 
 
The functionalist approach views language as cognitive structure that 
bridges the inner experience to the outer world (Halliday, 2004). This is 
also the paradigm of this study: language is a system of representation that 
can be interpreted from several different perspectives, and every 
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 perspective provides a new "truth". This is also my answer to the question 
whether language, as a representation, truthfully represents reality. To 
apply the poststructuralist approach to foreign policy in the context of 
Strategic Communication, the assumption here is that the representations of 
identity, in this case those both of the 'Self' and the 'Other', are linked to 
discursive, political, relational and social conceptualizations of identity: 
"The conceptualization of identity as discursive, political, relational, and 
social implies that foreign policy discourse always articulates a Self and a 
series of Others." (Hansen, 2006: 6). The analysis here will approach these 
conceptualizations of identity through the action and being descriptions of 
the Self and the Other, but the aim is not merely to understand the 
differences of these binaries, but to see how the binaries influence and 
construct the narrative itself, and what the narrative reveals about the 
conceptual dynamics of the society - in this case the American one.  
 
The problem that postructuralism sees with language is that it never means 
what it says (Derrida, 1997). 'Facts' and 'words' do not form a narrative. 
Writers and speakers do, and by arguing for the validity and legitimacy of 
these 'facts' they participate in the process of shaping reality. Language is 
never a neutral medium - not in this dissertation nor in the data used - and 
eventually the analysis of texts and discourses leads to several layers of 
interpretation. This dissertation obviously cannot address all of those 
layers, but it will start by recognizing the experiential dimension, which is 
essentially the dimension of representation, namely human experience, 
relationships and the modeling of knowledge (Halliday & Matthiessen, 
1999; Halliday, 2004; Halliday, 2009b). Language is a medium between 
the subjective self and the outside world, which leaves language little 
chance to be objective. The language-as-mirror logic, despite having a 
certain pragmatic function in our everyday lives (usually a yes means yes 
and a no means no, but only usually), it is problematic in the social context 
(Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000). According to Alvesson & Kärreman 
"efforts to say something definite, to establish how things are, rely on 
shaky foundations and ought to be deconstructed." This idea of 
deconstruction introduced by Derrida (1997) is founded on the principle 
that words do not have set meanings, as demonstrated by the use of 
metaphors and symbols.  
 
According to Alvesson & Kärreman (2000), language has gone from "a 
simple tool for theorizing and measuring to becoming the crucial issue in 
social research." Taking into account the problem of representation and 
interpretation leads to the social semiotic approach to understanding 
language: 
 
A social semiotic theory of truth cannot claim to establish the 
absolute truth or untruth of representations. It can only show 
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 whether a given 'proposition' (visual, verbal or otherwise) is 
represented as true or not. From the point of view of social 
semiotics, truth is a construct of semiosis, and as such the truth 
of a particular social group, arising from the values and beliefs 
of that group. (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006: 154).   
 
Language and society cannot be observed separately, and this is why social 
semiotics understands the grammar in terms of its three metafunctions - 
interpersonal, ideational and textual - which are, according to the approach, 
encoded into language (Halliday 2004, 2009a, 2009b). A clause can be 
understood as a representation, as can action and image. This position on 
language and communication will be further discussed in the Methods 
Chapter. 
 
1.3 Research questions  
 
This study does not claim to be a full, objective description of how 
Strategic Communication and its realizations in the media and elsewhere 
should be understood. Instead, it provides an analysis, which should be 
understood as one possible perspective to understanding, interpreting, and 
maybe experiencing it. However, the aim is not to merely observe and 
understand, but to reach a critical interpretation of Strategic 
Communication as a form of social practice, to recognize its paradoxes and 
to address its defects. This means that the dissertation also has 
emancipatory motivations. It is not merely descriptive, but takes a stand, as 
suggested by its framework of critical theory, on the exercise of social 
power, i.e. the communication and application of hegemonic ideology by 
the U.S. government and military organization. 
 
This dissertation aims to develop a perspective to Strategic Communication 
as a model of discourse without dismissing the reality of warfare, the 
experience of leadership or the actuality of the soldier. Communication 
strategies are not in the hands of the individual fighters, which means that 
the individual soldier remains in the margins of these strategies. What I 
hope is that the discussion sheds light on the problemacy of the 'agency of 
soldiership' in an age when soldiership is going through what I would call 
an identity crisis - or why has it become increasingly difficult to define 
what a soldier is and what a soldier does, let alone to define war? Warfare 
and its reality or motivations are hardly the domain for rational 
interpretations. Rather, this research approaches the question through 
communicative practices and treats communication as symbolic action - 
physical, verbal and visual - that represent the experiential domain. 
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 The research questions indicate that this dissertation treats Strategic 
Communication as ideological language that manifests itself in different 
genres: text (strategy papers and other texts generated by the organization), 
discourse (i.e. press briefings) and visual elements (news, commercials, and 
other multimodal documents). The hypothesis is that there is a Grand 
Narrative that underpins these products of different genres. This Grand 
Narrative may be either overt (politically motivated, a representation of an 
identity that is either accepted or considered appropriate) or covert (tacit, 
suggestive or possibly subconscious).  
 
There are three research questions.  The primary question seeks to address 
the factors that determine the ways in which Strategic Communication is 
manifested in theory on one hand, and in practice on the other:  
 
1) What are the key contents and mechanisms Strategic Communication in 
terms of practice and ideology? 
 
To further specify and narrow down the orientation of the research, this 
question is supplemented with two sub-questions that aim to address the 
processes of communication and narration and the relevance of the contents 
of Strategic Communication as representations of social order: 
 
a) What kind of a perception of communication does Strategic 
Communication enforce? 
 
b) What kind of representations of Agency do the practices of Strategic 
Communication result in? 
 
These questions aim to address both the theoretical (official and managed) 
concept of Strategic Communication as well as the practical (unofficial and 
uncontrollable) realization of the narratives, meanings and ideologies 
within Strategic Communication.   The concepts of theory and practice are 
essential in understanding the inner conflict of Strategic Communication, 
as well as the paradoxes it subsequently projects.  
 
1.4 Structure of the dissertation 
 
Because this dissertation is a contribution to the study of leadership within 
Military Science, discusses Strategic Communication in the context of 
communication and language theory and applies linguistic methodology, it 
is clear that it cannot structurally follow the conventions of any specific 
field of research.  
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 The term narrative is important in this research for two reasons. First, it is 
the object of research. Strategic Communication consists of narratives that 
together form the Grand Narrative addressed in the empirical part of the 
study: the narrative (that consists of discourses) contains descriptions of 
actions and happenings that construct the narrative arch. The second 
significance has to do with the structure of this thesis: it starts as a 
narrative.  This is, essentially, the nature of reporting qualitative research: 
 
There is no question that quantitative researchers also try to 
build stories in their manuscripts, but story is the very essence of 
qualitative research. Quantitative articles generally follow a 
well-defined structure: introduction, literature review, 
hypotheses, methods, results and discussion. Accounts of the data 
are spliced between accounts of theory; data and theory appear 
almost episodic. Qualitative researchers, on the other hand, 
attempt to create narratives through these accounts. (Bansal & 
Corley, 2012). 
 
Bansal & Corley see qualitative research as two narratives, the data and 
theory, which have intertwined.  
 
[The data and theory narratives] create tension through a 
provocative question, build plot through a data narrative, and 
provide an interesting and even provocative explanation and 
conclusion through a theory narrative. [...] The data are needed 
to give the theory context, and the theory is needed to give the 
data meaning. (Bansal & Corley, 2012). 
 
The dissertation begins with a Background Chapter that discusses one 
approach to understanding modern Strategic Communication, namely its 
roots in the Enlightenment rhetoric. This discussion contains the roles of 
the soldier, weapon and discourse as symbols of their time and age. The 
themes of technology and instrumentalism as well as values and ideology 
are introduced into the discussion. This is also the chapter that starts the 
narration of the research. The narration is put aside during the discussion 
on methods, but it will eventually be returned to. The conclusion will wrap 
up the narrative by considering the significance of the data in the light of 
the themes the discussion started with. 
 
Chapter 3 is the Methods Chapter, which starts the empirical part of the 
dissertation. It argues that Strategic Communication is ideological 
discourse and constructs the theoretical and methodological framework for 
analyzing it from the critical perspective. First, it introduces the key 
concepts of Van Dijk's social-cognitive-textual triangle in order to argue 
the relations of the social world, cognition, language and ideology. Then, it 
15 
 connects the social-cognitive-textual triangle to the metafunctions of 
Halliday's systemic language theory in order to specify the methodology. 
 
Chapter 4 is a literary review of some of the debate, discussion and 
criticism of Strategic Communication in the U.S. military community and 
in the field of military research. It outlines the main themes of discussion 
during the 21st century and serves as a platform for the article that follows 
it. After Chapter 4 the case studies follow.  
 
The first article is a follow-up to Chapter 4. Strategic Communication: 
Functions, characteristics and criticism analyzes the U.S. military concept 
of Strategic Communication and how it explains the essence of 
communication and sharing of meaning. By arguing that military 
communication still aspires to classical effects research, this article reveals 
the inner theoretical crisis of military communication, namely that of the 
conflict of the 'old' and 'new' paradigms. The concept of Strategic 
Communication renounces manipulation and refers to communication as 
influence - which leads to the discussion whether military communication 
really can rid itself from unethical practices of persuasion. This article is 
not an empirical, but a theoretical discussion of U.S. communication 
doctrine. It was written after the empirical articles, as it appeared that in 
order to understand the data, it was necessary to approach the actual 
theoretical foundation (and its problems) of U.S. military communication. 
 
The second article The hidden grand narrative of Western military policy: 
A linguistic analysis of American strategic communication was published 
in the Journal of Military Studies (Vol 2, No 1) in 2011. This article 
discusses the role of technology descriptions in Strategic Communication, 
namely the briefing on Effects Based Operations in March 2003. The 
empirical study is conducted with the methodology of transitivity analysis. 
This article covers the aspect of technology as an ideology, which, as will 
be argued, is paramount in the framework of humanitarian, "neo-
Enlightenment" narratives. This article was co-authored by Professor Aki-
Mauri Huhtinen, who contributed insights for the background discussion. 
This article was also the first one to be published, and greatly influenced 
my perspective to Strategic Communication as a narration that contains the 
same ideological glorification of technology that marked the Age of 
Reason.  
 
The third article, Kill, capture.. or what? How operational planning 
changes the language of communicating strategy in war is a case study on 
the term 'neutralize'. When introducing the concept of Effects Based 
Operations, Colonel Crowder (chief of strategy, concepts and doctrine) 
paid specific attention to explaining the meaning of this word. In his 
briefing, neutralizing is presented as an alternative to destroying, which is a 
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 similar attempt to negotiate meaning as the manipulation/persuasion 
negotiation discussed in the first article. This article can also be seen as a 
bridge between the thematics of the Enlightenment, namely those of 
agency, technology and instrumentalism, and their emergence in the very 
language structures of Strategic Communication. 
 
The fourth article, From power to a puddle of blood: Rituals and 
evaluation in the images of capture and death of Saddam Hussein, Osama 
bin Laden and Muammar Gaddafi, published originally in Finnish 
(Kosmopolis, vol 2-3/2012) takes transitivity analysis a step further to 
visual agency. The article on Saddam Hussein's, Osama bin Laden's and 
Muammar Gaddafi's images of capture and death addresses the 
representation of enmity in the visual narratives of both the authorities and 
the public media. This article started to develop during a "Media and 
Rituals" web-course I took at the Department of Communication in the 
University of Helsinki in the spring of 2012. The article is a classic analysis 
of the 'us' vs. 'them' dichotomy, but integrates rituals theory as an extension 
of transitivity to address the representation of agency. I see this article not 
only as a theoretical bridge between linguistics, communication studies as 
well as aspects of sociology, but also as a link to the thematic framework of 
Strategic Communication: the renaissance of the Enlightenment narrative 
that locates violence in the framework of democracy. 
 
These four articles present four different case studies of Strategic 
Communication. They are followed by the Conclusion that discusses and 
reviews the data by taking it back to the framework of Van Dijk's triangle-
approach (introduced in Chapter 3) that is the theoretical starting point of 
the methodology and provides a perspective to the social, cognitive and 
textual dimensions of Strategic Communication. 
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 2  
 
 
 
BACKGROUND: ON THE ORIGINS OF THE NARRATIVE 
 
 
 
 Society never advances. It recedes as fast on one side as it gains on the other. It undergoes continual changes; it is barbarous, it is civilized, it is christianized, it is rich, it is scientific; but this 
change is not amelioration. For every thing that is given, 
something is taken. - Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-reliance 
 
he story starts in the 18th century Paris, the symbol of the social, 
political and intellectual ferment that marked the Age of Reason. 
This age permanently planted the ideas of liberté, égalité, fraternité 
into the collective minds of people. The rights and privileges we have, we 
owe the 18th century martyrs who rose against the might of the elites on 
both sides of the Atlantic. The democracy built on this foundation is what 
led to the concept of human rights, abolition of slavery and the victory of 
democracy.  This is what my school books taught me when I was 15 years 
old.  
T 
  
Throughout this dissertation I will argue for a critical stand toward the 
'official Western narrative of the Enlightenment'. The aim is to explore its 
ideological foundations as well as its implications on the modern 
understanding of who 'we' are. The 'we' here refers to the American Self, 
but because the context of this dissertation is warfare and its 
communication, it is, at times, difficult to draw the line between American 
and simply Western, as modern warfare implies multinational cooperation 
where several nations unite efforts under a single stated aim and objective - 
be it democracy or stability. However, the process of the legitimacy and 
primacy of the Enlightenment narrative, discussed in the following 
sections, is what sets the boundaries of the acceptable in the political 
argumentation of today. The claim here is that with the Enlightenment, the 
West has claimed democracy and made it their image. The narratives of the 
Enlightenment have become our shared history that still guide our practices 
in social policy and political thought.  
 
The Enlightenment values are the signifiers of the overt Grand Narrative of 
Western identity - although the representations and interpretations of those 
may vary. The Grand Narrative approached in this dissertation is Strategic 
19 
 Communication, the official U.S. military communication doctrine defined 
by the 2009 Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept. In this 
research Strategic Communication is treated as the practice of 
communication that defines force and agency: it assigns roles to those who 
speak and those are are spoken of. Also, it specifies the perception of what 
non-kinetic, in this case communicative, influence entails: the context of 
legitimacy, acts of persuasion and the state of agency. 
 
Strategic Communication is thus a window to the modern application of the 
Enlightenment ideology. This chapter presents one approach to 
understanding the communication doctrine: the following sections advance 
as a narrative that comment on the underlying perceptions of identity and 
the Self, warfare, soldiership and the their ties to both the recognized and 
the denied "enlightenment ideals". All this is the background discussion 
that eventually leads to one understanding of Strategic Communication. 
The themes taken up in this chapter are those that I will return to in the end 
of this dissertation.  
 
This chapter attempts to bridge between the past and the present. It brings 
out a number of key themes in the narratives of the Age of Reason and 
links them to the 21st century narratives of Strategic Communication. This 
chapter also defines the perspectives and key concepts for the discussion 
and analysis of this research. As stated in Chapter 1, the orientation of this 
dissertation is critical, and in order to position oneself outside the 
hegemonic, political narratives and evaluate them, one must explore their 
use and contents. The Enlightenment narratives and the narrative identity of 
the United States are reflected on by means of analogies, which help relate 
the similarities and differences of the past and present narratives. 
2.1 Panem et circenses  
 
This ball of liberty, I believe most piously, is now so well in 
motion that it will roll round the globe, at least the enlightened 
part of it, for light & liberty go together.  - Thomas Jefferson 
 
The writing of this dissertation started when the global banking crisis 
begun. In Greece, the homeland of democracy, the problems were perhaps 
the greatest. When the problems were brought to light, the newspapers all 
over the world knew to tell the rest of the world about the Greeks' 
overspending habits and gigantic, corrupted public sector, irresponsible, tax 
evading corporations and general fiscal absurdity. As the case of Greece 
illustrates, democracy does not seem to grant legitimacy or ensure validity 
any more than authoritarian leaders. Greece, Europe's Madame Deficit, 
may be followed by a number of heirs. Time will tell. Monarchy or 
democracy, 18th century or the 21st, history keeps repeating itself. 
20 
  
The Madame Deficit of the 18th century France was guillotined at what is 
now a popular tourist sight, Place de la Concorde. On one side, you have 
the high-end shops of the Champs-Èlysées, on the other side the hotspot of 
high culture, the Louvre. The opposite axis is and has been reserved for 
political functions: the U.S. embassy, Hôtel de Crillon (occupied by the 
Nazis during WWII) and across from them, the National Assembly (the 
commissioner of the Guillotine) and the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. This historic resonance is constructed around the stage of the Reign 
of Terror - a site which, in 2012, is claimed by heavy traffic, an Egyptian 
obelisk that has replaced the guillotine, and young entrepreneurs who, just 
meters away from Marie Antoinette's death place, rent luxury cars: a 
twenty-minute joyride and a chauffeur in a car of your choice (a 
Lamborghini or a Ferrari), all for 89 euros. Revolution did indeed come. 
Democracy grants us all the right to be Madame Deficits now.  
 
But the age of revolution and reason does not resonate with only the fiscal 
crisis of the 2000s. Since the 18th century numerous revolutions have taken 
place. The industrial revolution gave birth to the revolution of 
communication technology and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). 
As the result of the asymmetry brought about by the RMA, the first 
decades of the 2000s witnessed first the death of the Absolute Evil, Saddam 
Hussein, followed by the revolution in Libya that led to the death of 
Muammar Gaddafi. The outcome was broadcast around the world, almost 
real time, as pictures of dying Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi 
were broadcast by mobile phones and social media. This revolution took 
place both in the real world and in the virtual, while the happenings were 
applauded both in Europe and the United States. Gaddafi's death "marks the 
start of a New era", stated Hillary Clinton. "People in Libya today have an 
even greater chance, after this news, of building themselves a strong and 
democratic future," declared David Cameron, announcing his pride on 
Britain's role in the death of the dictator (The Independent, 2011). "For the 
region, today's events prove once more that the rule of an iron fist 
inevitably comes to an end," hailed President Obama (Spetalnick & 
MacInnis, 2011). In the Western media, the lynching of the Absolute Evil 
was presented in the logical frame of the Enlightenment, where revolutions 
lead to progress and democracy brings death to authoritarian rulers. The 
images presented the Libyan uprising as a miniature version of its French 
predecessor - as a bloody and vile reminder of the 'The Terror', which 
finally ended in the victory of the oppressed nation in quest for freedom, 
equality and rights. 
 
Far away from the body bags of Libya, in modern Paris the bones and 
memories of the mass graves of the Revolution have long since been 
removed and brought to the vast darkness of the catacombs, where the 
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 headless martyrs intermingle with the remains of the millions of other 
deceased. Where the mass graves laid now stand apartment buildings, 
restaurants and pâtisseries, so we can forget about the skeletons in our 
closets and focus on being horrified by the brutality of the Other in the 
Middle East and beyond. We maintain the narrative of the victory of the 
Enlightenment, the Western Self and the consequent rights of man, while 
being aware of the bloodshed it caused. At the same time, images of mass 
graves in Syria are published as evidence of human rights violations 
(Hosenball, 2012). The bond between violence and sacred is a pivotal part 
of understanding the enlightened Western being.  
 
 
Image 1: The memorial plague of the Errancis cemetery, the non-final 
resting place of the "1119 people guillotined at Place de la Revolution". 
 
 
Image 2: The site of the Errancis cemetery memorial plague 
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Image 3: "Dream on board, drive me for 89€" at Place de la Concorde. 
 
But, this research is not a lament of the mistakes of the past. Instead, it is a 
description of the two intertwined aspects of Western discourse: the one of 
the virtuous ideology, and the other of legitimized violence. The next three 
sections will continue the discussion of the role of virtue in the Actors of 
warfare: the weapon, the soldier and the nation. These themes are discussed 
in the context of military science - in which they are transformed into the 
agents of Strategic Communication.  
2.2 The weapon - a symbol of social order 
 
A man hardly knows how much he is a machine, until he begins 
to make telegraph, loom, press, and locomotive, in his own 
image. But in these, he is forced to leave out follies and 
hindrances, So that when we go to the mill, the machine is more 
moral than we. Let man dare go to a loom, and see if he be equal 
to it. Let machine confront machine, and see how they come out.  
- Ralph Waldo Emerson, Power 
 
In France, the Revolution brought about new ideas and, consequently, 
demands. The uprising against old authorities, such as monarchy, 
aristocrats and religion, and the introduction of the concepts such as 
equality and citizenship and citizen's rights led to the deaths of tens of 
thousands. The roles had changed, as the great were mocked and the 
criminals were celebrated heroes, writes Foucault (2011). The rights that 
are now considered an irrefutable part of the Western moral landscape, are 
often seen as the result of unavoidable sacrifice and ideological battle. In 
the modern, Western discourse, the Revolution was the violence needed to 
realize the ideals of the Enlightenment. The execution of the Sovereign 
symbolized the dawn of the individual. What was used as the instrument of 
justice and equality, was the guillotine.   
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 In October 1789, only a few months after the declaration of the Rights of 
Man, Dr. Guillotin visited the National Assembly to introduce his ideas on 
the use of guillotine. As recorded by Chambers & Chambers (1844: 219), 
Guillotin proposed that 
 
1. Crimes of the same kind shall be punished by the same kind of 
punishment, whatever be the rank of the criminal.  
2. In all cases (whatever be the crime) of capital punishment, it 
shall be of the same kind - that is, beheading - and it shall be 
executed by means of a machine [l'effet d'un simple 
méchanisme]. 
 
The guillotine was thus, ironically, to execute the Rights of Man, as its 
purpose was to grant equality in the face of death, while the Rights of Man 
granted equality in the face of life. According to the Chambers, the debate 
at the National Assembly led to Dr. Guillotin's famous words, which, 
according to the witnesses, "produced a general laugh": "Avec ma machine, 
je vous fais sauter la téte d'un coup-d'ceil, et vous ne souffrez point!" (With 
my machine, I cut off your head in the twinkling of an eye, and you never 
feel it!) (1844: 219). The revolution revolutionized not only the life, but 
also the death. In an enlightened society, even death should be quick and 
painless.  
 
The study of history has always been interested in the way societies inflict 
death. It is the method of killing that symbolizes the state of the society, 
especially in retrospect. The guillotine ended what used to be a physical 
contest of the executioner (to kill) and the executed (to endure) and soon 
this physical struggle would appear as disturbing and provoking in the eyes 
of the public (Foucault, 2011: 101). Foucault argues that after the 
Revolution, the guillotines would eventually be moved away from public 
places and mechanical killing became the norm. Much like the 18th century 
attitudes towards torture changed, in the 21st century the use of "dumb 
bombs" is criticized, because unlike precision weapons, they kill people 
rather indiscriminately. Legitimate killing requires a certain standard of 
technology.  
 
Instrumentalism has become the norm of humanity. Since the 
Enlightenment, the ideology of progress has meant asymmetry and 
violence against the "Other" (Lawrence, 1999). Technological progress has 
meant that the means of war "were supplemented by the continual 
invention of ever more destructive technologies", making modernity an era 
of "extreme violence" (Lawrence, 1999). This pursuit of technological 
reason is, according to Lawrence, the core feature of modernity and its 
culture. 'Progress' has been one of the key words also in the global war on 
terror.  Rantapelkonen (2006: 291-292) questions the logic of the word by 
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 asking what is the content and perspective this "progress" is measured 
from: When President Bush announced that progress has been made, how 
had this progress realized? The paradox was that progress was the code for 
increased level of destruction caused on life and property, and that 
militarism has in fact "progressed" to areas of life considered civilian 
before (Rantapelkonen, 2006).  
 
It seems that the Enlightenment and its narratives produced two realities: 
the one of asymmetrical, hegemonic practice, and the one of the 
universalist narratives of the Revolution. In Kant's view, revolution is a 
means to end despotism and oppression only, but he doubted that a 
revolution would ever truly reform ways of thinking: new prejudices would 
replace the old ones to control the "unthinking mass" (Kant, 1996). Citizens 
have risen against the authorities time and time again, and will continue to 
do so, whether they were subjects of dictatorship or citizens of liberal 
democracies. Revolutions will always be called for. These revolutions are 
defined by their use of violence, and the weapon of the revolution becomes 
the symbol of the time: the guillotine of France, the precision weapon of 
the RMA, and the mobile phone of the Arab Spring. These weapons are the 
metaphors of their time, and the collective power of the revolution is 
channeled through these instruments of force. The Reign of Terror 
advanced the enlightened world view of reason and progress by cutting off 
heads infested with elitist thought. During the high-tech war against 
terrorism - or for "the universal values of the human spirit", as expressed by 
Tony Blair (BBC, 2003) - democracy and other "universal values" are 
implemented in the form of lethal accuracy that revolutionized the role of 
the soldier, making distance both value and a necessity. During the Arab 
Spring and the capture of Muammar Gaddafi, two revolutions merged - 
RMA, in the form of Western weapons technology, put the dictator on the 
move, and the revolution of communication technology broadcasted the 
rise of the collective will of the oppressed and the death of the dictator, 
making mobile phones an information weapon. 
 
In his discussion on scientific thought and technology, Max Horkheimer 
(2013) suggests that what is crucial in the development of instrumental 
reason that dominates Western culture and its discourses of power is the 
positivist philosophy of science. Horkheimer's criticism, originally written 
in 1947, describes the ethical paradox of warfare and technology as 
accurately now as it did after the Holocaust: 
 
According to the positivists, what we need is abundant 
confidence in science. Of course they are not blind to the 
destructive uses to which science is put; but they claim that such 
uses of science are perverted. Is this really so? The objective 
progress of science and its application, technology, do not justify 
25 
 the current idea that science is destructive only when perverted 
and necessarily constructive when adequately understood. 
(Horkheimer, 2013: 41). 
 
The positivist argument of the "right" kind of application of science and 
technology is central in the instrumental rhetorics of 21st century warfare. 
Concepts such as unintended damage or humanitarian warfare demonstrate 
that as the product of enlightened culture, technology is on the side of 
morality. Technology is good and pure by default. The context of Western 
weapons technology is therefore natural for the moral evaluation of 
technological progress. This brings technocracy to the core of not only 
morality, but the practices of social order: 
 
Positivist philosophy, which regards the tool 'science' as the 
automatic champion of progress, is as fallacious as other 
glorifications of technology. Economic technocracy expects 
everything from the emancipation of the material means of 
production. Plato wanted to make philosophers the masters; the 
technocrats want to make engineers the board of directors of 
society. Positivism is philosophical technocracy. It specifies as 
the prerequisite for membership in the councils of society an 
exclusive faith in mathematics. Plato, a eulogist of mathematics, 
conceived of rulers as administrative experts, engineers of the 
abstract. Similarly, the positivists consider engineers to be 
philosophers of the concrete, since they apply science, of which 
philosophy - in so far as it is tolerated at all - is merely a 
derivate. Despite all their differences, both Plato and the 
positivists think that the way to save humanity is to subject it to 
rules and methods of scientific reasoning. The positivists, 
however, adapt philosophy to science, i.e., to the requirements of 
practice instead of adapting practice to philosophy. For them 
thought, in the very act of functioning as ancilla administrationis, 
becomes the rector mundi. (Horkheimer, 2013: 42). 
 
It can now be asked whether it is the requirements of philosophy that the 
development of the technologies of warfare adapt to, or is it the 
requirements of practice that dictate the direction of technological progress.  
 
The symbolic role of technology considered, technology is a self-evident 
theme in the military discourses of today. On the first day of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Colonel Gary L. Crowder, chief of strategy, concepts 
and doctrine, introduced the new doctrine, Effects Based Operations, to the 
media: 
 
But the point here is, is that we don't have to attack everything, 
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 nor do you have to destroy everything. If we understood what the 
effect we desired on the battlefield, we could then figure out ways 
of creating that effect more efficiently, more effectively, striking 
less targets, using less weapons and, quite frankly, mitigating or 
easing potential concerns for collateral damage and civilian 
casualties. (Department of Defense, 2003a). 
The new, humanitarian 'grammar of violence' determines the discourses of 
military policy. As demonstrated by the above citation, the emphasis is not 
on the destructive force of the weapon, but on its selectivity. For example, 
the ability to be selective was one of the arguments used to legitimize the 
war in Iraq: press briefings discussed only the use of precision weapons 
(Department of Defense 2003a; 2003b; 2003c). Technology is now beyond 
its role as a tool, as today we are willing to give technology an agency of 
its own. The moral of technology appeals to the 18th century sentiment. 
Today, much of this attitude remains, or even becomes enforced: 
technological failures are easier to accept than human error. Technological 
failure is accepted, because it is something that is beyond our control and 
therefore beyond ethical judgment: 
 
A bomb comes off an airplane, and there are a number of both 
electrical and mechanical things (that) have to happen in order 
for that bomb to go where it is designed. And you could have a 
power failure on a guidance unit, you could have a fin lock up, 
and that bomb will go somewhere we know not. And so it's 
important to understand that collateral damage can occur not 
because you struck the wrong target, but because a bomb just flat 
didn't go. And that's -- that is not uncommon in 8 to 10 percent of 
the time. (Department of Defense, 2003d). 
This is something Paul Virilio might address as an "artificial accident"; a 
possible, or even probable outcome of innovations and technology. The 
issue, according to Virilio, is not the failure of the innovation, but how 
these innovations are used. "The issue is the building of an 'unsinkable' 
ocean liner or the setting up of an atomic station close to residential zones" 
(Virilio, 2008: 9, 15). Much the same way precision weapons are used in 
densely built urban areas. Accidents become probable, and eventually they 
become expected, accepted, and normalized into our everyday discourse. 
The acceptance of accidents becomes part of the instrumentalist approach 
to warfare. "Amidst all the enthusiasm for techno-solutions, no-one seemed 
to be looking at the endpoint of the trajectory: a battlefield in which 
networks, systems, robots, and smart weapons target each other, all damage 
measured in flesh and blood becomes "collateral"", writes Der Derian 
(2009). 
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 The argument of 'unavoidable accident' started to appear in the Pentagon 
press briefings when the semantic transition from warfare to humanitarian 
operations took place. Collateral damage has been one of the major public 
relations issues during the use of the effects-centric doctrines, carefully 
addressed by the experts of doctrine in press briefings. In the Effects Based 
Operations Briefing, the concept of collateral damage was contrasted to 
unintended damage, an accident that results from a mistake. Collateral 
damage, instead, is expected (see Department of Defense, 2003d).  With 
the term, the idea of unavoidable accidents is naturalized in the discourse of 
military planning otherwise characterized by confidence in the performance 
and capability of technology. 
 
These narratives of weapons technologies (further addressed in the 
empirical part of this dissertation) suggest that in the Western philosophy 
of warfare, the logic in the use of technology is that it guarantees an 
impartial and just treatment with little chance for error. Techno-faith 
resonates with the culture we know as the Enlightenment: "[T]he machine 
is more moral than we" (Emerson, 2006). Hence, in the American Grand 
Narrative of warfare the narratives of moral and technology are 
intertwined. Technology is not only employed to execute the acts that seem 
inhumane and therefore difficult to do in person, but to shelter our lifestyle. 
Technological solutions have alienated us from certain forms of sacrifice, 
the attribute traditionally associated with war and warriorship, redundant.   
The attitude towards technology is thus ambivalent. On one hand, it is the 
essence of virtue that serves the function of "enabling" the mankind. On 
the other hand, our attitudes have taken technology well beyond enabling, 
giving it agency of its own. In a sense, technology has turned into a vehicle 
and made people passengers: we no longer expect to be able to be in total 
control of our environment, but accept the fact that technological failures 
are unavoidable and the damages are the price to pay for the lifestyle we 
lead. This attitude is highly ideological and as such, exclusive. If we 
consider the social layout of this design in the context of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, it is evident that risk has been outsourced to those who have 
no other choice, who have no say in setting the standards of acceptable 
risks, and who eventually suffer the consequences of the risk. In the 
Western concept of asymmetry, risk rarely threatens the risk taker. In the 
adversary's doctrine, there is no risk, only decisions to sacrifice. This may 
well be the most significant factor in the power-balances of warfare: what 
kind of asymmetric sacrifice is more effective - that of the Self or the 
Other? 
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 2.3 The soldier - a moral agent? 
 
The characteristic of genuine heroism, is its persistency. All men 
have wandering impulses, fits and starts of generosity. But when 
you have resolved to be great, abide by yourself, and do not 
weakly try to reconcile yourself with the world. The heroic cannot 
be the common, nor the common the heroic. - Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, Heroism 
 
Self-incurred immaturity, addressed by Kant as the state that the public 
needs to overcome in the process of enlightening themselves, is tied to the 
alluring comfort that being patronized allows. Kant's thesis is that in order 
to enlighten themselves and reach maturity, the public should be given the 
right to practice public use of reason in all circumstances, even if it may 
conflict with the existing norms. The element of publicity is paramount in 
the questioning of dogmas and formulas which Kant considers as "the ball 
and chain of his permanent immaturity". Publicity empowers 
enlightenment and spreads understanding, a process that the sovereign, 
despite the risk of criticism, should accept. Therefore, Kant's demand that 
people "freely and publicly submit to the judgment of the world their 
verdicts and opinions, even if these deviate here and there from orthodox 
doctrine" was a courageous, if not revolutionary sentiment in his time. 
Demanding that all people from clergy to soldier practice their right to 
public reasoning made it clear that what was expected of them was a new 
kind of public courage. People were expected to emerge as individuals 
from the tradition of the collective. Emerson echoes this encouragement: 
"Heroism works in contradiction to the voice of mankind and in 
contradiction, for a time, to the voice of the great and good" (2007a). The 
Enlightenment philosophy obligated people to intellectual independence.  
"Self-trust is the essence of heroism" (Emerson, 2007a).  
 
The empowerment of the individual left its mark on soldiership too. 
Soldiers became moral agents, concerned with not only the consequences 
of their actions, but "with the acting selves that the action expressed" 
(Coker, 2002: 51). With the emergence of human agency as well as 
individuality and morale, victory was no longer dependent on God's will, 
but result of determination and human ingenuity.  In addition, it was 
recognized that soldiers who were ideologically engaged in the fight would 
fight harder (Coker, 2005: 48-49). Agency became an inseparable feature of 
what was considered proper soldiership: soldiers' actions became symbolic 
of their morals and motivation.  
 
But let us return to the concepts of heroism and courage. In warrior's 
reality, courage has traditionally been understood as the will to embrace 
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 sacrifice. Sacrifice is not seen as the denial of the individual self in 
preference for conformity. Instead, sacrifice is the extension of the Self, a 
means to break away from covenance and effectuate personal choice as a 
professional (Coker, 2007:93).  No soldier could be forced, demanded or 
legislated to be heroic, but, according to Coker, heroism is the result of the 
soldier being esteemed by himself and his fellows, and the will to give 
more than asked (2007: 94). This outlook means that the level of heroism 
depends on the character of the soldier, his moral and self-trust. A soldier 
could be heroic impulsively, according to his capability. Soldiership is 
contractual, but a heroism cannot be dictated from the outside (Coker, 
2007: 94).  
 
However, in Emerson's (2007a) understanding of heroism the essential 
element is not only the retaining of self-trust and balance, but the contempt 
of comfort. The "rudest form" of heroism "is the contempt for safety and 
ease, which makes the attractiveness of war." This is where the 
contradiction between then and now starts: safety and ease are the guiding 
principles of modern military policy.  
 
There is not much left of the Emersonian ideal of heroism in the modern 
trends of engagement in the battle. Modern weapons technology gives 
alternatives to self-sacrifice and hence makes courage redundant. The 
practices of force protection are in the way of actual operations. If 
Emersonian heroism meant the acceptance of risk, what is the essence of 
heroes when they are armored, locked away in base camps, and reluctant to 
operate without helicopters hovering above to provide security? (see 
Coker, 2002: 64-65). Risk aversion has become the norm: in Kosovo, 
sorties were flown at 15 000 feet to avoid being shot down, despite the 
errors in targeting and the advantage that the consequent imprecision gave 
the enemy (Coker, 2001, 58). This is what Coker calls "redundancy of 
courage". Virilio (2002:43) remarks: 
 
Unprecedentedly, during the Kosovo conflict, the two officially 
declared enemies were never to meet physically anywhere, thus 
marking the disappearance of a real battlefield of a kind which 
still existed, in a latent state, during the Falklands/Malvinas and 
Gulf conflicts. 
 
The distance between the soldier and his adversary has grown, and the 
asymmetry of warfare demands less and less physical sacrifice from the 
Western soldier. The purpose of technological progress is to take the 
soldier out of the actual battle field. This trend is often demonstrated in the 
images and videos released by the Pentagon, where distance is presented as 
something synonymous to safety. Yet, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 
courage and morale of U.S. soldiers was repeatedly highlighted in the 
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 media. "Courageous men and women in uniform", perform difficult tasks 
courageously, tirelessly and successfully and attack the enemy "with 
incredible courage and skill and dedication" (Department of Defense, 
2003e-g). Without questioning the psychological strains and the individual 
commitment of the soldier, this illustrates the strategic importance of the 
modern soldier's moral Agency, without which humanitarian battles would 
prove impossible to fight. However, the modern soldier can be courageous 
with a much smaller risk of having to eventually self-sacrifice. In this 
agency, the commitment to hypothetical sacrifice, i.e. joining the ranks 
voluntarily, is accepted as a sign of virtuousness and courage. "Indeed, the 
modern hero is the soldier whose ingenuity, toughness, competitiveness 
and efficiency help him survive. In surviving he becomes a hero." (Coker, 
2001, 34). Paradoxically, the soldier's sacrifice is not the body, but often 
the mind, as demonstrated by the statistics of soldiers impaired by post-
traumatic stress disorder, which, according to studies, is linked to violent 
behavior, work disability and depression, among other things (Pearrow & 
Cosgrove, 2006).  
 
Despite the instrumental nature of the modern wars, warfare may reveal its 
expressive dimension to the soldier involved in its actual reality. One of the 
complex questions of the wars of the 21st century is that expressive 
violence is getting increasingly difficult to justify, which eventually 
culminates in the criticism of the soldier and the military organization they 
represent. When wars are systematically represented as instrumental, 
sterile and calculated operations that rid the world of evils such as 
terrorism and tyranny, the public image of the operation becomes sensitive 
to the representations of reality of warfare as experienced by those who 
witness it. When images such as those of the Abu Ghraib scandal reach the 
media, the soldiers   become highly expressive agents. In order to control 
the public image of the organization, the military must make sure the 
actions and behavior of its representatives remain synchronized in 
signaling instrumental distance on one hand, and virtuous ideals on the 
other. It is no coincidence that weapons technology aims to increase the 
soldiers' distance to their enemies, and now even to the actual battlefield. 
Technology, human worth and the Western tradition of instrumental 
violence make up the "grammar of killing" we witness today (Coker, 2007: 
70). In a sense, moral agency has shifted from the soldiers to the 
technology they use. Technology is claiming agency on social production, 
as the distinction between the organic and the machine has collapsed 
(Coker, 2002: 191).  
 
Most importantly, machines have not only changed the way soldiers see 
and experience the war, but the way they experience themselves. 
Paradoxically, without technology their humanity would be impossible to 
realize. Without technology, they would have to regress back to those 
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 warriors who physically face their enemies and inflict violence without the 
comfort of distance. The horror and brutality of physical combat is now 
pictured in war movie scenes where the soldiers are ordered to attach the 
bayonets to their rifles. In cinema, this symbolizes not only the gravity of 
the situation and imminent death, but awakens the audience to the terror of 
the reality of battle. Whether war or crime, death inflicted with a knife is 
always considered brutal beyond the boundaries of humanity, whereas 
gunshots from a distance render comfortable, impersonal passivity. The 
same applies to precision warfare, where distance denotes certain 
indifference. Missiles kill groups of anonymous enemy soldiers and 
sometimes women and children, whose deaths are indifferently referred to 
as "undesired effects" in the Pentagon Press briefings. Personal encounters 
are reserved for the special, symbolic enemies, the most evil of the evil. 
Saddam Hussein and bin Laden were prime examples of icons wicked 
enough to be punished personally. They were encountered face to face, and 
for those brief moments, instrumentalism gave way to expressive violence. 
 
The faith in Reason, Science and Progress, the intrinsic values of the 
Enlightenment, changed the Western world view for good and paved way 
for the next revolution, the Industrial Age. Emerson illustrates the 
sentiment of the time by contrasting the difference between machines and 
the human agency. He sees technology as an improved version of 
humanity: technology is without follies and constraints of humanity 
(Emerson, 2006). Technology does not discriminate or let emotions get in 
its way. Guillotines were replaced by electric chairs and lethal injections, 
rifles with machine guns, tanks, and finally laser guided precision 
weapons. In the attempt to outperform the previous in efficiency also 
instrumentalism increased. The question is whether this has made warfare 
more humanitarian.  
 
2.4 The nation and its narrative 
 
A technological rationale is the rationale of domination itself. It 
is the coercive nature of society alienated from itself. 
Automobiles, bombs, and movies keep the whole thing together 
until their leveling element shows its strength in the very wrong 
which it furthered. (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979: 121). 
 
The first days of the war in Iraq are remembered as the days of the Shock 
and Awe.  
First is, to go back in shock and awe as a concept, the idea is 
very precise, and some people I think misinterpreted shock and 
awe for a wave of fire and huge destruction. In fact, in an effects-
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 based campaign, as this was, we can achieve much shock and 
awe by hitting just critical points. In fact, a perfect shock and 
awe would hit as few as possible to create those effects. 
(Department of Defense, 2003b). 
In the spirit of virtuous war, the above description of strategy and doctrine 
is presented from the perspective of morality. Kinetic doctrine is 
characterized as an effort to limit destruction instead of inflicting it. This 
demonstrates how in Strategic Communication efficiency is synonymous to 
the smallest possible kinetic effects. What this means semantically, is that 
discourses such as these couple increased lethality of modern weapons with 
efforts to minimize destruction. Semantically, force equals to virtue. 
This ideological landscape of virtuous force has made its way into the 
names of the operations: Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq), Operation 
Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), and Operation Unified Protector 
(Libya). Arjun Appadurai's (1990) concept of "ideoscape" well explains the 
naming process of 'Western action'. He uses the term to explain the 
concatenation of politically influenced ideas, images and terms that 
represent the Enlightenment world-view. According to Appadurai, these 
terms, such as 'freedom', 'rights' and 'representation' form the master-
narrative of the 'enlightened societies'. The narrative was "constructed with 
a certain internal logic" and organized the political culture around a number 
of keywords. In the West this keyword is democracy - the term through 
which we understand both war and peace. Appadurai notes that with the 
"diaspora" of these key words their semantic and pragmatic meanings 
demand careful interpretation: the semantic meanings depend on the 
context, whereas the pragmatic meanings require an understanding of the 
political actors and their audiences and the contextual conventions that 
translate the terms into public politics (Appadurai, 1990). The values 
protected by the Western soldier (freedom, democracy and security in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, for example) are the key terms of the Grand Narrative, the 
heir of the Enlightenment ideology. With this narrative, the terms become 
the mythologized blueprint of the shared ideology. "Ideoscapes" contain a 
certain internal, power-oriented logic: they "frequently have to do with the 
ideologies of states and the counter ideologies of movements explicitly 
oriented to capturing state power or a piece of it" (Appadurai, 1990). 
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment cosmopolitanism are, according to 
Venn (2002), "intrinsic to the discourse of modernity." However, the 
Enlightenment was a universal project that turned from the revolution of 
reason and equality to the practices of ideology and hegemony. The claim 
here us that the role of the Enlightenment master-narrative, in the form it 
exists today, is still to maintain a certain social order. It conveys 
representations of agency and activity and thereby determines the actor's 
role in the framework of ideology. 
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What is essential in the discussion of Strategic Communication is the 
narrative legacy of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment narrative has a 
significant role in the making of the American nation. As the United States 
became "the first nation in the world to base its nationhood solely on 
Enlightenment values" (Wood 2011: 274-275), these values became to 
characterize what a true American should be like. On one hand, there was 
individuality, and on the other, there was the need to become a nation. What 
this led to was that individualism became a defining characteristic of being 
an American. In the European tradition people were members of their 
family first, with little chances of true social mobility, whereas in the 18th 
century America, man was thought to be in control of his own destiny. As 
the citizens of this new state were of modest origin, it was natural for them 
to abandon the tradition of "family and blood" and promote "the new 
enlightened standards of gentility and learning" instead. These self-made 
men were "natural aristocrats" because of yielding to the right values 
(reason, tolerance, honesty, virtue and candidness) rather than family 
tradition. (Wood, 2011: 277).  
 
Ideologically motivated rhetoric came to establish the America we now 
know. The tradition of defining the Self in terms of virtue and universal 
verity is deeply rooted in the American culture. America has been the 
product of verbalized ideology from the very beginning, and therefore the 
verbalization of values is a form of communication that can be perceived as 
an integral part of maintaining the national identity. In addition to being a 
unifying narrative that distinguished Americans as a nation of their own, 
Enlightenment philosophy was easily converted into propaganda.  
According to Taylor (2003, 138-142), Washington had Paine's writings read 
out for his troops, believing it would improve his their morale, while 
Adams and Jefferson focused on influencing the American public opinion.  
"John Adams maintained that the American Revolution was essentially  a 
struggle for the hearts and minds of the people even before the war began", 
and as the war established, the Revolution demonstrated that ideology, in 
addition to nationalism and patriotism, was an important factor in 
maintaining the loyalty of the people (Taylor, 2003: 143-144).  
 
Paradoxically, the philosophy of individualism was also what would make 
Americans a collective: "Since the Enlightenment emphasized the value of 
homogeneity and of being a single people, by describing themselves as the 
most enlightened people in the world Americans assumed that they would 
thereby be a nation" (Wood, 2011: 274-275). The Enlightenment in the very 
core of 'American being' not only emphasized cohesion and unity as a 
nation, but identified with the "universal and ecumenical" principles 
(Wood, 2011: 275-278). Democracy and representation, as argued by 
Appadurai above, have driven political discourses ever since. Today, the 
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 moral responsibility based on ecumenical values still continues to 
determine the discourses of American foreign policy. These values have 
become universal to the extent  Smith (2006: 13) writes, that ""Reason" and 
the Enlightenment are typically associated, after all, with  political 
commitments - to liberty, equality, freedom of conscience, freedom of 
speech - that are widely accepted and that few of us would wish to oppose." 
Even the wish to discuss alternative values is understood as criticism of the 
very foundations of society. Smith (2006) argues for a "modern ideal" of 
the Enlightenment, which means inverting the interpretations of classical 
Enlightenment values such as commitment to truth, preference for reason 
over culture, the consensus ideal and the common worldview.  
 
Garrard (2006) summarizes the criticism of the Enlightenment concept of 
reason into three categories, labeling them as "the Enlightenment 
perversion of reason": The exaggerated power of reason, its instrumental 
conception reason unable to provide insight into objective truths about 
moral or justice, and suggesting that a view of reason could be "pure". 
According to Smith (2006: 16), the commitment to truth is based on the 
presupposition that a specific moral and political truth exists, but ignores 
how truth is in fact embedded in culture - that the philosophy attempts to 
renounce. Living by this truth was linked to the practice of reason that 
would eventually lead to (moral and political) consensus. This chain of 
ideals may describe the legitimation process of Western ideology, but it 
also reveals its deeply subjective essence, the very sin the commitment to 
truth rose to oppose. What it comes to show is the recipe for universalizing 
one truth. In his criticism, Smith (2006: 28) inverts the ideal of truth: 
 
Indeed, it would be at most a slight exaggeration to say that 
whereas in the classical Enlightenment the purpose of reason 
was to orient discourse towards the Truth, under the modern 
ideal the purpose of "public reason" is precisely to prevent 
claims about Truth from entering into public discourse. 
 
In other words, public reasoning should promote pluralism instead of 
hegemony. When scrutinizing the practices of Strategic Communication, it 
is obvious that discourses to produce "one truth" are its ultimate ambition. 
The parallel between classical Enlightenment and Strategic 
Communication may be what Smith (2006: 32) calls "complacent 
endorsement of the ideals and values of the culture that in our self-
satisfaction we happen to inhabit." Associating the "self" with the truth is 
something every culture is guilty of. In Strategic Communication we can 
observe the modern application of the truth-reason-consensus chain that is 
fundamentally instrumentalist in its purpose. This classical Enlightenment 
world view is still used as a rhetorical device in political argumentation and 
in the implementation of social order. Historian Howard Zinn (2001: 57-
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 58) states in A People's History of the United States that  
 
Those upper classes, to rule, needed to make concessions to the 
middle class, without damage to their own wealth or power, at 
the expense of slaves, Indians and poor whites. This bought 
loyalty. And to bind that loyalty with something more powerful 
even than material advantage, the ruling group found, in the 
1760s and 1770s, a wonderfully useful device. That device was 
the language of liberty and equality, which could unite just 
enough whites to fight a Revolution against England, without 
ending either slavery or inequality.  
 
The "language of liberty and equality" coexisted side by side with slavery 
and mass executions in the 18th century just like the mantras of democracy 
and freedom mark the political discourses of 21st century military policy.  
Above, Zinn suggests that in politics, equality and pluralism were not more 
than rhetorical tools. In fact, many members of the elites, despite of 
promoting the enlightenment philosophy, never wanted a pluralist society. 
Thomas Jefferson, himself a slave owner and yet considered one of the 
abolitionists, had a political program for the freed slaves. As he did not 
want to see the formation of a social class of liberated slaves, he demanded 
slave children be deported to Africa or West-India, without the liberation of 
their parents (Helo, 1999). The talk about equality was instrumental 
rhetoric, which may find its modern equivalent in Afghanistan, where war 
against terror must be waged as the rural Afghans must be liberated to 
allow them to go to school.  Both in the history books teaching us about the 
French Revolution and in the Pentagon press briefings about the military 
operations in Afghanistan, violence is presented as an unavoidable sacrifice 
for universal values - precision weapons have simply replaced the 
guillotine. 
 
It will be argued that this perceived moral agency based on the universal 
"truth" of the Enlightenment is the foundation for the instrumental Grand 
Narrative underlying Strategic Communication. The Enlightenment 
rhetoric of the 18th century with its political motivations was strategic 
communication of its time, as it aimed at the very same objectives as the 
concept of Strategic Communication of today: to unite the audience under 
one ideology. In the 18th century it was Franklin who spoke in America's 
interest as the American Ambassador in Paris, but in the 21st century the 
division of rhetorical responsibility, as discussed in the upcoming chapters, 
is far more complex. However, the themes of the revolutionary era have 
prevailed: the rhetoric of liberty, democracy and unity keep characterizing 
the discourses of Strategic Communication. Today, these ecumenical 
narratives have evolved from national to international, as they attempt to 
convince not only the home front, but the entire global audience. 
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 2.5 Conclusions of the Chapter 
 
The significance of the Enlightenment in the context of this research is in 
its narrative. The themes discussed here - technology as the symbol of 
progress, the culture of morality and ecumenical democracy - are 
intertwined themes that have preserved their social and cultural status in the 
narratives of American identity. This narrative identity contains the shared 
values and meanings that also form the foundation for Strategic 
Communication.  The Enlightenment was largely narrative. As argued in 
this chapter, the social practices during this Age included multiple 
interpretations of this narrative: who is entitled to equality and liberty, and 
how should the enlightened ideals be pursued?  
 
The Age of Reason produced several texts that reflect and narrate the 
political aspirations of the era. Documents of the era, such as the 
Declaration of Independence, echo the visions of the prominent political 
figures. In a sense, these visions were a certain type of a utopia of 
happiness. "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" as the motto of the 
era established satisfaction and contentment as profound rights as the right 
to live one's life as a free citizen.  
 
The paradox between the idealization of equality, democracy and liberty 
and their application in the social reality is another echo of the 
Enlightenment that can still be heard in the 21st century discourses of 
warfare. Giving birth to the enlightened nation required unpleasant actions 
such as the genocide of the indigenous people and slavery, although the 
ultimate objectives were good. Now, establishing a democratic and 
peaceful society in Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya requires certain sacrifice too. 
The tragedy of becoming enlightened is that it forces the objects of the 
project into long stretches of painful interim; to endure, wait and persist, 
while the enlightenment is brought upon them in the form of violence. To 
many, the enlightenment projects of the West have meant hegemony of the 
elites, contrary to the discourses of equality and freedom. In Afghanistan, 
the villagers are told that if they cooperate and endure a little while longer, 
happiness will follow: Even if it means losing everything, one day their 
suffering and sacrifices will be rewarded. These narratives educate the 
public and turn them into students, but in the enlightenment projects the 
role of the student is always agonizing, because the world can be made a 
better place only at their expense. In order to persuade the public into 
accepting their role as the ones being sacrificed on one hand and educated 
on the other, the elites need a narrative to explain the interim suffering. The 
practices of enlightening have manifested as political exorcism: the victim 
must suffer in the process. 
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 This chapter has provided background for the empirical research of the 
dissertation. It has discussed the role of the Enlightenment in the making of 
the American Grand Narrative, and drawn the conclusions that the Age of 
the Enlightenment is a pivotal factor in many aspects of modern warfare. It 
turned soldiers into moral agents, drew the attention to the rights of man, 
and embraced the tradition of uniting people ideologically. The critical 
claim of this chapter is that the ideals and practice never met. The 
paradoxes between the rhetoric and practice mean that the Enlightenment 
appears as a rather superficial ideal that never abolished the conflict 
between cultures, but aimed at harmonizing the society in the elites' terms 
without being able to recognize its own subjectivity in the face of Truth and 
Reason. This ultimately means that the Enlightenment was a convention for 
a new kind of power use that started with the introduction of the concept of 
democracy and realizes today as rhetorical humanitarianism. Violence is 
still practiced against the 'Other', but in discourses these practices are 
discussed in the context of the Enlightenment, as was done in Iraq, 
Afghanistan as well as Libya. The legitimations and descriptions of 
political action never cease to draw their meaning from the Grand Narrative 
and its themes of democracy, freedom, humanitarianism and efficiency.  
 
The discussion thus far has now arrived to the point where the take on the 
research topic must reflected in the light of the background discussion. The 
awareness of the role of interpretation is crucial in the framework of this 
research: not only in the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA, 
introduced in Chapter 3) but also demanded by the critics of CDA (see 
Billig, 2002). The different contexts of analysis determine the 
interpretations: in this case the underlying political needs and motivations 
of Strategic Communication on one hand, and the rights and the needs of 
those being impacted by it on the other. Interpreting the discourses 
demands understanding of the different perspectives of the different actors. 
These perspectives, such as the political need for hegemony or its social 
implications such as domination, are the contexts of interpretation. 
 
The contexts of interpretation are tried to the ideologies of the actors and 
targets of discourses. As argued in Chapters 1 and 2, language and ideology 
are intertwined elements that spell out, legitimize and actualize social 
practice. The key argument here is that social practice is always based on 
some ideological conception of the "legitimate" roles of social actors. 
Much of what constitutes these roles is negotiated verbally and textually. 
This applies to the framework of this dissertation too: as stated in Chapter 
1, warfare is ideological, which needs language to become actualized. This 
means that politics and ideology are the very context of this research. 
Considering the criticism leveled at CDA and its pursuit of political and 
ideological analysis (discussed in Chapter 3), this interpretation of context 
must be made explicit.  
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One aspect of ideology and attitude is the stand this dissertation takes 
towards the role of the Enlightenment. As the discussion thus far has 
focused on the critique of the Enlightenment, it may appear as an attempt to 
nihilistically deny the significance and value of the Enlightenment in 
modern Western society and its history. This is why it is important to point 
out that the criticism presented here is not criticism of the Enlightenment 
per se. Instead, what is being criticized is the use of the Enlightenment as a 
political vehicle for ideology and morality that lead to practices that 
contradict the rhetoric. Also, this dissertation is critical towards the 
persistent and uncritical use of Enlightenment themes and argumentation in 
today's political discourses. It is ethically problematic to maintain 
discourses that are known to have been used to legitimize violent and 
hegemonic purposes, and demonstrates a certain kind of indifference 
towards those who were subject to the Enlightenment very different from 
the triumph of rights and liberty. The use of such discourses in the political 
project of democratizing Afghanistan while aware of the social injustices 
associated with the original political project in the 18th and 19th century 
illustrates the paradox and subjectivity of the Western concepts of rights 
and justice, as well as the ideology of "us" and "them". 
 
This dissertation approaches the Enlightenment as a narrative of political 
and social change rather than a philosophy, and due to this approach the 
discussion of the Enlightenment is limited to the themes that define its 
contents as a narrative. This obviously leads to leaving out a number of 
perspectives to the Enlightenment as a philosophical movement. This 
should not be interpreted as a claim that the Enlightenment is dismissed as 
a failed project. Such suggestion is by no means the purpose, but rather the 
consequence of limiting the research topic. In fact, despite the critical 
approach to the Enlightenment as a political narrative, the theoretical as 
well as the methodological framework of the analysis pay tribute to this 
historical project. 
 
This dissertation proposes that the parallel between the Enlightenment and 
Strategic Communication as narratives is their political function. The 
problem of these narratives is that as soon as ideology (i.e. the 
Enlightenment) becomes politicized, the controversial social practices 
begin. These social practices were legitimized with the narratives of the 
Enlightenment, which became the linguistic pattern of hegemony: the 
narratives were discourses that not only advocated changes in social 
practice, but maintained social order. This is to say that the Enlightenment 
as generally understood manifests very differently than the political 
practices of its time. The praise of science, progress or the ideal of liberty 
were not problematic, but their political application often turned against 
their original purpose. The ideals of democracy, progress and human rights 
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 have introduced the guillotine or precision weapons. As a theater of 
advancing one's interests, politics is a poor stage for the philosophy of 
equality. This dissertation attempts to point out this difference between the 
practice and the official narrative. 
 
It is, however, the philosophical legacy of the Enlightenment that not only 
allows but encourages us to practice critical research. Kant's advocacy of 
the practice of "public reason" as presented in What is Enlightenment 
(1996) and his argumentation for the rational analysis in the Critique of 
Pure Reason (1964) promote critical analysis of social phenomena. Further, 
it is important to notice the methodological relevance of the empiricism 
introduced in Kant's approach: the roles of a priori and a posteriori could 
be interpreted as the division of analysis to experience and context (a priori 
knowledge) and empiricism (a posteriori knowledge) (see Kant, 1964) and 
a priori knowledge would therefore be influenced by ideology. Dialectical 
philosophy since Kant's day, according to Horkheimer, is based on the 
principle that "the fundamental traits and categories of our understanding of 
the world depend on subjective factors" (2013: 65). However, the 
awareness of tracing the subjective origins of these concepts must be part 
of defining the object (Horkheimer, 2013: 65). This means that a priori 
knowledge is an elementary concept in the critical philosophy attributed to 
Kant. As such, it addresses the questions of context and subjectivity, the 
challenges of which in terms of critical analysis are essential in this 
discussion. The value of these concepts can be examined in the light of the 
debate on CDA methodology, for instance. As elaborated in the following 
chapter more thoroughly, critical discourse analysts have been accused of 
analyzing discourse patterns in isolation of their context (see Breeze, 2011; 
Jones, 2007; Van Dijk, 2008b). Further, it has been argued that despite 
determining their approach as "critical", critical discourse analysts do not 
associate themselves with Kant's critical philosophy:  
 
The critical approaches that emerged in the 1990s do not claim 
to be the inheritors of all previously self-labelled critical 
approaches. Critical discourse analysts do not tend to position 
themselves as Kantians or Popperians. (Billig, 2002). 
 
Regardless of whether this understanding of the critical discourse scholars' 
preferences in terms of the philosophy of science is accurate or not, this 
dissertation in fact entertains the idea of recognizing the paradigmatic 
legacy of Kant's "criticism" as one approach to practicing Critical 
Discourse Analysis. In the context of this dissertation it not only honors 
Enlightenment philosophy of science, but complements the theoretical 
framework of CDA by defining the role and function of context and 
experience in the analysis. 
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 The criticism of CDA theory and methodology will be discussed later in 
Chapter 3. However, considering the points made above, one question 
regarding the disputed political and ideological motivations of CDA should 
be addressed here. Despite the earlier critique of the Enlightenment as a 
political project, the motivations for the criticism stem, unsurprisingly, 
from the moral standpoint determined by the Enlightenment tradition: the 
commitment to rights and the practice of critical reason. Considering the 
discussion here, it appears that CDA, in fact, resonates with the ideological 
context and the Enlightenment-spirit of public, critical reasoning. This 
means that the essential philosophical and scientific legacy of the 
Enlightenment is the ability to criticize and analyze social order from 
within. This also applies to the declared emancipatory reading of this 
research. The emancipatory motives of CDA to take a stand rather than just 
describe practices of hegemony and domination (Van Dijk, 1993: 252; 
Wodak & Weiss, 2003) can be seen as one type of a renaissance of the 
Enlightenment. This discussion on the role of the Enlightenment in the 
philosophy of science functions as an introduction to the methodological 
framework: it recognizes the theoretical parallels between the context 
discussed thus far and the method discussed in the following chapter and 
bridges between Critical Discourse Analysis and critical theory, and 
thereby links the methodological choices to the discussion on the role of 
the Enlightenment in scientific thought. 
 
This chapter has kept referring to a number of ideals that define the Grand 
Narrative.  In this narrative the essential concept is agency. Ideological 
being is manifested in the descriptions of being and doing: the identity of 
an individual, collective or a nation is always represented by the activities 
they participate in and the actions they take. Virtue and morality are coded 
in very different action descriptions than the lack of them. What should be 
noted here is the content of these descriptions: What are the things "we" do, 
and how are they evaluated? What is the role of these narratives of action? 
The following chapter will introduce the theoretical and methodological 
framework for analyzing this agency. It will be argued that these 
descriptions of 'enlightened practices' and 'being', as well as the 
descriptions of immorality, nonvirtuousness and heterogeneity of the 
adversary, are the window to understanding American 21st century 
Strategic Communication. 
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 3 
 
 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
n order to analyze narratives as hegemonic, political discourses that 
reflect social reality, one needs a method that treats language as a 
system that represents social relations. With the context of the research 
provided in the previous chapter, this chapter will construct a 
methodological framework that provides the tools for the critical analysis 
of power relations. The key term in this chapter is agency: as argued in 
Chapter 2 and as will be argued in the chapters that follow, agency is the 
most profound manifestation of being. The themes of instrumentalism 
discussed in Chapter 2 as well as social, textual and visual exclusion 
(discussed in the empirical part of the dissertation as well as in the 
conclusion) are both fundamental in the discourses of Strategic 
Communication. Both of these phenomena are based on the perception and 
operation of agency. This chapter links agency to the methodological 
choice of transitivity analysis and evaluation of action. 
 I
 
As concluded in Chapter 2, what brings Strategic Communication to the 
thematic context of action is its origin in the narratives of politicized virtue. 
The themes of the Enlightenment have always been the key words of the 
military operations the U.S. has engaged in. Warfare is an action based 
business, and as the Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication 
and Communication Strategy  (US Joint Forces Command, 2010) 
determines, Strategic Communication emerged to address the challenges of 
"unified action", linking communication to action. Throughout the 
document action is presented as one form of communication, side by side 
with "themes, messages, images and action" (p. xi). This means that 
Strategic Communication can be approached as a method for doctrinizing 
ideals and converting these ideals into action. This means that it is the 
concept of action that is critical in the analysis of Strategic Communication.  
 
This chapter introduces the methodological framework of the articles that 
follow. The discussion is divided in three parts. The first section locates the 
methodological approach in the domain of Critical Discourse Analysis, 
which should be understood as the 'umbrella theory' of the methodology. 
The second section links the analysis of action descriptions to Critical 
Discourse Analysis by introducing the specific methods for analysis within 
the systemic functional language theory, namely the analysis of the 
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 experiential function in communication, which is further combined to the 
Appraisal theory. The third section of the chapter deals with rituals theory. 
This theory supports the analysis of the experiential functional in both text 
and image and links language theory and media practice: both the 
experiential meaning and rituals theory deal with the representations of 
action in communication, which makes rituals theory a perspective to 
analyzing mediatized Strategic Communication.   
 
In an attempt to generate knowledge to address the research questions of 
this research, the methodological framework combines, as stated, 
approaches to deal with the syntactic and semantic dimensions of 
discourses. In addition, it discusses Strategic Communication in light of a 
number of concepts central to communication research. These methods are 
used to approach the underlying communicative resources of Strategic 
Communication.  
 
3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
The tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is well established and 
extensive, which means that for the sake of clarity and conciseness, only a 
number of theorists' contributions can be taken into account here. The 
following sections will discuss the approaches of Teun A. Van Dijk and 
Norman Fairclough, whose theoretical contributions to the study of 
discourse are applicable in the analysis of the structural and syntactic 
properties of language.  
 
According to Van Dijk, CDA is not a method, but something that could be 
understood as a perspective, position or attitude towards analyzing 
discourse, which characterizes the scholar engaging in the analysis rather 
than the method (Van Dijk, 2009: 62-63). It should result in detailed 
descriptions, explanations and critiques of dominant discourses and the 
way they influence and possibly shape socially shared knowledge, attitudes 
and ideologies (Van Dijk, 1993: 258-259). Further, CDA deals with 
discursive power abuse and its consequences (Van Dijk, 1993: 252) as 
CDA scholars are interested in how discourses (re)produce social power 
abuse of one group over another, and also how these dominated groups may 
(discursively) resist this abuse (Van Dijk, 1993; 2009).  
 
CDA as a multidisciplinary approach to the study of language and 
communication, which means that, unlike other discourse analysts, critical 
discourse analysts should venture to take an explicit sociopolitical stance: 
"they spell out their point of view, perspective, principles and aims, both 
within their discipline and within society at large" (Van Dijk, 1993: 252; 
also Wodak & Weiss, 2003). According to Van Dijk, the position of critical 
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 scholars should engage in the debate on power use and do it critically by 
focusing on the perspectives of those who are being dominated (1993: 
253). The purpose of Critical Discourse Analysis is therefore to produce 
interpretations and encourage to take a stand, not merely state "facts" that 
fail to analyze the implications of power relations and hegemony on the 
quality of discourses. "[A]ny critique by definition presupposes an applied 
ethics" (Van Dijk, 1993: 253). The critical, multidisciplinary nature of CDA 
is demanding, as it challenges the scholar not only to act as a scientist, but 
as a social critic who should be capable of taking into account the several 
perspectives to social phenomena: 
 
One conclusion of this discussion of the criteria applied in the 
choice of the discourse structures studied in CDS projects is that 
any `method' or `approach' that limits itself to some genre or 
dimension of discourse only can by definition only provide a very 
parcial analysis. Trivially, grammarians usually study grammar, 
conversation analysts conversations, and narratologists stories 
and their structures. Now, if some CDS researcher, for the double 
contextual reasons explained aboye, precisely needs to study 
some aspects of grammar, conversation or narration, it is 
obviously in these more specific areas of research that one looks 
for relevant structures. But as soon as the criticar aims of the 
research project require a broader approach, those scholars who 
limit themselves to the study of a single gente or types of 
structure are often unable to fully deploy their expertise. Hence 
also my oft-repeated criticism of the exclusive membership of one 
school, approach or scholarly sect, and my plea for diversity, 
flexibility and multidisciplinarity as general criteria for CDS. 
(Van Dijk, 2009: 73) 
 
Military Science is a multi-disciplinary field of research that does not in 
itself have a clearly defined research tradition. Although it appears as a 
genre of International Relations in the popular context of discussion, it 
contains areas of research that call for the paradigms of social sciences. 
Military science is an arena for analyzing political and ideological 
discourses, addressed here as strategic communication, the purpose of 
which is to persuade and serve power and dominance. This makes CDA a 
natural approach, or attitude, to engaging in its theoretical and practical 
implementations. Because Strategic Communication is essentially a 
communication model and realizes discourses of different kinds, it cannot 
be analyzed in the context of military policy alone.  
 
The following sections will continue the discussion on CDA. Van Dijk's 
(2008a: 213) approach to discourse analysis is triangular and understands 
discourse as a social, cognitive and discursive-semiotic phenomenon. The 
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 following section discusses the social dimension as it addresses 
manipulation, i.e. the discursive dynamics and (im)balances between social 
actors. After this a discussion on the cognitive dimension of discourse will 
take place, discussing Van Dijk's theory for conceptualizing the cognitive 
processes in attempts to influence. Finally, the discursive-semiotic 
phenomena refers to the exercise of manipulation in the form of text, image 
and speech. According to Van Dijk, all of these three approaches are 
required in order to establish "explicit links between the different 
dimensions of manipulation" (Van Dijk, (2008a: 213). This triangular 
model advocates a multidisciplinary approach that recognizes the social, 
cognitive, and discursive dimensions of influence.  This approach to 
discourse analysis is able to bridge language and social experience, which 
is crucial in the context of this research. Also, it is applicable to the further 
analysis of micro structures of language and discourse (grammar and 
semantics) - which is not always the case with all politically oriented 
discourse theories.  
 
The triangular (society/cognition/discourse) approach is further supported 
by a discussion on ideological discourse analysis as a subtype of CDA that 
particularly addresses the research interests of Military Science and provide 
context for the further discussion on methodology. Warfare is essentially 
the context of ideology and power, and Van Dijk's theoretical principles on 
the social, cognitive, and discursive phenomena provide a clear theoretical 
framework for analyzing the discourses that have always been the object of 
multidisciplinary research. However, the obvious benefit of Van Dijk's 
approach is that the gap between discourse as linguistic practice and 
discourse as social practice has been accounted for. 
 
3.1.1 Discourse as social practice: manipulation and persuasion 
 
The strategic objective of Strategic Communication is to influence the 
perceptions of the "key audiences" to "create, strengthen, or preserve 
conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government 
interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, 
plans, themes, messages and products synchronized with the actions of all 
instruments" (Department of Defense, 2009). This implies the objective of 
social and cognitive engagement that would result in asymmetry of power.  
 
Whereas military doctrines typically speak mainly of influence, Van Dijk 
(2008a: 212) differentiates between manipulation and persuasion by 
defining manipulation as "illegitimate influence" that is used to serve the 
interests of the manipulator against the interests of the manipulated. 
Persuasion, instead, is defined as legitimate attempts to present 
information, which leaves the participants free to accept or reject the 
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 arguments of the persuader. This leaves us with the question about the 
boundaries between manipulation and persuasion. What makes 
manipulation illegitimate is that is violates social norms (Van Dijk (2008a: 
212), which gives manipulation its permanently covert nature. The question 
remains: can communication rid itself of the objective to persuade or 
manipulate? Can communication labeled as "strategic" be much else other 
than manipulation? According to Marková (2008) "there would be hardly 
any reason to communicate if there were no tensions, asymmetries or 
conflicts between interacting parties." Instead of manipulation, Marková 
uses the term "propaganda" as the counterpart for persuasion. Marková's 
thesis is that the underlying difference between propaganda and persuasion 
is that in propaganda, the Ego and the Alter fuse their mutual positions, that 
is, engage in a negotiation in order to be mutually involved. Propaganda 
aims at monologue as the propagandist aims to merge the Ego and the Alter 
into one being. Persuasion is understood as a dialogical action that 
manifests in a struggle for social recognition and demands constant 
monitoring of the relationship between the Ego and the Alter.  
  
In this theoretical framework, the boundary between persuasion and 
manipulation may at times appear unclear, but to apply Van Dijk's 
definition, persuasion turns into manipulation when it stops applying 
adequate information and uses distorted facts to produce legitimacy. This 
goes against the aforementioned social norms, as "manipulation is 
illegitimate in a democratic society, because it reproduces, or may 
reproduce, inequality" (Van Dijk, 2008a: 216). The failure to provide 
adequate information and the use of distorted information may be best 
illustrated by the hunt for the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, which 
now can be given as an example of how manipulation was practiced instead 
of persuasion. The problem of manipulation undermines the practices of a 
democratic society. This means the analysis of manipulative practices 
always operates in the macro/social dimension. 
 
To summarize: In this section the social dimension of discourse is 
discussed in the framework of power dynamics. Influence can be 
understood either as persuasion or manipulation, the first referring to a 
more dialogical negotiation process, and the second to what could be 
characterized as propaganda or deception. 
 
3.1.2 Discourse and cognition  
 
After discussing the discourse as a social phenomenon, it is time to turn to 
the second approach to discourse - its cognitive dimension. This section 
therefore introduces the concepts of mental models and social cognition, 
which are some of the key terms in Van Dijk's theory on discourse and 
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 power.  
 
Van Dijk argues that because the long-term memory is where the episodic 
memories are stored, episodic manipulation is geared towards ideology, 
knowledge and attitudes (Van Dijk, 2008a: 218). The memories of our 
communicative events are stored in the episodic memory as mental models. 
Telling a story means that the storyteller constitutes a mental model of the 
subjective experience - and the recipient constitutes a mental model when 
the story is undertood and interpreted (Van Dijk, 2008a: 218). This is not 
mere interpretation and association of words: "It is this mental model that is 
the basis of our future memories, as well as the basis of further learning, 
such as the acquisition of experience-based knowledge, attitudes and 
ideologies" (Van Dijk, 2008a: 220). This obviously means that it is the 
mental models that must be targeted in order to manipulate, persuade, or 
influence the individual.  
 
Van Dijk (2009) makes a pronounced point of the fact that we do not have 
access to the emotions and mindsets of the communicators and their 
audiences. In order to study the phenomena of social cognition, one has to 
find some common ground between social psychology, language and 
communication theories, and political science. Van Dijk (2006a; 2006b; 
2009) advocates an integrated, multidisciplinary approach to discourse to 
address the relations between cognitions and discourses, namely the 
understanding of the concept of social cognition. He argues that social 
cognition is the "missing link" and the theoretical interface between 
discourse and dominance, the neglect of which has been a major 
shortcoming in many critical analyses of language and discourse (Van Dijk, 
1993: 251).  
 
Social cognition and mental models are the key to understanding the 
infrastructure of discursive and therefore social power and dominance, seen 
by Van Dijk as "the influence of knowledge, beliefs, understanding, plans, 
attitudes, ideologies, norms and values"  (van Dijk, 1993: 254, 257). He 
argues that the main resource of power is cognitive, enacted by strategies of 
persuasion and manipulation among others, in attempts to "change the 
mind of others in one's own interests" (van Dijk, 1993: 254, 257). These 
cognitive models are characterized as "[s]ocially shared representations of 
societal arrangements, groups and relations, as well as mental operations 
such as interpretation, thinking and arguing, inferencing and learning" 
realized by text and talk (Van Dijk, 1993). This means that social 
cognitions transmit knowledge between the micro level (words, syntax) and 
the macro level (social cognitions, currents, and collectivities) as well as 
between discourse and action and the individual and the group (Van Dijk, 
1993; 2009). In brief, "social cognitions allow us to link dominance and 
discourse" (Van Dijk, 1993: 257). 
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In addition to mental models, the cognitive structures essential in the 
socially shared representations and perceptions of social reality also include 
context models. Van Dijk presents these as a partially overlapping models 
complementary of each other. Mental models are "subjective, and possibly 
biased representations of ‘reality’", and may feature personal and/or socio-
cultural evaluations (opinions and emotions) of events or situations, which 
means to say they are the starting point of discourse as well as what 
discourses should, in order to make sense and meaning, result in (Van Dijk, 
2006b). Context models, in turn, are mental models that are the starting 
point to engaging in discourse and the basis of ‘pragmatic’ interpretation 
(Van Dijk, 2006b). Context models determine the genre and style of 
communicating mental models and thus control the verbal/textual 
realization of experience and perception. Context models mediate the 
relation between discourse and society and make sure "language users 
adapt their discourse to the social environment, so that it is socially 
appropriate" (Van Dijk, 2009: 73).  
 
The basic composition of context models contains the spatiotemporal 
setting, participants, identities, roles and relationships, goals, knowledge,  
ideologies and the ongoing social action (Van Dijk, 2009: 74), i.e. the 
shared knowledge of the components that make up the social reality. These 
models determine all the variable aspects of discourse, including 
intonation, syntax and lexicon (Van Dijk, 2009: 74). This establishes the 
link between grammar and cognition that is essential in the empirical 
analysis of discourse. Also, what is relevant in the focus of this dissertation 
is the link between language structure and power, when power is 
understood as established and shared social knowledge of roles, identities, 
relationships, and goals. The power of different groups is measured in their 
access to discourses (Van Dijk, 1993: 257), which means that power 
essentially means the opportunity to participate in and influence public 
discourses. The parallelism of power and discourse access is evident: "the 
more discourse genres, contexts, participants, audience, scope and text 
characteristics they (may) actively control or influence, the more powerful 
social groups, institutions or elites are" (Van Dijk,1993: 256). The 
implications of power and dominance over groups is thus not merely the 
access to discourse in terms of control (context or content), but the 
opportunity to influence and manipulate social representations and thereby 
the minds of other people (Van Dijk, 1993: 257, 260, 262).  As context 
models determine the approriate manner to engage in social practice 
(discourse), the apparent implication is that those who possess power are 
also able to break the rules of normative discourse, (i.e. who gets to be 
heard and who not, and in what circumstances) which is how social 
cognitions are influenced in the political sphere.  
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 The cognitive and emotional values and belief systems are deeply 
embedded in both culture and the individual, which makes them fairly 
enduring, if not permanent, and therefore contribute to the preservation of 
the status quo (Wodak, 2006). According to Van Dijk, the most influential 
form of manipulation focuses on creating not only specific mental models, 
but more general abstract knowledge, attitudes and ideologies (Van Dijk, 
2008a, 221). Therefore, manipulation should focus on more general, shared 
representations instead of the individual mental models in order to be most 
effective. 
 
Whereas manipulation may concretely affect the formation or 
change of unique personal mental models, the general goals of 
manipulative discourse are the control of the shared social 
representations of groups of people because these social beliefs 
in turn control what people do and say in many situations and 
over a relatively long period. (Van Dijk, 2008a: 222-223). 
 
To summarize: This section has discussed Van Dijk's theory on the 
cognitive dimension of discourse and its contribution to the analysis of 
persuasion and manipulation. It has introduced mental and context models 
that embody the personal history, attitudes, opinions and experiences of the 
individual and determine one's communicative behavior in social situations. 
In addition, there are more general, shared social cognitions, which control 
the social behavior of groups and collectives. According to this approach, 
effective influence attempts should focus primarily on the social cognition 
rather than individual mental models (Van Dijk, 2008a: 222-223).  
 
3.1.3 Approaching ideological discourse  
 
As postulated in Chapter 2, in this research Strategic Communication is 
treated as ideological discourse. This approach can be supported by 
Fairclough's regard of social institutions as ensembles of ideological-
discursive formations, which are essentialy their own 'speech communities' 
that each have their own 'ideological norms' (Fairclough, 2010: 30). 
According to Fairclough, it is the ideologies naturalized in the 
organization's discourse that determine the order of interaction. He calls 
this the "orderliness" of discourse: ideas of how things are expected to be. 
Naturalized ideologies begin to appear as 'common sense' and non-
ideological, which, in turn, means that a critical, micro/macro approach is 
needed to denaturalize them (Fairclough, 2010: 30-31).  This is the 
approach to the analysis of Strategic Communication here as well. As it is 
recognized as ideological, asymmetric discourse, the methods applied in its 
analysis aim to its denaturalization.  An aspect that should be taken into 
account in terms of ideological discourse is the fact that it is typically 
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 generated from within a position: no institution or organization produces 
discourses, but the members of those structures produce defences and 
legitimations of that position, organization or institution in order to either 
challenge or sustain one's position (Van Dijk, 1995a).   
 
The aim of ideological discourse analysis is specifically to link structures 
of discourse to structures of ideologies, which has shown to form patterns 
such as systematic, negative other-presentation: 
 
Since ideologies are the basis of our social judgments, and 
ideologically controlled propositions are opinion statements, 
expressions of such opinions, e.g., those about 'Others', will often 
indicate what ideological constraints are involved. Lexical items 
chosen to describe others, as in the case of the well-known pair 
of freedom fighter and terrorist, when applied to the Contras and 
the Sandinistas by ex-president Ronald Reagan, are an example 
in kind. (Van Dijk, 1995a).  
 
The assumed general schema of ideological discourse (ideology being a 
system "at the basis of socio-political cognitions of groups") consists of 
categories such as membership devices, typical acts, aims, relations with 
other groups and resources that result in different kinds of self-identity, 
being and activity, goal, norm and value, position and relation and resource 
descriptions that determine the semantic representations of both 'self' and 
the 'other' on both micro and macro levels of discourse (Van Dijk, 1995a; 
1995b; 2009). The micro/macro link also means ideological discourses are 
cognitive representations, as the association of certain actors with specific 
actions, goals, and other properties require existing mental and context 
models. Ideologies are social cognition: they organize group attitudes, the 
development and structure of sociocultural knowledge and, essentially, 
evaluative beliefs, ultimately leading to the polarizing applications of 
ideological discourses (Van Dijk, 1995b: 19).  
 
Ideologies in our perspective are not merely systems of ideas, let 
alone properties of the individual minds of persons. Neither are 
they vaguely defined as forms of consciousness, let alone as false 
consciousness. Rather, they are very specific basic frameworks of 
social cognition, with specific internal structures, and specific 
cognitive and social functions (Van Dijk, 1995b: 21). 
 
Because ideologies are defined as social cognition mediated by discourses, 
this discussion must be extended to its discursive-semiotic phenomena. As 
stated, Strategic Communication is treated as ideological discourse in this 
analysis. It is chatacterized by self-presentation, which means constant 
evaluative practices that are incorporated into its social, cognitive and 
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 discursive (syntactic and semantic) practices. This self-presentation is 
continuous and at times covert, whereas the other aspect of ideological 
discourse, the other-presentation, is typically periodic and overt. The 
structures of ideological discourse reflect this (re)presentation process. Van 
Dijk (2008a) summarizes the typical strategies:  
 
Overall interaction strategies  (self-presentation, other-
presentation) 
Macro speech-acts  (accusation, defense) 
Semantic macrostructures: topic 
selection  
(emphasize negative/positive topics 
about Us/Them) 
Local speech acts implementing and 
sustaining the global ones, e.g. 
statements that prove accusations  
 
Local meanings: Our/Their 
positive/negative action  
(vague/precise, general/specific 
descriptions) 
Lexicon: Select positive words for 
Us, negative words for Them  
 
Local syntax  (passives, nominalizations, agency) 
Rhetorical figures  (metonyms and metaphors) 
Expressions: sounds and visuals  (modality, order of presentation) 
Table 1: Discursive strategies of manipulation according to Van Dijk 
(2008a, 227) 
 
As demonstrated by the chart above, processes of presentation (and 
representation) are thus in the very core of ideological discourse. This is to 
say that ideology can be traced in the (re)presentations of being, acting, and 
behaving. This will be addressed in the next section.  
 
To summarize: The mental models that mediate social cognitions are 
essential in understanding how ideologies form and function. CDA expects 
ideology to have a micro level structure and a macro level reflection. 
Ideology is perhaps best reflected, both in the micro structures and in the 
macro reflections of discourse, by self- and other-presentation. This 
principle is, in essence, the social-cognitive-discursive triangular approach 
to understanding discourse. Each dimension has an impact on the other 
two, which means all three must be considered in the analysis. The 
following section builds on these assumptions. To bring the discussion 
from theory to practice, it builds a method that can be applied in the micro 
level analysis of Strategic Communication, as well as in the discussion on 
the macro level impacts of this ideological structure. 
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 3.2 The criticism of Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
After outlining the framework of CDA and before moving onto the more 
detailed methodological choices, the discussion will now turn to the 
criticism leveled at CDA as a research tradition. This discussion will bring 
forth criticism aimed at both paradigmatic and methodological principles of 
CDA, which are then addressed from the perspective of the methodological 
framework of this dissertation.  
 
The first theme of criticism aimed at CDA and its practitioners has to do 
with the very name of the tradition. The term "critical" and the claim to 
"the" critical analysis has irritated non-CDA scholars, who argue that the 
claim to the term suggests discourse analysis other than CDA could not be 
critical. Billig (2002) argues that CDA analysts are likely to consider 
traditional linguistics non-critical, whereas Jones (2007) claims that all 
language use is critical. Jones makes examples of situations and contexts 
where language users know to be critical and aware of the nuances of the 
conversation without any discourse analytical practice - like when a 
teenager asks to borrow the parents' car. This approach, or attitude, does 
however ignore that Fairclough (1992, 9) has specifically stated that 
"critical" means "showing connections and causes that are hidden" and 
therefore not explicit in verbal or textual interaction.  
 
Breeze (2011) interprets the claim to criticality as an implication of the 
politicized and ideological context of CDA. She argues that CDA claims 
monopoly over critical analysis and, by doing that, suggests that critical 
discourse analysts discredit analysis other than CDA as uncritical. This, she 
claims, is perceived by critical discourse analysts as siding with the 
hegemonic actor and supporting the status quo: 
 
Non-critical approaches are not simply another option: By not 
taking a critical stance, they are taking side with the existing 
hegemonies, guilty of precluding the necessary social critique, 
and thereby of collusion or of furthering the reproduction of an 
unjust social order. 
 
As suggested by Billig (2002), what constitutes the essence of CDA is the 
linking of language and power. The critics argue that the political context of 
CDA is problematic, as the political/ideological approach to analysis by the 
CDA practitioners may mean the analysis has a political reading. CDA 
tends to "assume their own left-wing political standpoint uncritically" 
despite the Frankfurt school principle of self-criticism, accuses Breeze 
(2011). This suggests that CDA is not merely a framework for the analysis 
of political and ideological discourses, but has integrated a certain 
emancipatory agenda in its methodology. Like other descendants of the 
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 Frankfurt school critical theory, CDA is associated with certain elements of 
Marxist tradition, but, according to Breeze (2011), CDA has stepped away 
from the Frankfurt school heritage in terms of the word "critical". 
According to Slembrouck (2001) "CDA continues to be unclear about its 
exact preferences for a particular social theory", but does this not suggests 
it is in fact not committed to any specific political preference? 
 
The second problem with the politicized nature of CDA, as raised by the 
critics, is the question of context (see Harris, 1981). Jones (2007) criticizes 
CDA for suggesting that the ideological orientation of text can be analyzed 
outside its political interpretation, as if semantic and grammatical elements 
alone would reflect the ideological orientation of the text. This would make 
CDA a system for certain preferences in interpretation and presenting it as 
something objective:  
 
In reality, the ‘method of analysis’ in question is simply a way of 
cloaking particular interpretative preferences – including 
particular assumptions and opinions about politics, ideology and 
the role and functions of discourse in society – with a spurious 
objectivity stemming from an appeal to the (segregationist's) 
‘facts’ of linguistic structure and function. (Jones, 2007). 
 
According to this argument, ideology has no specific linguistic structure. 
This is the reason that creates tension between CDA and its critics: if the 
correlation of language structure and ideology is denied (as in Harris, 
1981), the methods of CDA will appear artificial by default. 
Jones & Collins (2006) argue that political and linguistic analysis should 
not be combined, but this view dismisses the role of politics and ideology 
as the contexts of analysis. However, this dissertation argues that politics 
and ideology are, above all, linguistic phenomena, which require discourses 
to be actualized. By denying the legitimacy of these contexts in the analysis 
of these actual discourses undermines the legitimacy of all inter-
disciplinary research. This means that the critics cannot accuse CDA both 
for its politicized nature as well as lack of contextualization, as these two 
things are often the one and the same thing.  
Whether CDA is practiced for political purposes is another case. If the 
analysis is anything more than descriptive, it can be interpreted as 
"political". However, the inter-disciplinary nature of CDA means that 
critical analysis not only describes discourses, but addresses the parallels 
and paradoxes of the discourse and ideologies that come to contact with it. 
Mere descriptions of discourse have little social significance, but 
significance can be achieved by applying this knowledge in different social 
contexts - such as politics and power. Politicized analysis is not the right of 
social and political research only. If the legitimacy of the combination of 
54 
 political and linguistic analysis is denied, one may ask whether any inter-
disciplinary approach is, in fact, appropriate. Rather, the ethical 
requirements for the ideological and political analysis in CDA are in the 
transparency of the data and argumentation of the analysis, which must be 
available for scrutiny. As long as this transparency is realized, the analysis 
exists for its own right. Again, this is a question of research ethics in 
general, rather than a built-in problem of CDA alone. Excluding the social 
and political dimensions of discourse analysis would mean there is no 
actual analysis, but mere data. 
Jones (2007) extends his criticism to the methodology of CDA. His 
criticism is interesting in the framework of this dissertation, as it is leveled 
specifically at systemic functional language theory, the methodological 
framework introduced later in this chapter. Jones attempts to demonstrate 
the redundancy of the SFL approach with an example of a mountaineer and 
a linguist offering a systemic-functional analysis of the mountaineer's 
discourse. This is a typical example of criticism that is used to demonstrate 
the incapability of CDA, or in this case SFL as a rule-based linguistic 
framework, to provide relevant or interesting knowledge about social 
interaction. However, examples such as these ignore power, ideology and 
politics as the operational environment of CDA. Mountaineering is a 
context CDA was never designed for, as there obviously is no negotiation 
of power or hegemony. However, this example, according to Jones (2007), 
is an example of the "language myth". This is a reference to Harris's (1981) 
integrationist theory, according to which people refuse to or are unable to 
recognize the integration of social processes and communicative practices. 
This argument undermines rule-based linguistics, not only CDA and SFL, 
in general. One of the key criticisms here deals with context, which, in the 
integrationst approach promoted by Harris, is what determines the 
meanings in language and interaction. However, as argued thus far, context 
is an integral element taken into account, for instance, in van Dijk's 
triangular model as the prerequisite for the cognitive processing of 
discourse. Further, the integrationist approach undermines much of what is 
fundamental to the linguistic turn in social science, namely the 
methodological choice of treating language as a window to the human 
cognition. This paradigmatic discussion, unfortunately, is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. As framed in Chapter 1 and further elaborated in this 
chapter, the paradigm of language and communication research underlying 
this dissertation establishes that language and communication can only be 
interpreted.  
Much of the critique leveled at CDA originates from the paradigmatic clash 
of CDA as a rule-based framework, which means that also certain methods 
applied in CDA have received criticism. As Breeze (2011) points out, 
methods such as the analysis of nominalizations have been criticized by the 
critics of CDA (see Fowler, 1996; Widdowson 1998).  In 2008, a debate 
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 about the role of nominalizations in CDA sparked in a Discourse & Society 
edition, where Billig argued that critical discourse scholars use 
nominalizations while being critical of their use in political texts. Billig 
demanded CDA scholars start practicing what they preach:  
 
If critical analysts take seriously their own ideological warnings 
about nominalization and passivization, they need to change the 
standard ways of writing critical analysis. We need to use 
simpler, less technical prose that clearly ascribes actions to 
human agents. (Billig, 2008). 
 
This received responses from Fairclough, Van Dijk and Martin, who 
pointed out that CDA does not analyze nominalizations in isolation, but 
always pays attention to the context (Van Dijk, 2008b). Martin (2008), in 
turn, pointed out that Billig's own text was full of nominalizations Billig 
himself demanded should not be used in linguistic analysis. Fairclough's 
(2008) response was that in addition to writing to the general public, it is 
necessary for the CDA scholars to develop theory and methodology, which 
makes the use of technical jargon and abstraction necessary in the academic 
context. Martin (2008) points out that the challenge with interdisciplinary 
research is the merging of different knowledge structures. Martin cites 
Bernstein (1996), who sees hierarchical, vertical knowledge structures 
(science) and horizontal knowledge structures (humanities) at the opposite 
ends of the cline: 
 
For Bernstein, a feature of both social science and humanities 
knowledge structures is that they comprise a set of competing 
languages of description (various linguistic theories for example, 
or kinds of history – traditional, Marxist, feminist, post-colonial, 
etc.). Were I to arrange SFL, CDA and Billig along this cline, I 
would place SFL closer to the science end of the scale and Billig 
closer to the humanities end than CDA. (Martin, 2008). 
 
This perspective points out that the debate is mostly a question about the 
paradigmatic differences between disciplines.  
 
CDA criticism thus focuses on CDA's claim to the "critical" approach in 
the "ideological" context using a rule-based framework and methodology. 
This dissertation relies on Van Dijk's approach to criticality (as explained in 
the previous sections) as a necessary step towards recognizing hegemony. 
Even if deemed methodologically possible by some linguists, it appears 
problematic to analyze hegemonic organizations unless their hegemonic 
status is not first recognized and questioned. As stated, hegemonic 
aspirations create specific needs for the hegemonic actor (i.e. capabilities to 
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 persuade, manipulate and control), and dismissing this would equal to 
dismissing the context of the analysis. Further, judging discourse as 
"ideological", a practice criticized by Jones (2007; also Jones & Collins, 
2006) is not in this dissertation done merely in the tradition of CDA, but it 
is a perspective argued already in the contextualization of the research: in 
Chapter 2, this claim is based on a much wider philosophical notion of 
language as "violence". In this case the foundations of the "Grand 
Narrative" is compared and contrasted to the political practices in both 
history and present day in attempt to find correlations between language 
and practice.  
 
As this discussion on CDA criticism demonstrates, the dispute appears to 
stem from the paradigmatic conflict of not only CDA, but all rule-based 
linguistic frameworks and their critics. All in all, the points of criticism 
leveled at CDA are valid when CDA is done badly, which is exactly the 
case that applies to other traditions of linguistic analysis as well. Like in 
any other tradition of linguists, critical discourse analysts are and should be 
evaluated only for the research they produce. What comes to providing an 
unambiguous, simple and comprehensive analysis of the intertwined 
linguistic, social and cognitive phenomena, it should be asked whether any 
school of discourse analysis is capable of providing such thing. However, 
this should not discourage the attempts to do so and from developing 
theory and methods in this pursuit. The next sections will construct a 
methodological framework, where special attention has been paid to 
context: the method is based on the concept of transitivity, but this concept 
is understood as an experiential manifestation that actualizes multimodally. 
The framework attempts to enable diverse approaches to the core 
methodological concept of agency, although the focus here is on the textual 
and visual aspects. 
 
3.3 From Action descriptions to analysis 
 
Thus far the discussion has focused on the theoretical framework of the 
methodology. CDA, as stated, functions as the umbrella theory in the 
analysis of Strategic Communication as ideological discourse and a 
communication model. Attenttion has also been paid to the discursive 
micro/macro apposition, as it is important that the methodological set-up 
recognizes the interplay of both levels - the micro structures of language 
and the social cognitions. 
 
Language use, discourse, verbal interaction, and communication 
belong to the microlevel of the social order. Power, dominance, 
and inequality between social groups are typically terms that 
belong to a macrolevel of analysis. This means that CDA has to 
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 theoretically bridge the well-known "gap" between micro and 
macro approaches [...]. (Van Dijk, 2001). 
 
What bridges the micro- and macrolevels in the upcoming analysis is the 
concept of action. Strategic Communication is characterized as 80% action 
and 20% words (Murphy, 2008). Further, one of the core principles of 
Strategic Communication is the synchronization of words and actions. This 
implies that this communication model attempts to doctrinize the 
transforming of discourse (micro) into social behavior (macro). It 
determines the discoursive themes and messages as the blueprint of the 
"Battle of the Narrative" and then proceeds to laying out the methods for 
aligning speech and behavior to avoid the "say-do gap" (see US Joint 
Forces Command, 2010: III-10). The result of this is a model of 
communication that dictates the process of communication from discourse 
to physical action, i.e. from microlevel to macrolevel. 
 
A methodological framework that addresses the significance of action is 
hereby essential. This brings us to Halliday's functional language theory, in 
which action and being descriptions, referred to as Processes, are treated as 
the core of language and communication. The following two sections 
discuss the methodology of treating action descriptions as the primary 
object of analysis. 
 
3.3.1 Systemic functional language theory and the metafunctions 
 
The link between language structure and the social dimension of interaction 
is what ties CDA to the method, functional language theory, introduced in 
the next section. The functional language theory treats syntax not only as a 
system of rules, but as a resource for social interaction (Van Leeuwen, 
2005: 69). The understanding of language as a social and cognitive 
structure is thus the common field between the theoretical frameworks of 
Critical Discourse Analysis, social semiotics, and functional language 
theory. 
 
The micro/macro division underlies the functional language theory: 
language has a function in structure, and a function in society (Halliday, 
2004; Van Leeuwen 2005). Butt et al. (2003) captures these functions into 
three categories: 
 
 to express past, present and future happenings 
 to interact and express a point of view 
 to make the output of expression and interactions a coherent whole 
 
In Halliday's systemic functional grammar these functions are labeled as 
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 ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions. The ideational 
metafunction contains the experiential and logical meanings: the first 
encodes experience, whereas the second shows the relationships between 
them (Butt et al., 2003). In this research the experiential meaning is in 
focus. It expresses the "landscape of human experience" as it contains the 
answer to the question "who does what to whom under what circumstance" 
(Butt et al., 2003: 46). Further, it contains the information about the 
participants, actions, and the objects of actions - elements that may appear 
as mere clause constituents, but that participate, as will be argued, in the 
formation and mediation of persuasion, manipulation and ideological 
discourses. 
 
The interpersonal metafunction encodes interaction and ideas and expresses 
attitudes and approaches language as exchange (Butt et al. 2003: Halliday, 
2004). It looks beyond the information provided through language use, and 
deals with the relationship between the participants engaged in interaction. 
"What someone says may look like demanding or giving information but 
could be an oblique way of demanding goods and services" (Butt et al., 
2003: 86). The interpersonal metafunction emerges textually in 
grammatical functions such as Subject and the Finite (tense or modality of 
the verb) and the Mood (imperative, declarative, interrogative) they form 
together - which may be manipulated by the speaker to indicate whether 
they give or demand information, goods, or services (Butt et al., 2003: 86). 
 
The textual metafunction of language organizes the above meanings into a 
coherent written or spoken whole. This metafunction is realized by 
signposts that inform readers/listeners about where the writer/speaker is 
and is headed to (Butt et al., 2003: 134). Textual meanings include the 
Theme and the Rheme of the clause, indicating the focus of the message. 
 
The scope of the analysis emphasizes the experiential function of 
communication, namely the action descriptions. The experiential 
metafunction deals with the representational systems of language. Encoded 
action represents the experience, perception and communication-strategic 
aims of the interlocutor, which can be used as a window to understanding 
and discursive processes such as persuasion and manipulation in the 
context of ideology. 
 
3.3.2 Action and transitivity 
 
"[O]ur discourses, our knowledge about the world, ultimately derive from 
what we do" (Van Leeuwen, 2005: 102). This characterization of the 
experiential metaphor well defines the function of the experiential meaning 
in general: it establishes a link between discourse and social practice (Van 
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 Leeuwen, 2005: 102). Experience consists of a flow of events, happenings 
or 'goings-on', which means it realizes as grammatical figures of 
happening, doing, sensing, saying, being, or having (Halliday, 2004: 170). 
These figures are Processes, which bring together the Participant and the 
possible Target and Circumstance in the grammar of the clause: the clause 
is a "mode of reflection, of imposing order on the endless variation and 
flow of events" (Halliday, 2004: 170). The fundamental claim here is that 
the Process, here often referred to as an action (or being) description, is a 
window to the world of experience - the core of experience. Halliday 
(2004: 170) makes the main distinction between the Process types of the 
'inner' and 'outer' experience:  
 
There is a basic difference, that we become aware of at a very 
early age (three to four months), between inner and outer 
eperience: between what we experience as going on inside 
ourselves, in the world of consciousness (including perception, 
emotion and imagination). The prototypical form of the 'outer' 
experience is that of actions and events: things happen, and 
people and other actors do things, or make them happen. The 
'inner' experience is harder to sort out; but it is partly a kind of 
replay of the outer, recording it, reacting to it, reflecting on it, 
and a separate awareness of our states of being. The grammar 
sets up a discontinuity between these two: it distinguishes rather 
clearly between outer experience, the processes of the external 
world, and inner experience, the processes of the consciousness.  
 
Structure and system are the primary concepts for organizing language 
(Halliday, 2004; 2009a).  
 
In language as in other semiotic systems, meaning is the product 
of the interplay of system and structure - of syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic relations. (Halliday, 2009a: 64). 
 
Further, Halliday (2009a: 64) notes that in systemic functional linguistics, 
structure is thought of as something that derives from the system. System 
and structure are, according to Martin & White (2005) "complementary 
faces of meaning potential", which means neither face can be dismissed.  
The system is realized in structure, but the aim of systemic functional 
linguistics is not to describe the structure itself, but to represent the 
"meaning potential" of the language without fixating on patterns and 
syntax (Halliday, 2009a: 65). Such systems include the system of 
transitivity, polarity, voice, mood, and modality, theme and information. 
Polarity will be discussed in the next section as a part of the theory on 
evaluation, but transitivity is essentially tied to the context of action. 
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 Activity descriptions are what leads us to the transitivity system. This 
system is not language specific, but it should be understood as a system of 
organization. It is a system in which the interplay of the syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic relations (structure and outlook) are especially marked. The 
transitivity system construes the activity descriptions into a set of Process 
types, the main types of which, according to Halliday (2004: 171) are the 
material, mental, and relational Process types. The transitivity system 
contains the information of what is happening or being done, by whom and 
to whom: the Participant (nominal groups: actor, agent, goal, carrier, sayer, 
depending on the Process type), the Process (verbal groups: relational, 
verbal, mental, behavioral, material or existential) and the Circumstance 
(adverbial groups and prepositional phrases: time, place, etc.) (Halliday, 
2005). These elements are also the structural elements of narratives, 
especially the Process. If a narrative is seen as a flow of events, its very 
blueprint consists of Processes. The transitivity system can be seen as a 
mirror to the social world. Van Leeuwen (2005: 104) postulates that 
 
In short, I believe that all discourses are modelled on social 
practices and that our understandings always derive from our 
doings. But discourses transform these practices in ways which 
safeguard the interests at stake in a given social context. 
 
This further illustrates the significant role of action in the analysis of both 
discourse and social practice. Action carries both symbolic and practical 
functions: it represents both the ideological and physical world, and 
organizes relationships in the social world and transmits information. 
 
Process type Participant  Sample clauses 
Material Actor  we strike only military 
targets  
 
Behavioural Behaver  Saddam Hussein, on the 
other hand, flaunts the 
laws of war  
 
Mental Senser  we continue to believe [...] 
that maintaining the 
ability for a country to 
grow and flourish and 
have an economy after 
any military operation is 
important  
 
Verbal Sayer  we talked in here about 
61 
 countertargeting 
 
Attributive Carrier, Attribute our intent is to have a 
process that not only looks 
to determine the target's 
validity  
 
Relational 
Identifying Token, Value These are not tactics of 
war, they're crimes of war.
Existential Existent  there is a very good way 
to try to keep the number 
of casualties and the 
damage to the minimum  
 
Table 2: Process types, Participants and sample clauses (Background 
Briefing On Targeting / Department of Defense, 2003d). 
 
Because of the variation the transitivity system allows the language user to 
express certain experiences from many different perspectives. As the 
following chart illustrates, Process types allow the projection of values in 
the reports of the experiential world: 
 
A: Verbal They suggested it's a job that 
they've got to do. 
They claim it's a job that they've 
got to do. 
B: Mental (cognition) They know it's a job that they've 
got to do. 
They think it's a job that they've 
got to do. 
C: Relational (identifying) They are the ones who have got a 
job to do. 
They are not the ones who have 
got a job to do. 
Table 3: Processes contrasted 
 
Each Process has its own specific emphasizing character. Some emphasize 
the 'inner' world, some the 'outer'. The choice of Process makes the tone of 
the clause; it is not irrelevant whether a speaker reports the 'enemy' to 
claim, think, or simply to be something. In general, the projection of 
another entity's inner experience is always a strong statement. At the same 
time, reports of one's own actions evaluate action accordingly: the Self is 
identified with positive properties and legitimate, acceptable action. This 
means that linguistic evaluation, i.e. ideology, is present in the action 
description (Process) regardless of the genre of the text or speech. Process 
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 types are thus an example of micro structures of discourse that should be of 
a particular interest to critical discourse analysts. When dealing with 
Strategic Communication, this is even more so. Military (political) 
discourses are organized around the expectation of action, and, in a sense, 
only action counts militarily. This means military (political) discourses are 
a naturally descriptions of action. However, the evaluation contained by the 
Process can be discussed further than this. 
 
3.3.3 Evaluation and Polarity 
 
With the transitivity system introduced, it is time to turn to the other 
relevant system of language - polarity. Polarity is discussed here as an 
introduction to the Appraisal theory, in which polarity plays a very apparent 
role. Again, being a system of language, polarity is not tied to any specific 
language structure, but it is reflected by a number of them, one being 
evaluative patterns.  
 
Polarity can, according to Halliday (2009a: 65) be considered "the 
prototype of all grammatical systems", which carries the meanings of 
positive and negative: "it is the name of the choice between the two." 
Polarity is thus the system of yes and no, plus and minus, realized in 
language as claims, denials, affirmations and evaluations, for instance. This 
means that when we analyze glorification or demonizing, the system we are 
dealing with is polarity that realizes in an ensemble of syntagmatic and 
lexical choices. We will here focus on the polarization in evaluation, or 
more precicely, polarization in the evaluation signified by action.   
 
The method for analyzing evaluation, the Appraisal theory, strongly links 
social experience to language. If the transitivity system is concerned with 
constructing experience, the Appraisal theory explains the interpersonal 
function of discourse and negotiates social relations. It is concerned with 
the subjective stances of the speaker/writer toward the outer world. The 
theory deals with how speakers/writers "approve and disapprove, enthuse 
and abhor, applaud and criticise, and with how they position their 
readers/listeners to do likewise" (Martin & White, 2005: 1). Further, it 
analyzes the system of sharing emotions and assessments, construction of 
personae and aligning as well as disaligning oneself with respondents 
(Martin & White, 2005: 1): everything that evaluation does. 
 
Martin & White's (2005) Appraisal theory recognizes three resources of 
evaluation: Attitude, which is a framework for mapping feelings and 
emotions in text/speech, Engagement, which outlines the social perspective 
of stance-taking, and Graduation, which is concerned with adjusting and 
modulating intensity and degree of "force". The first two are discussed here 
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 as part of the methodological framework. The role of Graduation is 
recognized but however not included in the final framework due to the 
need to keep the framework manageable. 
 
Attitude 
The semantic regions that cover Attitude include Affect, Judgment and 
Appreciation. For the sake of clarity and conciseness, these are summarised 
in the table below, as presented in Martin & White (2005): 
 
Quality: describing 
participants/processes, 
attributes of 
participants/processes  
 
helpless men, 
women and 
children,  
 
talented 
individuals, 
 
we work very 
carefully with the 
intelligence 
community  
Process: descriptions of 
mental and behavioral 
processes 
to strike, 
to believe, 
to flaunt 
Affect Emotions:  
reactions to 
behavior, text, 
process, 
phenomena 
(un/happiness, 
dis/satisfaction, 
in/security) 
Comment: i.e. modal 
adjuncts 
unfortunately 
Social esteem: 
normality, capacity, 
tenacity 
have improved 
ability, precise, 
advanced, 
radically different, 
fortuitous 
Judgment Ethics: 
evaluating 
behavior  
Social sanction: 
veracity, propriety 
innocent, prudent 
Reaction (interpersonal) impressive 
Composition (textual) 
 
efficient 
Appreciation Aesthetics: 
evaluating 
"things" such as 
text, process, 
natural 
phenomena 
Valuation (ideational) adequate 
Table 4: Types of Attitude (Martin & White, 2005) 
 
As the above table demonstrates, Attitude covers both the 'inner' and 'outer' 
experience as well as the aspects of personal and social behavior. Polarity 
plays an important role in the categorization of the above evaluations: 
typically evaluations are either positive or critical. The obvious way of 
evaluating, assigning attributes to Participants (wonderful men and 
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 women), is an element of Attitude. But, what is more important to notice, is 
that Affect, Judgment and Appreciation evaluate especially being, doing 
and behavior, which makes Attitude the primary evaluative category in the 
methodological framework here. The focus shall thus remain on the action 
descriptions (Processes) and the evaluation they convey. 
 
Engagement 
As stated, the Appraisal theory operates in the intersubjective domain of 
discourse. Martin & White's (2005: 95) framework deals with the effects of 
this intersubjectivity: 
1. Role played by the speaker/writer in the meaning-making process when 
negotiating the relationships of alignment (or disalignment), as well as the 
socially constituted shared attitudes and beliefs that are associated with the 
positions and relationships negotiated. 
2. The way the resources (mass communicative text or speech) and the 
negotiation of alignment (or disalignment) engages the audience and 
possibly makes the readers/listeners feel as if they were the very target and 
the "ideal" audience to be "won over".  
 
Alignment and disalignment are thus the central concept of Engagement, 
which Martin & White (2005: 96-98) discuss as taxonomy of categories, 
summarised in the table below: 
 
Disclaim The voice is at odds with a 
certain position 
These are not tactics of war, 
they're crimes of war.  
Proclaim The voice rules out 
alternative positions 
These are not tactics of war, 
they're crimes of war. 
Entertain The voice presents a position 
as one of the many 
alternatives 
Now, there is no doubt that in 
those -- in this particular example 
that civilian housing area, you'll 
probably blow out some windows. 
Attribute The voice represents an 
external voice to present a 
proposition as one of the 
many alternatives 
International law draws a clear 
distinction between civilians and 
combatants. The principle that 
civilians must be protected lies at 
the heart of international law of 
armed conflict. It is the distinction 
between combatants and innocent 
civilians that terrorism and 
practices like the use of human 
shields so directly assaults.  
 
Table 5: Taxonomy of Engagement 
 
Again, polarity has the key function in determining alignment and 
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 disalignment. 
 
What should be noted now that the main categories of evaluation according 
to the Appraisal theory have been discussed, is the parallel between 
ideological discourse and evaluation. The (interpersonal) evaluative 
patterns and taxonomies discussed here share the social-cognitive 
constitution as ideological discourse, addressed in the sections on Critical 
Discourse Analysis. The evaluation contained and conveyed by the 
realizations of Attitude and Engagement are therefore understood as 
ideological, and the patterns presented in the above tables are treated as 
vehicles of ideology.  
3.3.4 Voice   
 
Finally, the system of voice takes us closer to transitivity again. The use of 
the passive voice, for instance, affects the set up of the clause: whereas the 
passive voice removes the active Participant, only clauses in active voice 
can fully utilize the meaning-making potential of all clause constituents: 
the Actor, Senser, Behaver, etc., the Process, and the Circumstance. This 
obviously affects the interpretation of the clause: in the case of passive 
voice, is the actor hidden, irrelevant, obvious and therefore omitted, or is 
the omission of the actor a way to highlight some other element of the 
clause (Circumstance, Process)? Voice typically determines the Theme of 
the clause. In active voice, the theme is typically the Actor/Senser/Behaver 
etc. and in passive voice the Goal/Range/Recipient/Receiver, etc. This is a 
means of emphasis: the speakers of English typically use the first position 
of the clause for signalling what the clause is about - in other words, the 
Theme (Butt et al., 2003; Halliday 2004). This means that in addition to 
having a function in the Experiential domain, it also has a Textual function. 
 
 We are not bombing Baghdad. 
Experiential  Actor Process (material, negative polarity), 
Goal 
Textual  Theme Rheme 
Table 6: Theme in active voice 
 
 And  the military targets in there are being hit 
Experiential  Goal Process 
(material, 
positive 
polarity) 
Textual textual  
Theme 
topical Theme  
Table 7: Theme in passive voice 
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It can be concluded that the configurations of Voice intertwine with the 
configurations of Transitivity, which means the experiential and textual 
metafunctions share some common ground that is eventually manifested in 
the forms and functions of the Process. 
 
Processes have now been approached textually as well as in the experiential 
and interpersonal context of analysis. The final sections of this chapter 
extend the discussion to the multimodal dimension by bringing in the 
concept of rituals. Rituals are an object of the study of communication and 
in this dissertation the study of rituals as communication is brought into the 
framework because of its connection to the study of Action.  
 
3.4 Rituals: multimodal processes 
 
Next, the methodological framework is extended to the discussion on 
rituals. The purpose of this is to tie together the textual/visual, social and 
cognitive dimensions of discourses. Rituals are a way to study agency and 
transitivity in the physical world: they can be seen as acted-out transitivity, 
which can be analyzed as a counterpart of textual transitivity. The purpose 
of the discussion on rituals is to offer a window to analyzing the physical, 
real world behavior that reflects the social relations of different actors. If 
we go back to the defintion of discourse used in this dissertation (discourse 
as a "set of relations" between communicators (Fairclough, 2010: 3)) we 
see that rituals are, in fact, one mode of discourse. Their study is always 
study of social practice and power relations. 
 
Whereas Processes represent action in the discourse analytical 
methodology in this chapter, rituals communicate on two different levels.  
First, rituals are closely connected to action and can be seen as systems of 
representing action and being. Second, they are communicative action: 
ritualization is behavior that attempts to label action discriptions. The 
discussion on the rituals of communication is added to the framework in 
order to be able to approach ideological discourse from a multimodal 
perspective that allows the analysis of what happens to action discriptions 
in the media. The information environment mediatizes communication, 
which eventually ritualizes it.   
 
The significance of action as communication ties rituals to the study of 
communicating (military) political action. The following sections focus on 
the symbolic, visual rituals of the media, who, as I will argue, are heavily 
influenced by information operations of the Pentagon and the White House. 
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 3.4.1 Rituals and media 
 
According to Èmile Durkheim (Sumiala, 2010: 47), symbolic 
communication is a force that creates unity in society.  These symbols are 
the key to understanding rituals, with which society constructs a shared 
understanding and experience of social reality (Sumiala, 2010: 49). This 
chapter will make use of Eric Rothenbuhler's (1998) definition of ritual as a 
repetitive action that is communicative, performative and regulated by 
certain rules and norms. Rituals thus make sense of the world and organize 
social life (Sumiala, 2010).  
 
Sumiala (2010) divides rituals into three categories: rituals of reception, 
journalism and media performances. This discussion will focus on the last 
two, namely press rituals (the way to report news of a social significance), 
strategic rituals (that maintain the idea of the journalist's objectivity and 
independence) and different rituals of media and mediazation. These 
categories will be illustrated with case examples next. 
 
3.4.2 Press rituals and the problem of invisible enemies 
 
The visual landscape of the war in Afghanistan has been one-sided. In the 
media, American soldiers and their international allies are portrayed as 
humanitarian, inviolable bodies, whereas the local public is presented as 
the "colonialized Other" (Kotilainen, 2011). In these visual representations 
of warfare, one central actor is absent. The strategic communication 
imagery of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan does not portray insurgents 
or terrorists, only the soldiers fighting them, and the public, represented as 
the victims and the citizens saved by the protectors, the ISAF soldiers 
(Kotilainen, 2011). Kotilainen argues that this is a reflection of the lack of 
face-to-face encounters between the ISAF forces and the 'enemy', a 
consequence of the high-tech war. The humanitarian soldiers are pictured in 
encounters with the local public - playing with the children, handing out 
toys and humanitarian aid, and patrolling and thereby creating security 
among the populace (Kotilainen, 2011). When there is need to refer to the 
enemy, the media, who has no access to the hidden, invisible enemies, have 
to be creative with their visual narratives. The focus is on the victims of the 
"terrorists" and "insurgents". The imagery of enemy violence contains 
everything from bloody victims, scenery of bloody pavements and wrecked 
cars, and possible weapons and explosives the terrorists have either 
intended or managed to use (Kotilainen, 2011).  
 
During the war in Afghanistan, the media has repeated the broadcast of 
these images. One specific photo genre of the war is pictures of shoes lying 
on the street, often next to bloodied pavement. Why this image? A shoe is a 
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 representation of its wearer. Consider a pair of Louboutins, sandals, 
cowboy or army boots - and it is easy to determine the cultural background 
and possibly even the social class of their owner. In the pictures of the 
bloodied shoes, the size of the shoe tells the age of the victim, the sandal 
refers to the Arab and Middle-Eastern culture and the military boot to the 
Western sacrifice - to soldiers as the martyrs of humanitarism. The shoes 
featured in the photos represent the average citizen, the worker, and 
soldiers among them. In the ISAF imagery, Kotilainen (2011) notes, shoes 
denote humanitarian aid: in one of the pictures a little girl, in her broken, 
dirty shoes, is waiting to get new shoes from the ISAF soldiers. Kotilainen 
understands this exchange of the old and broken to the new and functional 
as a symbolic narrative of Western influence. The humanitarian West brings 
modernization and development to the colonialized Other (Kotilainen, 
2011: 59).  
 
From the perspective of press and strategic rituals, the shoes photos have 
the reading of reporting a happening rather than an action. An action is 
difficult to narrate visually without an actor. Now that the actor, the 
terrorist, is a taboo, the journalist is left with the happening and the 
consequence - the inevitable outcome of someone's actions that are outside 
the scope of the picture. Still, what makes these pictures effective is the 
narrative behind them. The journalist gets to present the consequence 
instead of making claims of the action. A visual description of the 
consequence is a fact, whereas a description of action is always an 
interpretation. This way, the journalist gets to maintain his professional 
integrity as a sensor that objectively transmits information from the scene 
to the public - either by personally capturing a picture of the shoe, or by 
borrowing an ISAF sponsored photo free of charge from the photo 
databank of Flickr.  The shoe photos reduce the interpretative role of the 
journalist and highlights the narrative behind the picture, and so makes the 
viewer responsible for making an interpretation and forming of the 
narrative. A shoe on the ground is a shoe on the ground - not a claim or an 
opinion. Ehrlich (1996) argues that news organizations use objective, 
strategic rituals to protect themselves from knowing they are intertwined 
and built into the power structure. Strategic rituals are thus attempts to keep 
the journalists and media professionals as outsiders and observers. This 
adds to the matrix of persuasion. When the journalists and media are 
specifically targeted by strategic communication and the government's 
"truth" is one of the few resources the media has access to, the media is 
bound to have an imbalanced perception of the reality of war at some point 
- and attempt to report it as something else.  
 
According to Sumiala (2010: 107), press rituals are a ritualistic form of 
narration and their analysis should focus on answering the questions who 
are the heros, villains and victims of the story, who are the 'us' who are 
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 being threatened, and by whom. The shoe photos manage to give out all 
this information without visually showing a single person. Rituals are 
repetitive, standardized, institutionalized, and express sacred values 
(Ehrlich, 1996; Sumiala, 2010). They are not personal interpretations, but 
shared and institutionalized ways of communicating even abstract 
phenomena. The rituals of picturing terrorism focus on the consequences of 
'absolute evil' by the repetitive, symbolic use of shoes, which have come to 
personify violence against shared values such as the right to life and 
freedom from fear. Rituals are evaluation of what is good (ingroup) and 
what is not (outgroup) and in this process, media are the mediators of the 
shared values and social experience (Sumiala, 2010).  
 
Whereas visualizing the bodies and wounded has become problematic in 
the Western media, there is no such problem with the shoe pictures. By 
representing the victims with their shoes, the media determine the way we 
perceive not only the war, but the invisible enemy. The victim can be 
anyone, awoman, child or a soldier, in environments they cannot avoid, 
meaning the enemy is present everywhere, about to inflict death and 
destruction indiscriminately, leaving no space for peace, security and 
stability. The shoes have become a grammar of victimhood produced by the 
media, which influence the way we attach significance to the happenings in 
Afghanistan.  
 
3.4.3 The rituals of hide and seek and the historic captures 
 
Another way to approach rituals is to analyze mediated rituals and 
mediatized rituals. Sumiala (2010) recognizes the overlap and problemacy 
of the discussion on the definitions, but states that in mediation process the 
focus is on the transmission of communication by the means of the media, 
whereas mediatized rituals require mediation, but emphasize the role of the 
media as a modifier of rituals and thereby as a participant in the process of 
representation and interpretation. The mediatization process thus attaches 
meaning to public events and rituals and creates structures to their 
representation by choices such as what to mediate and what not (Sumiala, 
2010: 115-116; also Cottle, 2006). The mediatization of rituals may realize 
as media spectacles or media events. 
 
One of the legitimizing aims of the 'war on terror' (understood here not 
only as terrorism, but as terror and horror) has been to capture the 
representatives of absolute evil - Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden and 
finally, Muammar Gaddafi - who, in the Western media, have been 
represented as violent, malicious and dangerous leaders. The captures have 
followed more or less the same pattern:  the evil, suppressing leaders have 
been found and captured by their enemies (and citizens) all in a state of 
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 dishonor. One found in a "spiderhole", another in a dirty and less than 
luxurious house described as a primitive compound, and the third 
conveniently in a sewer, like a "rat". These places of capture were 
illustrated by highly descriptive drawings that elaborated the course of 
events and the final panic of the toppled leaders. These caves and holes 
have become paramount in the process of denouncing the 'profane other', 
and have thereby become the setting of the ritual of capture as well as a 
press ritual. As a press ritual, the publishing of the place of capture once 
again allows the audience to discover the facts of the event. However, as a 
mediatized ritual, the imagery of the setting is combined to the narratives of 
capture: how Saddam Hussein begged for mercy, how Bin Laden tried to 
hide behind his wife, and how Gaddafi begged not to get shot. All this as 
instructed by the Commander's Hanbook for Strategic Communication and 
Communication Strategy (US Joint Forces Command, 2010: IV-22): 
portraying the "terrorists" as "cowardly". The captures were media events 
that were presented as the change of history: the end of oppression, the 
beginning of a democratic era, and the victory of justice. These media 
events engaged the whole world, as everyone was able to witness these 
mediated events. The capture of Muammar Gaddafi may have been the best 
example of a media event. It combined the elements of live broadcasting, 
the interruption of daily routines, a massive, global audience and 
ceremonious nuance of the event (see Dayan & Katz, 1992). The function 
of the media event was to unite the global audience (also an element of the 
media events, according to Dayan and Katz).  
 
Mediatized rituals, I argue, are more productively conceptualized 
as an identifiable and variegated class of performative media 
enactments in which solidarities are summoned and moral ideas 
of the ‘social good’ are unleashed and exert agency in the public 
life of societies. (Cottle, 2006). 
 
The communicative power of these captures is based on their ritualistic 
nature. The collapse of the glory is symbolised by the final days of the 
formerly great leaders spent "underground" and in dirty, primitive 
surroundings. The place of capture becomes the evaluation of the captive 
and as this ritual builds, in the future this is what we will expect from the 
capture of the the absolute evil: dirty, toppled and powerless men in the 
surroundings that are the absolute opposite to their former glory. The 
captures were highly symbolic and were mediatized ritualistically, leaving 
no space for second guesses on whether the captures were 'good' and the 
captured 'bad'. From the Western perspective, the captures were presented 
as media spectacles - as triumph of justice and democracy. From the 
American perspective, the captures were a good realization of strategic 
communication objectives: they showed the cause and effect in a very 
concrete way. 
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Strategic communication, or more precicely the Battle of Narrative and its 
delegitimizing discourses, mythologize the enemy. This provides resources 
to the ritualization process. Strategic communication and the mass media 
are symbiotic in the sense that the media needs the 'official story', and 
strategic communication needs the media to produce the rituals and thereby 
narratives in their full form. In Hussein's and Bin Laden's case, the media 
had to rely on the Pentagon and the White House in order to receive visual 
material of the events of the capture. In Gaddafi's case, the visual material 
was produced by both the Libyan public, but broadcasted according to the 
ritualistic rules set by the previous captures. Photos and illustrations of the 
sewage pipe emerged. A point to notice here is that the pictures of the place 
of capture enable the Pentagon to tell the story of the end of 'evil' without 
visually engaging in overt violence. Gaddafi's case was different: he was 
lynched by his fellow citizens, which allowed the role of the international 
community in the capture to remain in the background.  
 
3.4.4 Conclusions on rituals of communication 
 
War and conflict are natural environments for death and mourning. Sumiala 
(2010) and Pantti & Sumiala (2009) argue that rituals have an essential 
function in the context of death. Death and rituals that relate to it join 
people together and, even though they alone cannot construct unity out of 
nothing, rituals are factors in the sense of togetherness and solidarity:  
"ritual activities remain critical, not despite but because of increasing social 
disintegration" (Pantti & Sumiala, 2009). This chapter demonstrates that 
death can be treated as a public trauma or a public celebration, and in both 
cases the mediation of these media events happens through extensive use of 
media rituals.   
 
What connects the rituals of the media to strategic communication? As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the different organizations of the U.S. 
government are one of the primary sources of war-related information and 
materials. Also, the ties between the government and the media in some 
cases prevent journalists from broadcasting unauthorized material (Snow & 
Taylor, 2006). The discussion on the use of rituals demonstrates how 
strategic communication does not limit itself to public affairs and 
information operations, but specifically targets journalists to make them tell 
the stories of warfare. The media is one of the key audiences of strategic 
communication efforts - in fact, the Commander's Handbook on Strategic 
Communication and Communication Strategy names media as one of three 
significant characteristics that have an impact on the information 
environment during military operations. The other two are populace and 
communication structure (US Joint Forces Command, 2010: p. IV-14). 
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 According to Cioppa (2009) after taking command, General David Petraeus 
stressed that 60% of the fight is information and that in order to operate 
effectively, the mission leadership have to be the ones who first get the 
information to the media.  
 
What rituals do is construct a different kind of an experience of warfare 
compared to the official Pentagon briefings. Rituals engage the audience 
both emotionally and cognitively, participate in the evaluation processes of 
legitimation and delegitimation and establish clear causal connections 
between the 'illegitimate' and defeat. Rituals are a means to evaluate both 
'self' and the 'other'. They are a natural phenomenon during the age of 
publicity, where your chances of influence depend on how you are 
perceived by the global audience. These processes of legitimation and 
delegitimation are what link rituals to strategic communication. This should 
remind us that these forms of communication are powerful in the 
manufacturing of consent. "[I]t is important to look at rituals from the point 
of view of what kind of social centres they construct and what kind of 
social order they naturalize" (Pantti & Sumiala, 2009). 
 
Rituals are social structure and are therefore essential in the sensemaking of 
war: in the words of the Strategic communication Joint Integrating Concept 
and the Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and 
Communication strategy, the presentations of cause and effect are vital in 
the Battle of Narrative. The "holistic" understanding of strategic 
communication is the fact that "actions speak louder than words" (US Joint 
Forces Command, 2010). Rituals are action and the heavy emphasis on the 
meaning of action makes media rituals a natural context of communication. 
However, it is not the Pentagon or the White House that 'produce' rituals. 
The communicative patterns of rituals in the media are an outcome of the 
interaction between the government representatives and the media. The 
most essential function of strategic communication, generating legitimacy 
and illegitimacy, is fulfilled by media rituals to a great extent. It is 
important to understand that these rituals are not entirely controlled by the 
Pentagon, even though they may be influenced by the Pentagon's 
information hegemony and practices of handling the media. Also an 
important notice is that the expressive violence of the enemy is never 
ritualized by the enemy themselves, but by the mediatization of the Western 
media. This, in addition to the taboo-enforcing practices of the Pentagon, 
contributes to a highly stereotypical visual and semantic landscape of the 
adversary and their ideology. 
 
Rituals are the domain where the ideology of strategic communication and 
the Bataillean notions of the homogenous and heterogenous merge. 
Whereas the strategic manuals instruct to construct separate realities of 'us' 
and 'them', rituals are the practice that carry out this process.  
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 3.5 Summary of methods 
 
The discussion of the methodological framework thus far started from the 
CDA demand for a multidisciplinary approach to analyzing discourse. The 
argumentation started from Van Dijk's triangular (social-cognitive-textual) 
approach that supported the line of argument that i) discourse is determined 
by the interplay of the social, cognitive and textual domains, ii) discourse is 
influenced by ideology (cognitive and social structure),  and iii) this 
ideology has textual manifestations. This argumentation was continued by a 
discussion of the experiential, interpersonal and textual metafunctions of 
the systemic functional language theory, which were developed into a 
method for analyzing discourse as ideological structure. The core claim 
here is that action descriptions (Processes) encapsulate the communicative 
aim of ideological discourse. It was stated that while the main emphasis is 
on the experiential and interpersonal meaning (transitivity and evaluations), 
the three metafunctions (experiential, interpersonal and textual) are all at 
play in the production of ideological discourse. In order to keep the 
theoretical framework concise, the articles that follow will focus on 
transitivity and appraisal analysis, while it is recognized that there are 
approaches and theoretical discussion that would contribute to the analysis, 
were it possible to include them. Finally, the theory on the rituals of 
communication provides theoretical background to the discussion on the 
empirical findings of the case studies that follow.  
 
Image 4: Discourse and methods for analyzing the representations of 
ction A
 
The Experiential, Interpersonal, and Textual metafunctions are parallel with 
Van Dijk's social-cognitive-textual triangle. Therefore, ideology can be 
approached as a discourse through the methodological framework set up in 
this chapter: the systems of transitivity, voice and polarity, which are 
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 realized in the Processes of clauses and the evaluation they contain. Be it 
the case of text, speech or image, the different representations of Action 
ncapsulate the meanings and evaluations of what is being communicated.  
vid 
)  
Analysis 
e
 
Excerpt from Secretary Rumsfeld 
Interview-Bob Schieffer and Da
Martin, CBS Face The Nation 
(Department of Defense, 2002
We're not bombing Baghdad. 
sanction/propriety) 
 
 
 
 
 
Voice: active 
Polarity: negative 
Transitivity: material 
Evaluation: Judgment (social 
That is a precise attack on the regime 
of Saddam Hussein --  
ty) 
Voice: active 
Polarity: positive 
Transitivity: material 
Evaluation: Judgment (social 
sanction/proprie
that's what's being targeted, and that is 
what's being hit, and they know it. 
ity: material ('us'), mental 
ocial sanction 
apacity, Affect (insecurity) 
Voice: passive 
Polarity: positive 
Transitiv
('them') 
Evaluation: Judgment (S
/propriety) ('us'), social 
esteem/c
('them') 
And the military targets in there are 
being hit, the communications targ
are being hit,and they know that's
ets 
 
what's happening.  
), active ('them') 
ity: material ('us'), mental 
ial 
'), Affect 
hem') 
Voice: passive ('us
Polarity: positive 
Transitiv
('them') 
Evaluation: Judgment (soc
sanction/propriety, social 
esteem/capacity) ('us
(insecurity) ('t
Units are calling up and saying, "We 
want to surrender,"  
ffect (insecurity) 
Voice: active 
Polarity: positive 
Transitivity: verbal, behavioral 
Evaluation: A
and we're communicating with them 
and finding ways to do that.  
ent (social 
esteem/propriety) 
Voice: active 
Polarity: positive 
Transitivity: verbal, mental 
Evaluation: Judgm
Table 8: Means of analysis 
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In the first two clauses the voice is active, and the material Process is 
evaluated positively: by bombing Saddam Hussein's regime instead of 
Baghdad, the speaker claims propriety, in this case legitimacy. In the third 
line the voice changes from active to passive and the second material 
Process evaluates as capacity - a description of effective use of force. The 
'enemy' action is verbalized as a mental Process, which demonstrates the 
wish to describe the 'inner' experience (insecurity) of those under attack. 
The same patterns continue in the fourth line, further emphasizing the roles 
of dominator and underdog, until in the fifth line the 'inner' experience of 
the 'enemy' is expressed with a verbal Process, giving the 'enemy' a voice. 
Obviously here the interpretation of the Other's inner experience is a strong 
claim, which further illustrates the evaluative element of the experiential 
metafunction. In this excerpt the actions of 'self' are typically descriptions 
of the use of force (material Processes), which are typically coupled with 
passive voice, whereas the 'enemy' action is reported in active voice and 
with mental and behavioral Process types. The 'self' is thus dynamic, but 
the action (Processes) are "muted" into happenings. The 'enemy', instead, is 
not represented as an actor, but as a 'senser' or 'behaver' in addition to being 
a Goal, an object of someone else's action. The above table thus 
summarizes the main ideas of the experiential and interpersonal domain 
presented in this chapter: the systems of voice, polarity, and above all, 
transitivity and the resource of appraisal, which can be traced in both image 
nd text. 
sses in the context of media and thereby 
mplement the framework.  
a
 
The above excerpt also illustrates how configurations of clauses show 
systemacy in representing identities in certain ways and patterns. Similar 
systemacy can be observed in the rituals of communication and how they 
construct identities: in fact, the very systemacy makes the act a ritual. This 
is to say that there are also parallels between visual and verbal 
communication that could be characterized as ritualistic. The theoretical 
framework for approaching the rituals of communication can be applied to 
text just as well as images, and the processes of appraisal are equally 
present in images as in texts. Therefore, discourse analysis and the theory 
on rituals should not be treated as separate methods, but here the function 
of the discussion on the application of rituals theory here is to approach the 
ideological evaluation proce
co
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4 
AND CRITIQUE ON 
TRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 
s a leadership model differs from the actual practices of 
commentary on the abolition of the term and revision of the 
oncept. 
 
 
A REVIEW OF THE DISCUSSION 
S
 
 
 
 
efore the empirical part of this dissertation, it is necessary to engage 
in the theoretical discussion on Strategic Communication. This is 
done in these following two chapters (4 and 5). This chapter is a 
literary review of the discussion as well as critique on the development and 
application of communication strategy and practices. It summarizes the 
contents and themes of some of the key documents that address the 
development and execution of Strategic Communication. This chapter also 
lays the background for Chapter 5, which contains the contribution this 
dissertation makes for the critical, theoretical discussion on Strategic 
Communication from the perspective of communication theory. By 
addressing the aims, practices and shortcomings of Strategic 
Communication, these two chapters provide theoretical background and 
context for the empiricism that follows. They illustrate the way Strategic 
Communication a
B
communication. 
 
The ways and means of how warfare and military operations are 
communicated about are not subject to so-called civilian critique only. 
However, whereas the critics who represent the civilian world tend to focus 
on the ethics of military communication in the U.S. military community 
and organizations close to it, the criticism has revolved around the 
questions of effective implementation. The following review addresses a 
number of reports and documents in chronological order. It starts from the 
pre-doctrinal development phase of Strategic Communication and finishes 
with the 
c
 
4.1 Towards doctrinization 
 
The term Strategic Communication has been around for the entire 21st 
century. The development of Strategic Communication we know now 
started under President Bush and continued until its doctrinization in 2009. 
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 One of the first more comprehensive accounts on how Strategic 
Communication should be understood and applied is the Department of 
Defense's (DoD) 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review: Execution Roadmap 
for Strategic Communication (QDR). It states that national interests depend 
on the "accuracy, consistency, veracity, timeliness, and transparency in 
words and deeds". During the years that followed, the above attributes of 
consistency and transparency have also been the guiding principle of all 
criticism towards Strategic Communication, but from two different 
perspectives. The military community has called for better and more 
effective synchronization of communications, whereas it is the 
transparency of "words and deeds" that can be seen as one of the ethical 
tarting points of the Public Affairs (PA) and Public Relations (PR) 
ic Communication has been about the mechanisms and hierarchies 
f responsibility. This can be seen in the three objectives the 2006 QDR 
that incorporates the principles of 
lic Affairs, 
n, 
ilitary Diplomacy and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy.  
ctives focus on how and who rather than what in terms of 
ommunication. Strategic Communication is seen as a model for 
s
professionals as well as the civil society.  
 
However, the QDR discusses the implementation of Strategic 
Communication from the perspective of the military leadership and 
attempts to establish a hierarchy of personnel and responsibilities rather 
than a communication model. As a consequence of the responsibility-
orientation, it identifies "gaps" between Public Affairs, aspects of 
Information Operations (IO), Psychological Operations (PO), Military 
Diplomacy (MD) and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD). 
Strateg
o
sets:  
 
1) Institutionalizing a DoD process 
Strategic Communication into the development of strategy, policy 
formulation, planning and execution.  
2) Define roles, responsibilities and relationships in terms of Pub
Information Operations, Psychological Operations, Visual Informatio
M
3) Organize, train and equip DoD's communication support capabilities. 
 
All the above obje
c
(re)organization. 
 
4.2 Determining the guiding principles 
 
In 2008, the Department of Defense published a guide for the Principles of 
Strategic Communication. The guide lists nine principles "in no order of 
precedence". However, leadership is placed clearly topmost. In Strategic 
Communication, "leaders must lead communication process": in other 
words, Strategic Communication is a top-down, one-way process of 
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 transferring meaning. According to the document, communication must be 
at the very core of everything leaders do to ensure actions, words and 
images produced are integrated and coherent. Like the 2006 QDR, this 
document thus continues to highlight synchronization (or consistency, as 
hrased in the QDR) as the key element of successful Strategic 
s and their 
xecution have been addressed by critics since the publication of the 
document and have remained in the focus of debate ever since.  
 multiple “means” and these 
eans should be restricted only by the requirement to achieve the desired 
p
Communication.  
 
The rest of the nine key principles include credibility (truthfulness and 
respect), dialogue and exchange of ideas, unity of effort (integration and 
coordination), responsiveness, the understanding of others, pervasiveness 
of actions, results-based pursuit of desired effects, and continuous analysis, 
planning, execution and assessment. Many of these principle
e
 
4.3 Doctrine criticism at a pre-doctrinal phase 
 
Before the official concept was even published, it already attracted 
criticism. Murphy's (2008) The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s), 
published a year before the final Strategic Communication doctrine, 
criticizes the long process of drafting the concept on one hand, and the 
confusion that the failure to finalize the concept and "flying the plane while 
we're building it" on the other. This, according to Murphy, resulted in 
confusion about what Strategic Communication is and is not, leaving the 
definition and the process for the leaders as well as warfighters to interpret. 
He points out that the 2007 The National Strategy for Public Diplomacy 
and Strategic Communication does not define Strategic Communication, 
but distinguishes between it and Public Diplomacy. Instead, the 2006 QDR 
defined Strategic Communication as "focused USG (United States 
Government) processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences 
in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance 
national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated 
information, themes, plans, programs and actions synchronized with other 
elements of national power" but, as Murphy notes and as mentioned above, 
lists Public Affairs, Information Operations, Psychological Operations 
(PsyOps), Visual Information (VI), Military Diplomacy and Defense 
Support to Public Diplomacy as elements of Strategic Communication. 
This, according to Murphy, is a problem, because it limits the means 
(capabilities such as PA, IO and PsyOps) that are needed to achieve the 
ends: "Strategic communication employs
m
information effect on the target audience."  
 
Murphy continues the discussion on the failure to define what Strategic 
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 Communication is. Is it simply PR (which would "limit the synergistic 
support of military operations") or is it something else? He highlights his 
view that the key to successful Strategic Communication is "an 
organizational unit culture that values, understands, and thus considers 
strategic communication means as important capabilities (limited only by 
imagination) to be integrated within established planning processes." This 
is to say that Strategic Communication should be understood as "a way" 
and not as "a means". Understanding Strategic Communication as a way to 
create information effects "using any means available" takes, according to 
Murphy, "the mystery out of the concept." Murphy's critique is an example 
of the boundary between military and civil/commercial communication. In 
the light of this article it appears that the development of Strategic 
Communication in the military community, in isolation from the academic 
world, has created a rather artificial concept that addresses only the 
uestions of organizational hierarchy, responsibilities and leadership, but 
d non-kinetic) and communications contribute to and 
hape the ultimate effects. This reflects the effects-centric paradigm in 
milit
 
ducted is also a key component of 
trategic communication, since actions send very loud and clear 
t of Defense, 2009) and the Commander's 
andbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy (U.S. 
Joint Forces Command, 2010).  
q
fails to address the problems of actual communication. 
 
In Murphy's article, the final criticism is based on the difference between 
Strategic Communication and Information Operations. Whereas Strategic 
Communication is the more general concept that targets key audiences, 
Information Operations target the adversary's decision making capability. 
According to Murphy, achieving a military objective will automatically 
create an information effect, which means that the messages sent by both 
actions (kinetic an
s
ary planning.  
Strategic Communication is simply a way to affect perceptions, 
attitudes and beliefs of key audiences in support of objectives. 
Certainly communications means are very important in 
ultimately achieving those desired information effects. But how 
military operations are con
s
messages. (Murphy, 2008). 
 
In conclusion, Murphy's arguments about the say-do gap and the 
synchronization of words and actions resonate with the finalized doctrine 
and its practical guidance presented in the Strategic Communication Joint 
Integrating Concept (Departmen
H
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 4.4 R
 
ntless studies, articles, and opinion pieces have announced 
that U.S. strategic communication and public diplomacy are in 
blished means that it argued 
trategic Communication was in a crisis before it was officially born. The 
t in the debate (Paul, 2009: 3): 
 s of 
communication  
trategic 
ommunication. When the organization is the Department of State, the 
eacting to the "crisis" of Strategic Communication 
Cou
crisis and are inadequate to meet current demand. (Paul, 2009: 
v). 
 
In 2009, the RAND Corporation published a report that was the first to 
review and summarize several sources on the Strategic Communication 
development and debate thus far. Claiming Strategic Communication was 
in a crisis the year the official concept was pu
S
report does much to map out the multifaceted topic. It recognizes four areas 
of disagreemen
 
 demonstrating and projecting American values vs. sharing values and 
respect 
 disagreements in reputation and image management 
disagreement on communication models and the mechanism
 disagreement between the advocates of "black" (propaganda) and 
"white" (trustworthy and credible) communication 
 
The official doctrine, as argued in the next sections as well as the next 
chapter, highlights the first two debates. The specific aim of sharing values 
and meaning is an element of the official concept, however this is 
understood as projection of values rather than dialogue. At the same time, 
public diplomacy is, as Murphy's criticism above demonstrated, understood 
as an element of the concept. The report supports Murphy's critique by 
recognizing the terminological overlap: "Some experts use strategic 
communication and public diplomacy as synonyms, while some 
subordinate strategic communication to public diplomacy and others vice 
versa" (Paul, 2009: 2). Strategic Communication and public diplomacy are, 
according to the report, more or less the same phenomenon, simply 
delivered in different contexts. When the organization producing 
communication is the Department of Defense, the product is S
C
product is Public Affairs. Either way, the aim of both forms of 
communication is to manage the reputation and image of the state.  
 
The third disagreement takes place between the military and the academic 
communities. This dissertation is an example of the criticism Strategic 
Communication attracts due to its outlook on the models and mechanisms 
of communication. An example of this is Robert D. Deutsch's (2010) 
Ambassadors to the world: A new paradigm for Public Diplomacy and 
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 Strategic Communication. As the title demonstrates, the conceptual overlap 
of public diplomacy and Strategic Communication is recognized also in the 
academic community. More importantly, Deutsch's contribution to the 
Strategic Communication debate addresses the problems that have largely 
been ignored by the military community. He argues that the "'push-down' 
theories of persuasion - public diplomacy strategies that rely on logic and 
facts, and even the concept of 'winning hearts and minds' - are all obsolete 
odels of communication. People cannot be persuaded of something they 
Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy (U.S. 
oint Forces Command, 2010), which associate propaganda with adversary 
(2008), "US military’s 
eavy reliance on the Internet and other public communication networks 
m
do not instinctively believe." This line of argumentation is continued in the 
theoretical discussion of the next chapter. 
 
The fourth and last disagreement, in turn, is also characteristic for the 
academic as well as public debate. As Strategic Communication contains 
the element of perception management in addition to Public Affairs and 
Public Diplomacy, the ethics of communication, namely who can be 
manipulated, by what means and to which extent, remains controversial. As 
Taylor & Snow (2006) argue, the relationship between the "democratic 
ideals and principles toward openness" and "military needs of operational 
security and to secure public support in a ‘war’ that has been declared on 
global terrorism" is problematic. Taylor & Snow (2006) refer to the current 
practices as the "democratic propaganda model", in which the enemy 
practices propaganda, while democracies "tell the truth" and take the moral 
high ground by reflecting democratic ideals. This lexical and semantic 
difference of propaganda and truth-telling is in fact incorporated in the 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Department of Defense, 2006/2009) as well as the Commander's 
Handbook on 
J
communication. However, the Handbook does instruct the use of counter-
propaganda.  
 
Winseck (2008) criticizes the "blowback" effect of information operations. 
According to Winseck, due to combination of the "full-spectrum 
dominance" U.S. communication doctrine, military–information–media–
entertainment complex and the global media, the information operations 
conducted abroad in Muslim-majority countries eventually have an impact 
at home. The blowback takes place when the line between black and white 
propaganda is crossed. In the Iraqi media, for instance, the contents have 
been heavily manipulated and yet available globally, making the audience 
much broader than necessary. This means that black propaganda has been 
directed globally rather than locally. And, it is not only the foreign media 
that are being influenced. According to Winseck 
h
means that cyberspace is being retooled to meet national security, 
surveillance, propaganda and cyberwarfare needs." 
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These four perspectives listed by the RAND report demonstrate that 
trategic Communication is subject to debates and criticism both within the 
ip and/or coordinating authority 
strategic communication 
verall strategy: the purpose and 
 The need for better coordination and organizational changes or 
is suggests that despite the constant research and reporting, the 
oncept has failed to address and incorporate the demands of the 
ent, discussed in detail in the following chapter, 
presents the basic principles of the communication model. The concept is 
desig ent 
of D
, 
S
military community and outside it. The report presents the reoccurring 
themes of recommendations (Paul, 2009: 4-16): 
 
 A call for “leadership": Many of the sources used for the RAND 
report call for presidential leadersh
across agencies and departments. Also, responsibility as well as 
"good choices" regarding organizing for 
and creating policies are called for. 
 Demand for increased resources for strategic communication and 
public diplomacy (personnel and funding). 
 A call for a clear definition of an o
aim of the government and how it communicates these messages. 
Such would be "a clear foreign policy strategy that strategic 
communication can support" (p. 8). 
additions: creation, reorganization and rebalancing government and 
independent agencies to improve coordination of SC. 
 
Overall, three out of four of these recommendations are explicitly 
leadership-oriented. These recommendations date back to the time the 
drafting of the concept first began. The 2004 Report of the Defense Science 
Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (Department of Defense, 
2004: 1-3) calls for presidential leadership, synchronization of policies, 
improvement of America's "negative image" as well as government-private 
sector partnership, all proposed five years later in the RAND report. As 
argued in the next chapters, many of these challenges have remained to this 
day. Th
c
community that is directly involved with developing the communication 
policy. 
 
4.5 Bridging theory and practice: the launch and the first overhaul 
 
In 2009, the Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept was 
published. The docum
ned to solve "the military problem", described as follows (Departm
efense, 2009: 3): 
 
How could a future joint force commander plan and execute joint 
operations to affect the behaviors of selected populations
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 governments or other decision-making groups to achieve the 
lex and globally interconnected information environment? 
 
The  Defense, 
2009
 
 to affect the perceptions, 
in 
3. monitor, measure and assess the effects of these signals; and 
ent levels of 
ommand." Further, it highlights the importance of a synchronized 
mission and promote broader national interests in a socially 
comp
operational solution to the problem follows (Department of
: 9): 
1. identify, segment, study and listen to potential audiences; 
2. conceive, produce and coordinate signals through both 
information and actions designed
attitudes, beliefs and thus the behaviors of selected audiences 
ways that support the accomplishment of the mission and 
promote broader national interests; 
4. iteratively modify actions and information products based on 
feedback on the effects of the signals. 
 
The mechanism of the communication process contain the concepts of 
messages, themes and narratives and their synchronization.  
 
In 2010, The Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and 
Communication Strategy followed. As the name of the Handbook implies, 
this document, published only nine months after the official concept, 
already questions the term Strategic Communication. It uses it side by side 
with Communication Strategy and states that "[i]n order to eliminate the 
confusion caused by the currently broad SC definition, and intellectual 
baggage that comes with the term “strategic,” we may want to consider 
using the term “Communication Strategy” for the overall construct, leaving 
specific terms intact that describe efforts at the differ
c
communication strategy in operations and further elaborates the 
synchronization process of messages, themes and narratives. 
 
These two documents are relevant in the discussion on the Strategic 
Communication debate for two reasons. First, the timing. The official 
concept was published five years after the 2004 Report of the Defense 
Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (Department of 
Defense, 2004) that concludes by stating that "U.S. strategic 
communication must be transformed". Between 2004 and 2009 the term 
Strategic Communication was in use although the official doctrine was not 
yet published, and the time period, as suggested by the review here, was 
marked by criticism and debate on the approach and practices of the 
concept. The slow doctrinization process resulted in uncertainty and 
thereby fueled criticism, questions, and multiple interpretations of the term 
and its interpretation. Second, the years of debate and uncertainty followed 
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 by the publication of the concept meant that the process of running down 
e term started almost immediately. The term, as suggested by the 2010 
trategic Communication and Communication 
lematic from the beginning.  
ommunication does not guarantee success or far reaching 
olitical consequences: the U.S. "must recognize how consistent words and 
munication synchronization. 
his means that as a concept, Strategic Communication only lived for three 
ears, most of which it was criticized for being unclear and confusing both 
th
Commander's Handbook on S
Strategy, has been prob
 
4.6 Killing the term  
 
Crowley's (2012) short article The Pentagon Drops Strategic 
Communication: Behind the Name Change sums up many of the sore 
points of military communication understood as Strategic Communication. 
First, again, is the overlapping terminology. The use of the basic terms such 
as propaganda, persuasion and information largely depend on the target 
audience: "For example, by law, the United States government cannot 
'propagandize' its own people, but is permitted to try to 'persuade' others 
around the world to support U.S. interests and actions. It can 'inform' 
anyone about U.S. policies, actions, history, culture and opportunities." 
Persuasion and informing are both key themes in Strategic Communication, 
but Crowley suggests the terms and the distinctions drawn between them 
are artificial:  communication practices that may be called either Public 
Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Information Operations and global engagement 
- again depending on the audience - have simply been referred to as 
Strategic Communication when practiced by the Department of Defense. 
He argues that it is irrelevant what these practices are called, but what 
should be carefully considered is the practice itself, which should focus on 
the synchronization of communication.  Crowley (2012) notes that 
consistent c
p
actions translate into effective and sustainable policies, regardless of what 
you call it." 
 
Crowley's article is a reaction to the Department of Defense's (2012) 
memorandum that addresses the questions about the status of Strategic 
Communication and Public Affairs. According to the document, the 
original purpose of Strategic Communication was to "synchronize 
communication across the department", which eventually created confusion 
in terms of the roles and functions of the staff. Also, the document notes 
that Strategic Communication was mostly public affairs, which is not the 
responsibility of the Department of Defense. Due to these conclusions, 
Strategic Communication is replaced with com
T
y
terminologically and in roles of responsibility. 
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 But is "communication synchronization" different than Strategic 
Communication? According to Crowley, it is not. Rosa Brooks (2012), who 
erved as a counselor to the U.S. defense undersecretary and participated in 
the d that 
with 
 
2006. It hearkens back 
to the days when DOD leadership imagined that disciplined use 
 importance than the success of synchronizing not only 
ommunication, but words and deeds. This is obviously a difficult task, as 
tions of the audience, which are 
ferent name. This is the reason 
hy the concepts have never overcome their core problem: the focus is 
tion) is another element that links communication to other 
rms of military action suggests that in fact, synchronization emerges not 
s
rafting of the 2009 concept of Strategic Communication, argues 
communication synchronization nothing changes:  
"Communications synchronization"? To me, the term has a rather 
fascistic ring. Though I'm sure this was not the intent, it suggests 
a rigid determination to make all utterances hew to a narrow 
party line. Mostly, though, it just misses the point, which is that 
strategic communication isn't about "communications." Little's 
memo could have been written in 2002 or 
of the right "messaging" would "win the war of ideas," and 
ignores a decade of accumulated wisdom. 
 
The year 2012 was thus marked by the conclusion that the name of the 
policy is of less
c
the success depends on the interpreta
beyond control. 
 
4.7 Discussion  
 
The fate of Strategic Communication is similar to that of Effects Based 
Operations: it is modeled after effects-centric planning, found to be blurry, 
misleading and confusing, and finally replaced with a version that draws 
from the previous concept that carries a dif
w
never on the problemacy of effects-centricness and its historic failure in 
communication efforts other than military.  
 
The question arises whether all current concepts are essentially the one and 
the same thing, as they have been intended to serve a common purpose, 
influence. As Murphy (2008) argued, SC should have been applied the 
same way as operational planning: to consider the desired informational 
and cognitive effects in the model of “ends, ways and means” of military 
strategy. The importance of action (other than verbal and visual 
communica
fo
only in the communication strategy, but between kinetic and non-kinetic 
doctrines. 
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 The concept of synchronization also reveals the absurdity of warfare. In 
order to communicate sustainably, one must also act ethically. When the 
principles of consistency and synchronization are brought into the focus, it 
 leadership that has to be addressed. This was the case with the original 
. Messages that do not 
upport the master narrative must be done away with, and as demonstrated 
e 
ame time they may force the military community to isolate itself from the 
r, this conclusion is followed by a discussion of the 
eoretical dead-end of military communication, which is consequence of 
e challenge the military community would face if they were to adopt 
ansparent communication models and abandon the control-oriented 
erations model. 
 
 
is
concept of Strategic Communication, as it is with communication 
synchronization. Throughout the 21st century, it is the leadership and 
management of communication that has received most attention. 
 
The increasing focus on leadership means that communication will be 
subject to increasing amounts of control and management. On one hand, 
this promotes discussion on the ways and means to improve transparency 
and ethical practices. On the other hand, the shift towards comprehensive 
synchronization efforts may encourage the opposite
s
by the several WikiLeaks scandals and materials of events and deeds made 
public by the soldiers, up to now censorship and denying the problem has 
been easier than engaging in a transparent dialogue. 
 
The Strategic Communication debate has fragmented into different themes 
and isolated communities that do not communicate with each other well. 
Whereas government organizations have engaged in the practical issues 
such as leadership and the implementation of the concept, the academic and 
non-military communities criticize the problematic perceptions of Strategic 
Community from the perspective of theory and research. All these 
communities have a very different conception of the ethics of 
communication. From the perspective of Public Relations, persuasion that 
does not adhere to the rules and norms of the 'marketplace of ideas' is 
unethical: whereas attempting to appear legitimate and make oneself hear is 
every actor's right, the attempts to silence other actors, which usually is the 
case in warfare, is not. This creates profound tension between the military 
and academic viewpoints. These tensions may force the military 
community to address and attempt to overcome the controversies, but at th
s
general field of communication - which, as argued in the following chapter, 
has been the case this far. As stated in the RAND report (Paul, 2009), the 
use of research in Strategic Communication has been insufficient this far.  
 
In the next chapte
th
th
tr
op
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STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION: FUNCTIONS, 
CHARACTERISTICS AND CRITICISM (ARTICLE I) 
 
 
 
All successful men have agreed on one thing - they were 
causationists. They believed that things went not by luck, but by   
law; that there was not a weak or a cracked link in the chain that 
joins the first and last of things. - Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
 
Power 
 
Thi
Str
Def
trategic Communication and Communication Strategy (US Joint Forces 
 doctrine, and 
tr f strategic 
im
 
Th
do
practices in the field and the migra
do  SC JIC 
de
the
re  the previous with an emphasis on 
 
s article consists of two parts. The first part will take a look at the 2009 
ategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept (Department of 
ense, 2009, hereafter SC JIC) and the 2010 Commander's Handbook for 
S
Command, 2010, hereafter CHSCCS) and introduces its aims. Also, it will 
discuss the elements that the concept specifies as its basic building blocks. 
This discussion aims to conceptualize the core function and constitution of 
the communication model that is labeled as "strategic".  For the sake of 
larity, Strategic Communication (upper case) refers to thec
s ategic communication (lower case) to communication o
portance in general. 
e SC JIC, as the title states, is a concept, whereas the CHSCCS is a pre-
ctrinal document that aims to serve "as a bridge between current 
tion into doctrine" (p. i). These two 
cuments thus cover the aspects of both theory and practice. The
termines the strategic function and objective of the doctrine, as well as 
 understanding of what communication is about, whereas the CHSCCS 
sents a much more detailed account ofp
the practical implementation of communication.  
 
The second part of the article analyzes the concept of Strategic 
Communication as a communication model and compares and contrasts it 
to the tradition of Mass Communication Research (MCR). This discussion 
is relevant in the analysis of Strategic Communication, because it reveals 
the strong theoretical parallels between Strategic Communication and MCR 
in terms of the outlook on the mechanics of the communication process. 
The history and challenges of MCR explicates the problems and 
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 complexities in the Strategic Communication processes of the 21st century. 
 
2. Purpose and aims of Strategic Communication: legitimacy and 
he SC JIV starts with a mission statement that underlines the aim of the 
 that should 
volve the audience and thereby make them do something - a textbook 
case  be 
unde ion, 
the p ls 
the c
 
 redibility and legitimacy 
 Weaken an adversary's credibility and legitimacy 
ording to the concept, are: 
 
1.
2. tion 
an the 
behaviors of selected audiences in ways that support the 
ac d promote broader national and 
international interests; 
on is the non-kinetic extension of doctrines such as Effects 
ased Operations and the Comprehensive Approach. The key notion here is 
unication. It 
 this purpose that determines the context and contents of Strategic 
Com  to 
persuasion  
 
T
concept in the very first paragraph: "to understand and engage key 
audiences". The "understanding" is presented as a practice
in
of persuasion. Despite the aim to understand, which could
rstood as commitment to interactive and dialogical communicat
urpose and function of the concept is made clear by the specific goa
oncept sets for Joint Force Strategic Communication: 
 Improve US c
 Convince selected audiences to take specific actions that support 
U.S. or international actions 
 Cause a competitor or adversary to take (or refrain from taking) 
specific actions 
 
These aims specifically state the objective to influence the audience's way 
of thinking and acting:  improve, weaken, convince and cause are all action 
descriptions that refer to creating effects rather than dialogue. The methods 
for pursuing these objectives, acc
 Identify, segment, study and listen to potential audiences; 
 conceive, produce and coordinate signals through both informa
d actions designed to affect perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and thus 
complishment of the mission an
3. Monitor, measure and assess the effects of these signals; and 
4. Iteratively modify actions and information products based on 
feedback on the effects of the signals. 
 
In other words, communication is seen as an instrument for creating 
desired, measurable effects. This approach to communication parallels with 
the effects-centric doctrines of the 21st century, meaning that Strategic 
Communicati
B
that the SC JIC states its key function is to generate legitimacy, which 
makes legitimation the key effect of (strategic/military) comm
is
munication:  the design of Strategic Communication is created
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 generate ourses of warfare 
perm
 
2.1 The elements of Strategic Communication: Theme, message and 
arrative  
at the term strategic communication is problematic 
nd suggests communication strategy should be used instead:  
 
In sed by the currently broad 
SC definition, and intellectual baggage that comes with the term 
se of communication 
trategy to address all communication-related concepts would not disrupt 
the rts. 
Com and 
strate
 
Acco egy 
cons rds, 
comm om 
resou ior. 
The n and its significance as a message receives attention 
roughout the Handbook. Action, as well as verbal and visual signals, 
re 
rucial in understanding the communication process (p. II-10): 
 Theme: an overarching concept or intention, designed for 
 narratives of what is legitimate, fixating the disc
anently onto the themes of right, wrong, good and evil.  
n
 
The CHSCCS notes th
a
order to eliminate the confusion cau
“strategic,” we may want to consider using the term 
“Communication Strategy” for the overall construct, leaving 
specific terms intact that describe efforts at the different levels of 
war. (p. II-11) 
 
This can be seen as a response to the problematic redefinition and renaming 
processes of different communication strategies (from information 
operations to perception management and now Strategic Communication) 
and as an effort to make sense of the variety of concepts that overlap and 
create confusion on different operational levels. The u
s
already existing terms related to communication effo
munication strategy is intended to cover the tactical, operational 
gic levels. It is defined as  
 
A joint force commander’s strategy for coordinating and 
synchronizing themes, messages, images, and actions to support 
national level strategic communication related objectives and 
ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to 
the lowest tactical level. (p. II-11) 
rding to this definition, the overarching communication strat
ists of themes, messages, images and actions. In other wo
unication is understood as a multimodal process that draws fr
rces such as speech, text, image, physical/kinetic action and behav
emphasis of actio
th
should be synchronized in order for them to "inform and influence selected 
audiences".  
 
In terms of text, speech, image and action, the terms theme and message a
c
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 broad application to achieve specific objectives. 
 Message: a narrowly focused communication directed at a 
The n is 
narra
 
 
Strat es. 
Mess [..] 
the n ort 
strate ults 
in ii). 
Sync tion 
effor unified and harmonized 
arratives undermines all communication efforts. Cioppa (2009) illustrates 
On a daily basis, key quotes were captured from MNF–I and GoI 
Division 
Director (US Navy flag officer). [...]This is a good example of 
specific audience to create a specific effect while supporting a 
theme. 
 
third key term in the process of producing strategic communicatio
tive, defined as  
 Narrative: enduring strategic communication with context, 
reason/motive, and goal/end state. 
egic documents, according to the Handbook, produce narrativ
ages, instead, should support the themes, "themes should support 
ext higher level themes, and themes at all levels should supp
gic themes and the enduring national narrative" (p. xiii). This res
"consistent communications to global audiences" (p. xi
hronization is seen as the key requirement of all communica
ts. The failure to produce synchronized, 
n
the synchronized use of themes in the production of strategic 
communication during the Operation Iraqi Freedom:  
 
leaders. On a weekly basis, the best quotes for each of MNF–I 
and GoI were placed in a theme category (e.g. political progress, 
security, troop reduction). These best quotes were quite selective 
and limited to no more than one page each for MNF–I and GoI. 
The intent of these one-page documents was to frame events and 
highlight specifically the key messages that should be reinforced 
in media engagements based upon guidance from General 
Petraeus, the MNF–I STRATEFF Director (US Army general 
officer), and MNF–I STRATEFF Communication 
mutually supportive and synchronized messaging. [...] These key 
messages, especially for MNF–I, were integrated into the press 
conferences and enabled the shaping and reinforcement strategic 
communication. 
 
In short, the concept of Strategic Communication is based on the principle 
that themes and messages are the building blocks of the desired narrative of 
the military operation. The narrative has a legitimatory purpose, which is 
presented as the primary objective of strategic (military) communication. 
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 2.2 "The Battle of the Narrative" 
 
If messages and themes are needed to establish narratives, then how are 
these narratives used in the context of Strategic Communication?  
 
The battle of the narrative is a full-blown battle in the cognitive 
dimension of the information environment, just as traditional 
warfare is fought in the physical domains (air, land, sea, space, 
hysical domains, is to shape the environment such that the 
contest of arms will be fought on terms that are to your 
ative doesn’t just diminish in appeal or followership, it 
becomes irrelevant. The entire struggle is completely redefined in 
tive" is based 
n the idea of an overarching narrative that appears more rewarding than 
the o ale 
scho ve 
shou  a simple story, but as a socio-cultural product 
that ce. 
The '
 
The attempt to establish a consistent narrative is an element in the effort to 
estab gic 
Com  to 
influ vey 
evalu  of 
evalu ntiation are not "regulated by mechanical learning 
algor ion 
proce  to 
guara tive 
shou earlier narratives. The 
secon e in 
the p  be 
and cyberspace). One of the foundational struggles, in warfare in 
the p
advantage. Likewise, a key component of the “Battle of the 
Narrative” is to succeed in establishing the reasons for and 
potential outcomes of the conflict, on terms favorable to your 
efforts. Upon our winning the battle of the narrative, the enemy 
narr
a different setting and purpose. (p. xiii-xiv) 
 
This definition announces the form and function of the narrative: the 
narrative should be consistent and it should, again, serve a legitimatory 
function.  
 
The first principle, consistency, correlates with the rationalist idea of 
cognitive tendency, i.e. the intrinsic tendency to avoid cognitive dissonance 
(Pietilä, 2005: 116; Festinger, 1962). The "Battle of the Narra
o
ld beliefs, feelings and actions - a model proposed already by the Y
ol of neo-behaviorists (see PIetilä, 2005: 113-114). This narrati
ld not be understood as
is used as a non-kinetic weapon to target the cognition of its audien
narrative' should be, in this case, treated as an ideology.  
lish patterns that convey evaluation in the discourses of Strate
munication. "[T]he efficiency of discourse and its capability
ence or convince people, lies, to a large extent, in its ability to con
ations" (Malrieu, 2002: 30). According to Malrieu, the processes
ation and differe
ithms", but consistency does, indeed, play a role in the communicat
ss. He argues (Malrieu, 2002: 31) that there are three ways
ntee the consistency of ideological narration. First, the narra
ld actualize as logical and consistent with the 
d way may be to define the 'ideological language' and so interven
roduction of discourses. The last and the most arduous way would
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 to se se of language. 
Ardu gic 
comm the 
CHS rd 
choic ese 
recom nd 
its ap
 
To c l 
patte
sturbing indeed if 'grand' actors for example, 
performed more 'small' actions than 'small' actors. It would be 
 addition to consistency, the second key principle of the 'Battle of the 
Narr ion, 
if ad  of 
Strat t a 
Strat the 
conte  for the 
intervention, legitimation is a built-in feature of strategic communication. 
The ion 
proce
 
don’t need to message. (Perceptions of moral 
authority/legitimacy)  
 
should be documented and communicated before, during and 
t up specific institutions to monitor and control the u
ous or not, such institutions exist. In terms of strate
unication, it is clear that the first two means are actively used: 
CCS does make recommendations for appropriate and effective wo
e in the communication efforts in the field. In this context th
mendations are treated as doctrinization of ideological language a
plication. 
onvey evaluation, the overarching narrative thus demands 'ideologica
rns': 
 
It would be di
puzzling if 'good' policies had 'bad' consequences, or if 'good' 
phenomena systematically entailed 'bad' ones. (Malrieu, 2002: 
49) 
 
In
ative' is its actualization of legitimacy. Legitimation (or delegitimat
dressing the actions of the adversary) is not only the overt aim
egic Communication, but also its tacit structure. The fact tha
egic Communication narrative should, by definition, contain 
xt, motive, as well as produce the desired goal/end state
SC JIC (p. M-3-M-4) does not provide instructions for the legitimat
ss, but the Commander's Handbook presents examples: 
a. Never assume you are on the moral high ground, and that you 
therefore 
b. An intervening armed state tends to be seen as “Goliath”, 
while non-state actors that resist are often cast as “David.” 
(Perceptions of moral authority/ legitimacy) 
[...] 
g. When it comes to rumors of war-fighting gone wrong, the first 
stories onto the wire stick. Even if these stories prove to be 
exaggerated or false, the damage to your reputation, and moral 
legitimacy, is hard to erase. (Information sequel: perceptions of 
moral authority) 
h. Humanitarian action undertaken to limit civilian casualties
after action. (Informational sequel and prequel: perceptions of 
legitimacy; preempting and dispelling rumors) 
i. Even if you don’t trust certain media, engage them. Restricting 
media gives an informational advantage to your adversary. 
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 (Information management: perceptions of legitimacy) 
j. Western democracies have low tolerance for the moral 
ambiguities of kinetic action. This is especially so when, in the 
heat of battle, mistakes or civilian casualties occur. Kinetic 
action that violates the law of war creates informational effects 
that decrease domestic and Western support. (Informational 
effects: perceptions of legitimacy) 
[...] 
l. Cohesive all-of-government coordination can yield 
synchronization of the message, but not necessarily the effects. 
(Informational effects: perceptions of legitimacy/perception 
management)   
 
Thes  the 
Israe he 
instr ion, 
addre
 
bate, it has to be in a context of respect, transparency, and 
rceived benefit for 
changing perspective (such as peace, prosperity, dignity etc.) 
gy to delegitimize terrorism could be to show it 
nother 
its rdly,” “impotent,” or 
 
Here, the Handbook goes into such detail that it specifically instructs the 
ey words for debating ideological issues. These are strategic definitions of 
e guidelines, presented as "informational effects takeaways" from
li- Palestinian case studies, remain on a fairly abstract level. T
uctions get more concrete in the discussion surrounding delegitimat
ssed as "Engaging in a Dialogue of Ideas" (p. IV-22): 
If the exchange is to be a dialogue that influences, instead of a 
de
honesty. There should be the appearance of active listening, 
consideration for the other viewpoint, and a pe
 
1. One strate
inconsistent with moral, religious, or social standards. A
strategy could be to show it as unattractive, such as portraying 
practitioners as “desperate,” “cowa
“inept.” 
k
the 'self' and the 'other': as proposed by Malrieu (2002: 30) the second way 
to create ideological narration is the ideological definition of language. By 
officially determining the evaluations that the organization is obliged to 
convey, the CHSCCS institutionalizes the ideology. This means that 
ideological evaluations are not only a matter of rhetoric, but they have 
become doctrinized: the enemy is "'desperate', 'cowardly', 'impotent', or 
'inept'" (CHSCCS, p. IV-22) and thus evaluated in the context of judgment, 
namely that of social esteem or sanction (see Martin & White, 2005). 
 
The concept of Strategic Communication treats legitimacy as the key 
informational resource, and rightly so. Strategic Communication is a 
paramount weapon in irregular warfare and is critical across the range of all 
military operations, which means it should be integrated into all planning 
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 on all operational levels (p. I-1, II-8). This 'information as a weapon' 
approach culminates in the doctrinization of legitimation and 
delegitimation. The Handbook encourages the analysis of adversary 
communication in order to determine the inconsistencies and weaknesses of 
their "propaganda". Indeed, propaganda is now reserved exclusively for 
referring to adversary   communication: The 2010 Joint Publication 3-13.2 
n Psychological Operations defines propaganda as "[a]ny form of 
esigned to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any 
propaganda, whereas democracies ‘tell the truth’, or at least as 
                   
horization, meaning references to tradition, custom, law 
and status 
nces to value systems 
 rationalization, meaning references to goals and uses of social 
onsidering the strategy documents discussed in this article, it appears that 
the a on. 
In te f it: 
it is , is 
depe . In 
the a es, 
insig gns of hierarchy are all expected of a military 
fficial. Moral evaluation, in turn, is present in both discourses and actions 
o
adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, 
d
group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly."  As 
summarized by Snow & Taylor (2006),               
 
Democratic enemies are usually non-democracies – a 
dictatorship or an authoritarian regime that does not conform to 
international laws or norms. Hence, the ‘enemy’ conducts 
much of the truth as can be told to achieve victory while 
preserving those fundamental democratic values so cherished in 
normal times.           
  
But how can legitimation be conceptualized? Van Leeuwen's (2007) four 
categories of legitimation present one framework:  
 
 aut
 moral evaluation, meaning refere
action, references to cognitive validity 
 mythopoesis, meaning legitimation through narratives, the 
outcomes of which either reward legitimate action or punish 
non-legitimate action  
 
C
bove types of legitimation are all applied in Strategic Communicati
rms of Strategic Communication, authorization is an integral part o
obvious that much of the impact of press briefings, for instance
ndent on the authority of the person who delivers the information
rmed forces, authority is so overt that it has become naturalized: titl
nia, and other explicit si
o
of all members of the U.S. armed forces - as the instructions on the use of 
legitimatory and delegitimatory language in the CHSCCS illustrates. 
Rationalization actualizes in the cognitive dimension, namely in the efforts 
to avoid dissonance and inconsistency. Mythopoesis, the "educative tales of 
right and wrong", tend to surface as media spectacles aimed at the global 
96 
 audience. The ultimatum that Saddam Hussein leave Iraq to avoid war and 
s consequece, the highly mediatized display of shock and awe show, the 
symbolic celebration of the arrival of the Americans in Iraq, and finally the 
capture of the former dictator and the broadcast of the downhill of his once 
glorious dictator's life were all examples of an enduring, continuous 
narrative that contained not only moral evaluation, but a moral lesson. 
 
his far the discussion has focused on what could be understood as the 
 the hearts, minds and behavioral choices of the audience, it also 
as essential to cooperation as it is to 
competition or conflict. 
it
3. Strategic Communication as a communication model 
 
T
"contents" and purpose of Strategic Communication. Next, the focus is on 
understanding the communication process itself. When we turn from the 
objectives of legitimacy and coherence to the process of producing them 
through themes, messages and narratives, what does the communication 
process proposed by the concept of Strategic Communication look like? 
 
The following sections address the representation of communication that 
the doctrine of Strategic Communication bases its operational model on. 
This representation is addressed in terms of a number of basic terms and 
notions used to conceptualize differences between different models in 
communication studies. This helps conceptualize Strategic Communication 
in terms of analysis. The discussion is further illustrated with some of the 
practical guidelines for the communication process, assigned by the 
CHSCCS. 
 
3.1 The mechanics of Communication 
 
An interesting aspect of the 2009 SC JIV is its argumentation on the nature 
of influence it seeks to practice. While it treats communication as a vehicle 
to
recognizes the negative connotation of the term 'influence' and makes, in 
fact, an effort to renegotiate its definition (p. iii): 
 
The term influence sometimes carries negative connotations 
because the term is often associated with deceptive manipulation 
or exploitation. Influence will not have that connotation in this 
concept. Influence is a pervasive and fundamental form of any 
social interaction, 
 
This statement positions itself at odds with what is further stated about 
communication in the doctrine. By renouncing the attempts to practice 
negative influence, the concept attempts to approach the idea of sharing 
meaning. Still, influence is defined as actions of informing, educating, 
persuading, inducing and coercing (CHSCCS, p III-18). The term 
97 
 manipulation has officially been removed from doctrine (p. v): 
 
F c 
 
T e 
p : 
how ion 
(illeg ijk (2008: 212), manipulation is 
illegitimate influence" that produces inequality and that is used to serve 
he core problem of Strategic Communication is the perception of 
hat the organization cannot escape its purpose - 
fluence. Instead, the SC JIC states that communication is the vehicle for 
dons the notion of sharing. "In fact, the 
ndamental purpose of all purposeful communication is to influence - to 
ause some intended effect" (p5). The source? David K. Perlo's The 
igu gi
Com
he  b
ract cy
re 1: The influence spectrum according to the 2009 Strate
munication Joint Integrating Concept  
question is whether urging, advocating, inducing or coercing can
iced without manipulation. This leads us to the question of legitima
to differentiate between persuasion (legitimate) and manipulat
itimate)? According to Van D
"
the interests of the manipulator against the interests of the manipulated. 
Strategic Communication, in turn, aims at communicative asymmetry, 
where competing narratives become irrelevant. Herein lies a paradox. The 
influence spectrum presented in the above image suggests that influence is 
synonymous with one-way flow of communication. Communication is 
practiced for the sole reason of influence. Not simply to inform or teach, 
but to create a desired effect in the audience: to make the audience think 
and behave in a desired way. This obviously links Strategic Communication 
to the tradition of effects-centric kinetic doctrines such as Effects Based 
Operations and the Comprehensive Approach. To make a comparison it 
could thus be said that much like there are no kinetic operations for the 
sake of "just operating", there are no communication operations for the 
sake of "just communicating". Strategic Communication should be 
understood as a non-kinetic equivalent of effects-based strategy and tactics.  
 
T
communication as transfer rather than sharing of meaning. Communication 
is defined as "the act of sharing meaning by sending and receiving 
messages" (p. 5), but considering what has already been discussed about 
influence and the absence of dialogicality in the model, is "sharing" 
realistic or even possible? Seeing communication as sharing of meaning 
would demand two-way flow of communication, forcing the organization 
to engage in a dialogue.  
 
The problem here is t
in
"reception, comprehension and acceptance of a message". This line of 
reasoning specifically aban
fu
c
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 Process of Communication: An Introduction to Theory and Practice from 
asurable and to generate the much needed empiricism in 
e new field of research.  What was in focus was the behavior of the 
sis the characteristics of media content were seen 
model, where the reaction (R) is dependent on the 
rganism (O) that is subject to the stimuli (S) (Pietilä, 2005: 109). This 
mode nication (see 
Hovl xposure to 
comm ays entirely 
contr d therefore 
heter
 
For t etween MRC 
and S
 
 
1960. This is followed by a description that leaves little room for 
speculation:  
 
Communication works this way: A source puts out a signal 
intended to convey a meaning. The receiver recognizes and 
selects the signal, if he chooses, from among the various signals 
available to him: he interprets the signal based on his own frame 
of reference and interests to create meaning.  While the source 
may have an intended meaning in mind, it is the receiver who 
actually provides the ultimate meaning, which may or may not be 
the meaning the source intended. The challenge in effective 
communication is to anticipate what signal will trigger the 
desired interpretation. (p. 5-6).    
 
This outlook considered, it is easy to position Strategic Communication in 
the field of communication research. The 1960s were marked by efforts to 
establish a theoretical framework for the field of mass communication 
research (Pietilä, 2005: 105-109). Part of these efforts was Lasswell's 
model, which presented communication as a transmission process. In 
Lasswell's theory the central analytical concepts were the contents, 
channels and effects of communication (Pietilä, 2005: 108; Lasswell & 
Blumenstock, 1939/1970; Lasswell, 1960). It was the effects that were 
intended to be me
th
audience: "in effects analy
as causal factors that may produce specific behavioral consequences" 
(Pietilä, 2005: 109). Lasswell (1946a: 80) classified audience responses as 
attention, comprehension, enjoyment, evaluation and action, where all 
responses above the level of attention are effects (1946b: 97).  
 
This causal-quantitative methodology of the behavioral research tradition is 
best characterized by the S>R model that developed into the neo-
behaviorist S>O>R 
o
l of the 1950s demonstrates the process of commu
and, Janis & Kelley, 1953). The audience's e
unication creates effects, although the effects are not alw
ollable or predictable due to the audience's organic an
ogeneous quality.  
he sake of clarity and conciseness, three key parallels b
C are considered here: 
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 1) Fo   
he first key parallel relates the effects-centricness of Strategic 
ffects of communication.  
trategic Communication is a "continuous function" that integrates Joint 
Forc (SC 
JIC p ion 
into ion, 
and, gly 
inclu ing, 
whic  to 
comp like 
these ine 
Strat  in the 21st 
entury doctrines, such as the Effects Based Operations and the 
logical approach to 
ommunication: communication is seen as a causal process that results in 
idual undergoes some new 
learning experiences. Exposure to a persuasive 
cessfully induces the 
 old 
one held prior to exposure to the communication. 
cus on causing and measuring effects
T
Communication to the Lasswellian theory on the e
S
e actions "to maximize the desired effect on selected audiences" 
. ii).  Lasswell (1946a: 80) categorized the effects of communicat
the categories of comprehension, enjoyment, evaluation and act
according to the SC JIC, the range of influence correspondin
des informing and educating, persuading, inducing and coerc
h clearly resonate with Lasswell's categories (education lead
rehension, etc.). The effects-centric doctrines refer to effects 
 as "desired effects". This effects-centricness does not only def
egic Communication, but is the underlying principle
c
Comprehensive Approach. In practice, this means that what unites Strategic 
Communication and MCR is a similar methodo
c
measurable effects. However, MCR underwent a methodological crisis 
during the 1960s, which led to the abandoning of, for instance, the linear 
S>O>R model, later replaced by the idea of 'communication as 
interpretation' rather than transmission (Pietilä, 2005: 126). Interestingly, 
the so-called Lasswellian magic bullet theory and the emphasis of the 
significance of measurable effects are still what the American doctrine 
writers aspire to. 
 
2) Cognitive persuasion  
The commitment to the behaviorist tradition of conceptualizing 
communication leads us to the second parallel between MCR and the 
concept of Strategic Communication. The Yale school of neo-behaviorists 
treated the effects of communication as learning much like the SC JIC 
refers to the influence of communication as "education". Further, the Yale 
school researchers (see Hovland, Janis & Kelley, 1953) argued that the 
individual may be persuaded by offering a more rewarding experience to 
replace the old one: 
 
We assume that opinions, like other habits, will tend to 
persist unless the indiv
communication which suc
individual to accept a new opinion constitutes a 
learning experience in which a new verbal habit is 
acquired. That is to say, when presented with a given 
question, the individual now thinks of and prefers the 
new answer suggested by the communication to the
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 (Hovland, Janis & Kelley, 1953: 10) 
 return to the CHSCCS, the parallel is clear: 
The Battle of the Narrative is often thought of as a battle for
 
If we
 
 the 
local audience to “buy” our “story” and push out the enemy’s 
ship, it becomes irrelevant. (p. II-13) 
 states that "[a]ssessing 
e cognitive impact of a signal is much more difficult, for example, than 
 target" (p. 6). This 
nalogy is another example of the methodological problems of reducing 
 Pietilä, 2005: 126; 
unelius, 2010: 141-142), whereas Strategic Communication keeps 
same time - the concept of Strategic 
ommunication continues to draw from both behaviorist and cognitive 
) Communication is transmission 
The ion 
proce tion 
and t reas the 
octrine defines the communication process in terms of stimulus and 
“story,” such as “we are the good guys, we are here to help you 
and bring you a better quality of life.” This perspective on the 
"Battle of the Narrative" is incorrect. The battle is not merely to 
push aside, defeat or gain superiority over the enemy’s narrative; 
it is to completely supplant it. In fact, upon our winning the battle 
of the narrative, the enemy narrative doesn’t just diminish in 
appeal or follower
 
The Battle of the Narrative is thus a battle over persuasion: as postulated by 
Hovland, Janis & Kelley (1953), the best story wins.  
 
This approach to the persuasion process understands communication as a 
cognitive process rather than conditioning. Echoing the problemacy of 
measuring the effects of communication, the SC JIC
th
assessing the physical impact of an air strike on a
a
communication research to the study of cause and effect.  The problem 
arises when the organic society is subjugated to causal theory. As the 
analogy above demonstrates, this has been experienced not only by MCR 
scholars, but by the Pentagon as well as the U.S. Joint Forces Command. 
The difference between the theorists here is that the veterans of MCR 
admitted the methodological crisis in the 1960s (see
K
aspiring to the past. Also, it was the cognitive theory of learning that 
challenged the behaviorist learning theory and established the theory of 
cognitive consistency (Pietilä, 2005: 116). While the two theories are 
mutually exclusive - influence cannot be both a conditioning process and a 
cognitive process at the 
C
frameworks at the same time. 
 
3
third parallel is the understanding of communication as a transmiss
ss. Clearly, there is a paradox between both the theoretical defini
he practical implementation of Strategic Communication. Whe
d
response, the very objective it sets is "shared meaning": 
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 Strategic communication essentially means sharing meaning 
(i.e., communicating) in support of national objectives (i.e., 
strategically). This involves listening as much as transmitting 
and applies not only to information, but also physical 
communication - action that conveys meaning. (SC JIC p. ii) 
 
The stated method is the transmission of information, while the objective 
appears to be the confirmation of shared meaning. Repeated and specific 
references to communication as "signals" and "transmission" link Strategic 
Communication to the tradition of propaganda models, where the targets 
tend to be seen as individuals rather than an audience (Kunelius, 2010: 
153). At the same time, the doctrine clearly indicates that it aims to 
influence collectives.   
 
Ultimately, what Strategic Communication and the MRC tradition have in 
common is their emergence as the result of fear and anxiety. Whereas Mass 
Communication Research developed during an age when the media were 
seen as a factor that may change and possibly even threaten the social order 
f society, Strategic Communication is modeled to serve the purpose of 
cation. (Coombs & Holladay, 2007: 31) 
o
maintaining and legitimizing a certain global order. 
 
3.2 Symmetry and asymmetry of communication   
 
As argued this far, despite its attempts to renounce negative manipulation, 
Strategic Communication fails to define itself in terms other than 
propaganda and behaviorism.  Ultimately, Strategic Communication 
appears as a top-down propaganda model that aims to inform, persuade, 
and therefore legitimize. However, this does not mean that it lacks the 
efforts to build oneness and create shared experience.  
 
In addition to being a communication model, the concept of Strategic 
Communication also contains elements of Public Affairs, as its function is 
to ensure "conditions favorable" for the national interest of the U.S. 
government. Therefore it is worth considering Strategic Communication as 
doctrine of Public Relations.  
 
The first obvious problem brings us back to the question of dialogicality 
and interactiveness.  
 
Dialogue requires listening. Listening represents the "two" in 
two-way communication while "one" is simply sending a message 
via one-way communi
 
At least in theory, the SC JIC includes "listening" and "sharing" in its 
operative model. As discussed this far, the practical application of listening 
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 and sharing may prove difficult. The paradox of listening and persuading 
culminates in the question of dialogue. In order to persuade, a certain 
attentiveness to the audience's reactions (i.e. the effects of communication) 
is necessary. However, does this type of listening count as dialogue? 
According to Coombs & Holladay (2007), it does not. In the case of 
Strategic Communication, listening is a matter of persuasion rather than 
aiming at a communicative balance between the organization and the 
audience. This two-way asymmetric model of public relations has been 
defended as an organization's way to look after its interests and is 
characterized as "advocacy" (see Grunig, 2001; also Grunig, 1992). A PR-
strategy may appear as naturally asymmetrical and to favor either the 
interests of the organization or the public, but according to Grunig (2001: 
25), the middle of the continuum of these interests contains "a symmetrical 
win-win zone" where both the organization and the public can "engage in 
mixed-motive communication". Unlike the original symmetrical model, the 
mixed-motive model would not force the organization to sacrifice its 
interests, and would ideally lead to practices of collaboration instead of 
advocacy (Grunig, 2001). 
 
Obviously, collaboration is an unrealistic request to an organization that 
specifically aims at asymmetry. However, the public and stakeholders have 
the tendency to communicate, whether their input was called for or not. The 
asymmetric methods force the counterparty to engage in respectively 
asymmetric activities in order to pursue its interests. This turns us to the 
question of audiences. The problem with Strategic Communication is its 
undefined audiences and the matrix of their interests. It is practically 
impossible to predict their expectations, which makes proactive 
communication strategies virtually impossible. In the asymmetric model, 
stakeholders can force the organization into dialogue (Coombs & Holladay, 
007: 54), which has also been the case with the ongoing military 
mutual 
fluence, communication becomes unpredictable and uncontrollable. This 
ch causing 
e organization significant damage and further undermining their 
cognize its stakeholders. The CHSCCS 
2
operations. The Abu Ghraib and WikiLeaks scandals have forced the 
organization to comment and evaluate its practices in public. In these cases 
the strategic stakeholders have included U.S. soldiers who have been able, 
intentionally or not, to reveal something about the practices from within the 
organization - something that is difficult for an outside stakeholder to do. In 
this sense WikiLeaks has been a significant element of asymmetry, and in 
fact a dire consequence of the asymmetric nature of U.S. Strategic 
Communication. As the scandals prove, without symmetry and 
in
means that communication will turn from flows into bursts, ea
th
credibility and legitimacy. 
 
Further, it seems that one of the major shortcoming of Strategic 
Communication is its failure to re
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 makes numerous references to the importance of analysis and maintenance 
ls have 
een caused by individual soldiers. These "strategic corporals" have had 
diffe ing 
infor the 
Wiki otos 
and ned 
with iers 
urina the 
field hey 
will d 
Narr hat 
the c a feedback 
hannel that would ensure that in addition to making the individual soldier 
e influence only on the outside stakeholders and the 
dversary, the approach to the needs of the inside stakeholders, i.e. the 
soldiers, is underdeveloped. This will continue to pose a threat to the U.S. 
c
 
B lders and audiences will ately 
this means that the organization faces the options of either evading 
transparency ders. 
T t, d e ethics and the 
efficiency of communication: the absence of it maintains distrust both in 
the minds of the soldiers participating he operation, and in the minds of 
ates the 
n that is the very objective of the organization.  
of stakeholder relations, but keeps referring to governmental and non-
governmental organizations, interagency representatives, intergovernmental 
and international organization representatives, media, etc. Considering the 
recent scandals and their impact on public opinion, the focus should 
perhaps be on the global audience and the individual soldier. Failing to treat 
the soldiers as stakeholders has in this case led to major reputational 
damage. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, most PR scanda
b
rent motivations to communicate their perspective, some by leak
mation on purpose, as was the case with Bradley Manning and 
Leaks scandals, and some by recording their war experience in ph
videos, never intending the outside world to see them, as happe
the photos taken in Abu Ghraib and the video of U.S. sold
ting on dead Taleban fighters. When the soldier's experience in 
 does not correspond with the official Strategic Communication, t
continue to produce micronarratives that undermine the Gran
ative. These narratives will be produced regardless of the outlet. W
oncept of Strategic Communication ignores is the need for 
c
responsible for generating "synchronized messages" where words 
correspond with actions, there should be a way for the soldiers to engage in 
a bottom-up dialogue with their organization. However, the concept of 
Strategic Communication recognizes communication as a top-down 
process. While the doctrine of Strategic Communication focuses the 
practices of persuasiv
a
ommunication policy.  
ut stakeho continue to communicate. Ultim
, or engaging in a dialogue
his dialogue, or the lack of i
 with its members and stakehol
etermines both th
 in t
the global audiences and other stakeholders. This, in turn, complic
legitimatory functio
 
3.3 Implementation of SC: practice in the field as instructed 
 
The previous section introduced the theoretical principles and 
contradictions of Strategic Communication. This section will focus on a 
practical application of the doctrine as instructed by the CHSCCS, the so-
called themes and messages card. 
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As stated, the CHSCCS, which aims to provide practical information and 
guidance to the execution of Strategic Communication, goes as far as 
providing examples of themes and words that should be used to influence 
the perceptions about the enemy (p. IV-22). The purpose of these cards is to 
prevent the "say-do gap". The inconsistencies between the words and deeds 
of the military force trouble the organization not only on the level of 
decision making, but at the grass-roots level of individual soldiers.  
 
[W]ith actions at all levels sends conflicting messages and 
significantly inhibits the creation of desired outcomes. Many 
refer to this as a “say-do gap.” To help solve this problem in the 
CENTCOM and  OUTHCOM AORs, units issued each soldier a 
card with key themes and messages to carry with  them at all 
times. This approach was designed to synchronize words and 
activities all the way down to the individual level. This card 
helped soldiers and activity participants consistently 
communicate the desired message and guided their actions 
anticipated circumstances.  (CHSCCS, p. III-10) during un
 
The themes and messages card presents an understanding of the practical 
implementation of Strategic Communication: how strategic level objectives 
should be transformed into dialogue. Individual soldiers are seen as 
operators who negotiate with the stakeholders, and in order to equip them 
for these exchanges, the card consists of lists of themes and messages that 
should be enforced:  
 
 
SC Standing Themes and 
Messages 
 
Themes to Stress (through actions 
and/or words) 
 
 
Related Themes and Messages 
 
Themes to Avoid 
 
 
Figure 2: The outline of the themes and messages card 
(CHSCCS, p. K-1) 
 
Here, it is the individual soldier who is eventually made responsible for the 
generating of strategically applicable verbal and physical communication. 
Unlike the culture smart card that provides the basic information about the 
cultural environment, the themes and messages card is not intended to 
form and educate, but to instruct the individual soldier on the correct way in
to practice conditioning. This means that Strategic Communication is not 
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 truly a model for communication, but a means of internal organizational 
control. It determines the roles within the organization and the correct 
usage of language.  The instructions on the practical application of SC 
emphasize dialogue (CHSCCS, p. A-2): "Effective communication requires 
a multi-faceted dialogue among parties. It involves active listening, 
ngagement, and the pursuit of mutual understanding, which leads to trust." 
nvironment that Strategic Communication is intended to cover. A model 
 on the methodology of one-way influence and control rather 
an interaction is not suited for the global cultural landscape of modern 
nication 
s a transfer process and conditioning is inseparable from the tradition of 
nes of the 21st century, all of which are based 
n the principle of measurability of effects. This keeps it tied to the 
more collaborative approach to 
ommunication would require a dramatic reform in the doctrinal repertoire. 
ecause from the perspective of strategy and tactics, 
ommunication is seen as an asymmetric capacity. This keeps it tied to the 
n the 
rganization. 
e
This instruction would be in favor of symmetrical communication, but the 
themes and messages card does little to promote deep understanding or 
dialogue. Instead, it models communication as an asymmetrical process 
that aims at persuasion rather than dialogue and mutual attunement. Moral 
agency may be manuscripted into the smart cards that promote democracy 
and partnership, but instead of treating soldiers as moral agents, the 
doctrine reduces the soldier into an instrument of asymmetric capability. 
With the themes and messages of the official Grand Narrative determined 
in the smart card, there is little space for "multifaceted exchange of ideas" 
or "deep comprehension of others". The objectives and methods of 
Strategic Communication are once again in dissonance.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
This article has discussed a number of problems and paradoxes that the 
concept of Strategic Communication is subject to in terms of theory and 
practice. In conclusion, the communication doctrine that aspires to the early 
propaganda model will face increasing difficulties in the operational 
e
that is based
th
communication, which values uninterrupted communication, feedback, 
interaction and individualism. However, the perception of commu
a
military communication. Strategic Communication is a parallel, non-kinetic 
doctrine to the kinetic doctri
o
theoretical framework of Mass Communication Research. Abandoning the 
behaviorist approach and adopting a 
c
The nature of the organization complicates the adoption of symmetric 
communication, b
c
problematic tradition of costly and burdensome management, which 
essentially makes Strategic Communication a control model. Its function is 
not merely to produce narratives, but to provide control withi
o
 
The question remains: is it possible for military communication to escape 
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 its purpose? If symmetry and transparency are unrealistic methods of 
ommunication, Strategic Communication will remain essentially a 
arch tradition of Mass Communication Research. 
nication as a hierarchy cannot legitimately control the 
ows of information.  This has led to the concept of information age 
ic 
ommunication'. Political, strategic level statements made from the 
egic narrative, the information value 
f the unofficial micronarratives is far greater. What makes the soldiers' 
 thus 
e that the Department of Defense fails to recognize one of its key groups 
 the doctrine effectively attempts to silence.  
ioppa, T.M., 2009. Operation Iraqi Freedom strategic communication 
oombs, W.T. & Holladay, S.J., 2007. It's not just PR: Public Relations in 
9. Strategic Communication Joint Integrating 
oncept (Version 1.0, 7 October 2009). 
d 
niversity  Press. 
runig, E.J., 1992. Symmetrical systems of internal communication. In 
ciates, pp.531-576. 
, ed. 2001. Handbook of Public Relations. 
c
propaganda model. As long as it aspires to its current framework, it will 
have to wrestle with the methodological problems that resulted in the 
weaning of the rese
 
Finally, soldiers are agents and stakeholders. They react, make mistakes, 
and generate communication that expresses their experience. During the 
age where communication practices are based on the principle of access, 
Strategic Commu
fl
'strategic corporals', who may either support the efforts of the military 
operation - or undermine them. In fact, the communicative actions of the 
soldiers, voluntary or involuntary, may just be the true 'strateg
c
Pentagon press room or the politically motivated key words memorized 
from a smart card are easily challenged by the depictions of the soldiers' 
reality.  Compared to the official strat
o
narratives strategic is their truthfulness and authenticity - which is 
something Strategic Communication cannot offer. The problem may
b
of stakeholders: the soldiers, those actors that live the reality of strategic 
decisions but whose experience
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THE HIDDEN GRAND NARRATIVE OF WESTERN 
MILITARY POLICY: A LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF 
AMERICAN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION (ARTICLE II) 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Strategic communication has replaced information warfare. As Art of War 
has been replaced by science, the representations of war and the role of the 
military have changed. Both war and military forces are now associated 
with binary roles: destruction vs. humanity, killing vs. liberating. The logic 
behind 'bombing for peace' is encoded in the Grand Military Narrative. 
This narrative is hidden in American (and NATO) strategies such as Effects 
Based Operations, which rely heavily on technology. As people aim to 
rationalize the world with technology, they fail to take into account the 
uncertainty it brings. In warfare, that uncertainty is verbalized as “friendly 
fire”, “collateral damage” or simply as
re up to technology. Technology is no longer a tool, but an ideology and 
 “accident”. Success and failure 
010, Reuters reported that missiles fired from a U.S. drone 
kistan. Combat drones such as the 
a
an actor that not only 'enables' the military to take action, but legitimizes it. 
This article aims to contribute to military studies by analyzing, in the spirit 
of critical discourse analysis, American 'Grand Military Narrative' and the 
standard and trends of rhetoric it creates. The article focuses on 
pinpointing some of the linguistic choices and discourses that define the so-
called 'techno-speak', the product of modern techno-ideology. These 
discourses result in representations of techno-centered binary values, 
which steer military strategy and foreign policy. 
 
Keywords 
Revolution in Military Affairs, Effects Based Operations, critical discourse 
analysis, military technology 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On August 23, 2
illed 13 militants and 7 civilians in Pak
Predator and Reaper usually carry precision weapons such as Hellfire 
variations, designed to kill tanks and bust bunkers (Defense News, 
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 31.5.2010). Now a smaller, lighter and more accurate missiles are 
developed. "You want to hit only the guy you want, not the school bus three 
cars back", says Steve Felix of the Naval Air Warfare Center (Matthews, 
2010). According to Steve Martin, the representative of Lockheed Martin, 
the aim is to reduce collateral damage: "The bad guys are figuring out how 
to hide out in homes and near schools. We can't go in and drop large bombs 
- that just doesn't work any more" (ibid.) One of these new, smaller and 
lighter missile types is Raytheon's Griffin, currently deployed in Predator 
drones. "The Griffin's maneuverability and accuracy reduce the risk of 
"collateral damage"" says an Army representative. "When you can start 
producing a lower ratio of collateral damage, that's how you win this kind 
of war", notes Anthony Cordesman from Strategy at the Center for 
Strategic and and International Studies in Washington, D.C. (Wichner, 
2010). No more 'enemy', but virtuous precision to rid the world of the "bad 
guys". A glance at the press briefing transcripts from the past years reveals 
that the Pentagon increasingly refers to the enemy as "the bad guys". The 
concept of the absolute enemy (see Mouffe, 2005) is particularly obvious in 
modern military (political) discourse, where 'they' no longer are an 
adversary, but an absolute evil. The lack of legitimacy of the enemy is 
demonstrated by titles such as 'bad guys' - they are not recognized as 
ilitary or as anything the military represents. Instead, they are faceless 
g ready to close its door after a successful project. The Center 
ffered visitors information on military careers as well as video games and 
simu uth, 
wand nal 
imag the 
teena bat 
simu hey 
know ent 
indus war is made easy. Being 
good at war is about pressing a button: in the Army Experience Center, the 
teenagers can "touch and feel and experience what the army is all about", 
expla gh-
tech ual 
simu wer 
lies i
 
2. Ba
m
and in want of status. The enemy is fully visualized only in computer 
games, where the player is free to shoot.  
 
In July 2010, the Army Experience Center (AEC) in a Philadelphia mall 
was gettin
o
lators (some of which are used to train the troops). The yo
ering the malls, are the perfect target for recruiters. The traditio
es of depressing boot camp physical training disappear once 
gers (13 and older, according to the AEC) get to show with com
lators what they have been practicing most of their lives. Because t
 gaming, warfare has to become game-like. Now, the entertainm
try is replacing boot camps. Being good at 
ins one of the Center's recruiters (thearmyexperience, 2008). Hi
weapons to kill the "bad guys" from a comfortable distance and virt
lation create combat experience: what ever the problem, the ans
n technology. This is the Grand Military Narrative. 
ckground 
 
The military-industrial complex gave birth to the Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA). The future of the military is computers, information 
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 networks, and precision-guided munitions (Toffler, 1981; 1993). 
Technological advances are used to solve the military and strategic 
challenges of the U.S. (Shimko, 2010: 213). This revolution, or evolution, 
 depicted by the Grand Military Narrative. RMA's focus on technology 
y. These doctrines are 
haracterized by the term precision. Colonel Crowder (U.S. Department of 
 that capability is now to the point where 
we can hit multiple targets on a single pass. 
is
has led to technology-centered strategies and doctrines. Technology offers 
the option of unmanned war, to “bring knowledge forward” for the people 
whose observation is limited (Rantapelkonen, 2006:72). “Maximizing 
output” and “minimizing input” (citing Lyotard, 1984 in Rantapelkonen, 
2006:73) match the American ideal of “easy living”. Lyotard argues that 
technology is “good” because it is efficient, not because it is “true”, “just” 
or “beautiful”. According to Rantapelkonen (2006), 'war on terror' is 
technologically driven. However, the binary image of war contains the idea 
of not only destroying and devastating, but also avoiding risk, threat and 
death by liberating, helping and building. Der Derian (2008) calls this 
"virtuous war". He argues that the military-industrial complex needs binary 
rhetoric such as 'bombing for peace' and 'killing to live' in order to operate 
and make profit: technology is in service of virtue. As death and destruction 
are no longer accepted, technology steps in. By replacing the soldier with a 
precision (fire-and-forget) weapon, 'targets can be hit' and 'operations 
conducted' without causing protests on the home front. 
 
The doctrines of Effects Based Operations and Comprehensive Approach 
are built around the promise of technolog
c
Defense, 2003), much quoted in the upcoming analysis, elaborated on the 
concept: 
 
Crowder: With the development of the laser-guided bombs, and 
specifically the laser-guided bombs on aircraft such as the F-111 
and the F-117 in Allied -- or, in Desert Storm, we were able to hit 
two independent targets very precisely with about 10-meter CEP 
or 10-foot CEP from a single aircraft. When we added additional 
aircraft, such as the B-2,
[...] 
Q: What does CEP stand for? 
Crowder: Oh, pardon me. Circular error probable. It is the 
probability that that weapon will -- that 50 percent of the 
weapons will land inside that line. So, if what I say basically is -- 
if I say the CEP of a B-17 in World War II was 3,300 feet, that 
means there was a high likelihood that 50 percent of the bombs 
dropped landed with inside 3,300 feet. So not very -- 
 
Surely new 21st century missiles are precise. But at the same time, a 
weapon with a 50% error margin can still be labeled as a 'precision 
111 
 weapon'. Obviously this is a mere reflection of strategic communication. 
Precision is now equal to humanity, and legitimizes the Western way of 
war. 
 
The evolution of warfare demands science is in the service of war. 
echnology “enables us to do a lot more stuff” and to “more effectively 
ons” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003). Because 
f its efficiency and speed, strategies, doctrines and even foreign policy 
Doctrine aimed to solve 
roblems by overwhelming force in the form of superior weapons 
age of the press-briefings, but also soldier-to-soldier 
ommunication has changed. In the battlefield and combat, propaganda has 
been and 
socia ons 
creat oits 
all th blic 
discu War 
and 9 ing 
the 'W ism'.  
T
prosecute those operati
o
rely on the sole use of technology. The Powell 
p
technology. Shock and Awe in 2003 worked much the same way. However, 
the modern narratives and threat descriptions do not, after all, change 
much. President Obama no longer uses the term "war on terrorism", but this 
choice of term did not change the warfare in Afghanistan or Iraq. The US, 
China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea are still developing 
nuclear weapons. The new threat descriptions have not removed the old 
threats. Despite precision munitions, B52 bombers are still in use. The real 
change first takes place in discourse, but lags behind in realization. The 
Grand Military Narrative contains a techno-ideology, which is encoded in 
language. In this Narrative war has two aspects: the "how" and "why". How 
wars are conducted is a matter of technology descriptions. Why wars are 
fought is a matter of value systems. The merge of these two aspects create 
what is now known as strategic communication. 
 
Not only has the langu
c
 replaced by strategic and psychological influence. The global 
l media create an increasing influence and new technology soluti
e an opportunity to make an impact. Strategic communication expl
ese. The new generation's war, the Gulf War, was a catalyst to pu
ssion on the new wave of Information Operations. The Kosovo 
/11 sped up the discussion. A whole new narrative was created dur
ar Against Terror
 
According to Taylor (2003), the concepts of political, psychological or 
information warfare are outdated. Instead, we use the concept of 'strategic 
communication'. Taylor recognizes three types of it. First is “public 
diplomacy”, referring to state and political level. Second is “public affairs”, 
which contains the global media. The third type, Information operations 
(Info Ops), deals with military capability. Strategic communication has 
abandoned the Cold War era categories of propaganda: the so called 
“black” (covert), “white” (overt) and “grey” (unknown) propaganda. Today, 
the speed of communication is enough to disturb our perception 
management capability. The 24/7 model takes advantage of our values and 
understanding of democracy: we say no to censorship and want all 
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 information to be available at all times, everywhere. Strategic 
communication is a child of the complex world. Instead of rational 
nowledge, we have information flow. Planning and execution are parallel 
t in order to 
fluence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated 
d "effective". EBO was, according to 
rowder, a way to mitigate collateral damage. In order to explain the 
conc  to 
discu  if 
colla  of 
dama s". 
This he 
perfo e 
respo he 
strate ble, 
technology has its fail-ratio, and these are facts that just have to be 
k
processes; Speed dictates the operational modes, and strategic 
communication is an attempt to control all this. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1 The Language of Effects Based Operations 
 
Effects Based Operations (EBO), is a US military concept and doctrine that 
stands for "operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted 
based on a holistic understanding of the operational environmen
in
application of select instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims". 
On the day of "Shock and Awe" in 2003, Colonel Gary L. Crowder, chief of 
strategy, concepts and doctrine, elaborated the concept in layperson's terms 
in a press briefing dedicated for EBO alone (U.S. Department of Defense, 
2003). Before proceeding to explaining any further, the concepts of 
technology-based approach and doctrine step in. Crowder explains that the 
new approach was "more than just people, it was the combination of a 
fortuitous development of different capabilities and technologies [...] that 
enabled us to do that." The phrases that follow this capture the very essence 
of the discourse that characterized the American public relations during the 
beginning of the war: 
 
Instead of a traditional attritional approach in terms of listing a 
bunch of targets and then go bombing targets, or finding where 
the enemy is and killing all the enemy, we really determined that 
what we wanted to do was in fact to achieve some sort of policy 
objective, and that you could, in fact, craft military operations to 
better achieve those policy operations in a more efficient and 
effective manner. 
 
The key words here are "efficient" an
C
epts of "collateral damage" and "unintended damage", Crowder had
ss risk-taking as part of doctrine. Crowder explains that even
teral and unintended damage happen, and "both of these types
ge will take place", they "still went through a methodical proces
precisely is the problem with strategy that relies almost solely on t
rmance of technology. Technology fails, and when it does, th
nsibility of that failure lies on technology itself. According to t
gy, both collateral and unintended damage are unavoida
113 
 accepted. In Virilio's (1989: 8-9) terms, Art of War has turned into Science 
 Military Narrative of strategic communication, we have to look at 
e theme and structures of the strategists' language. The United States has 
an ir ew 
milit gs 
on s ing the evolution of 
trategic communication. The upcoming analysis continues the discussion 
 Joint Operating Environment 2010 (JOE10) (United States 
sis and 
e future of American warfare. It argues and 
ition of the human limitations in the complex world, created by the 
lash of different ideologies and cultures, and further supplemented by 
 the report, the "battle of narratives". If winning the 
attle is important, winning the battle of narratives is "absolutely crucial". 
nclusion that 
of the Accident. 
 
Technology is complex and when techno-speak enters press briefings such 
as Crowder's, a new kind of language is created. Žižek (2009) argues that 
public communication increasingly applies expert and scientific jargon that 
no longer translates to the 'common speak' of the society. The 'expert 
speak', despite its abstract nature, still shapes our thinking, especially when 
it is labeled with adjectives such as 'precision', 'smart' and 'efficiency'. With 
examples of virtuous warring (liberating) and precise and efficient 
operating models (avoiding collateral damage), it complies with the 
modern imperative of clean and safe, effective and lethal, and yet moral 
and humane war fighting. The kind of war that we will accept. 
 
Although EBO as it was first created and intended is already abandoned by 
the American Department of Defense, it created a new narrative tradition of 
virtue and the superiority of technology and binary values. This tradition 
continues to influence Western military discourses. In order to pinpoint the 
Grand
th
refutable position as the military trend-setter and the creator of n
ary concepts. This makes American strategy papers and press briefin
trategy and doctrine a good resource for analyz
s
on strategy, doctrine and Effects Based Operations and their influence on 
discourse. The
Joint Forces Command, 2010) provides the framework for our analy
aims to predict and forecast th
elaborates on what should be prepared for. The narrative starts from the 
recogn
c
advances in technology and changes in the economy. The complex world 
affects, according to
b
The report makes the co
 
Dominating the narrative of any operation, whether military or 
otherwise, pays enormous dividends. [...] In the battle of 
narratives, the United States must not ignore its ability to bring 
its considerable soft power to bear in order to reinforce the 
positive aspects of Joint Force operations. Humanitarian 
assistance, reconstruction, securing the safety of local 
populations, military-to-military exercises, health care, and 
disaster relief are just a few examples of the positive measures 
that we offer. 
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This statement is interesting, as we have witnessed the emergence of 
operations 'other than war'. In the narrative of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 
military leadership put much focus on the humanitarian aspect of the 
operation. But, the "battle of narratives" manifested itself not only in word 
choices such as liberate and humanitarian aid, but also as words such as 
recision-guided weapons. The emphasis of the use of precision guided 
 also 
tresses that in future, asymmetric and irregular warfare will be more likely 
than  for 
this: 
 
 
To summarize the report, we make the following conclusions: in strategy, 
chno-speak 
he methodology of the analysis builds on the concept of action as a 
ference to identity and evaluation. It contains three levels of approach: 
e application of the transitivity system and the process of nominalization. 
he transitivity system contains the information on who does what to whom 
utt et al, 2001) and "constries the world of experience into a manageable 
et off process types" (Halliday, 170). Clause structures typically contain an 
ctor, a process, and a goal or a target (and, of course, much else). The 
ariations in the combination of these elements are significant. In the 
ontext of war and conflict, they are a medium for expressing an 
p
munitions can be seen as semantic tactics. Technology is part of the 
narrative. JOE10 mentions the words deter and deterrence several times, 
and finally concludes that deterrence will be the "primary purpose" of the 
military forces. This explains the threat discourse: the only way to deter is 
to excel over the rest in skill, capacity and resources. Deterrence will be 
created by absorbing education and science: "The Services should draw 
from a breadth and depth of education in a range of relevant disciplines to 
include history, anthropology, economics, geopolitics, cultural studies, the 
‘hard’ sciences, law, and strategic communication", the report states. It
s
conventional warfare, and that the U.S. military should be prepared
Irregular wars are more likely, and winning such conflicts will 
prove just as important to the protection of America’s vital 
interests and the maintenance of global stability. 
te
1. is part of the "battle of narratives" and Strategic Communication 
2. is based on threat discourse 
3. serves the function of deterrence on one hand, and legitimation on the 
other. 
 
The analysis uses these conclusions as the starting point for the linguistic 
part of the analysis. 
 
3.2 Methods and data 
 
T
re
th
T
(B
s
a
v
c
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 experience or ideology. For example, Lukin (2005) refers to ”doing without 
doing to” by pointing out that in clause structures such as 'The operation 
began on the 19th of March', 'Our forces are operating throughout Iraq' or 
'A particularly successful operation occurred last night', there is an actor 
and a process, but no target or goal: the entity impacted by the process is 
excluded (Lukin, 2005: 6). 
 
The target of the action may also be an abstract of an inanimate entity when 
referring to 'own' action. The clause structures of enemy action may look 
very different: the entities impacted are human and far from abstract: 
women, children and civilians. We will compare the data to a number of 
nominal constructions found in the text. The analysis of nominalizations is 
a methodological tradition in Critical Discourse Analysis. It refers to the 
grammatical process of turning a verb into a noun or a nominal 
construction: quit - quitter, fail - failure, etc. Nominalization brings 
grammatical metaphors into discourse. As Martin (2011: 803) writes,  
ivation in general) is a resource for 
started the Operation Iraqi Freedom by bombing Baghdad. 
In this briefing, Colonel Gary Crowder (the division chief at Air Combat 
Command and the plans director for Strategy, Concepts and Doctrine) 
introduces the concept of Effects Based Operations (EBO) to the press and 
the public. It can be found online in the US Department of Defense 
transcript archive with the title Effects Based Operations Briefing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[N]ominalization (and der
extending the lexical resources of a language. Grammatical 
metaphor, by contrast, is a resource for scrambling, within limits, 
the realization relationship between semantics and grammar and 
so indefinitely extending a language’s meaning potential. This is 
much more than a vocabulary-building exercise. It allows 
writers, and people who learn to speak writing, to mean more 
than one thing at once. 
 
In the framework of this article, nominalizations are thus an extension of 
the very action descriptions first discussed. The data of the analysis comes 
from a press briefing transcript that aired on the same day when the 
coalition forces 
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 3.3 Results  
Table 1: Technology as a Doer 
 
The analysis consists of two categories of action descriptions: of those, 
where the 'doer' is technology, and of those, where the 'doer' is 'us' (the US, 
Coalition Forces, etc). When looking at the clauses where technology is the 
Actor, the main observations are that in these descriptions the typical 
process is a description of 'enabling', and the object of action (Goal or 
Range, often in a projected clause) is abstract or ambiguous as seen in the 
table above. 
 
In action descriptions where the Actor is human or animate, there are two 
main types. The first type are the descriptions of dynamic military action 
and capability: 
Table 2: Human as a Doer 
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The action descriptions refer to the use of weapons and technology. In 
 often abstract. The data also 
contains a number of possessive attributive action descriptions (having 
something), where the entity possessed is typically capability or ability, 
both abstract. The evaluation of the first ten sample clauses is positive. The 
Process (often combined with the Goal/Range) signal social esteem in the 
form of capacity; Technology and Self are described as competent, expert 
and powerful. The objects of action are inanimate, which signals Social 
Sanction: the one acting is good, moral and ethical by attacking non-human 
targets. 
 
The second type consists of action descriptions that are somewhere 
between material and mental processes: 
s context we will analyze them as mental 
ce text emphasizes Capacity that is 
descriptions of military action, the process is typically material (physical) 
and the object of the action is inanimate and
Table 3: Human as a Doer 
 
These descriptions highlight the analytical part of waging war: the planning 
and the creating of strategy. In thi
processes, because they are strongly contrastive to the material processes of 
attacking and neutralizing, and their purpose is to emphasize the role of the 
scientific and creative planning process in warfare. The evaluation in the 
above clauses is, just like in the first ten, positive. Capacity is signaled with 
descriptions of observation, consideration and learnedness. These Process 
types can further be characterized as perceptive and cognitive (Halliday, 
004: 210). To put it briefly, the sour2
realized by descriptions of having both inner (ability, cognitive skills) and 
outer (material, technological) resources. Of all action, the emphasis is on 
118 
 inner experience: weapons are of course used, but after a planning process 
that is described as highly scientific. 
 
In addition to action descriptions, the briefing contained a number of 
nominal constructions that are worth notice: 
Tabl
 
he above nominalizations capture the semantic content of the action 
he technology descriptions in American war-speak execute the function of 
e 4: Nominalizations 
T
descriptions: development, capability, evolution, ability. The order of these 
nominalizations create a narrative of evolving and developing capability 
that finally is utilized as an ability. This narrative creates a concept of 
advancement and technological omnipotence. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
There are two major players in the Grand Narrative of War: technology is 
the enabler, and 'we' are the able. The ability technology creates is to wage 
war effectively, precisely and securely and so save lives by avoiding 
casualties and collateral damage. Technology is the prerequisite for 
humanity in warfare. In this narrative, war has evolved into "Effects Based 
Operations" on one hand, and into humanitarian operations on the other. 
The result is war's new image, which is slowly drifting further and further 
away from the killing, and closer and closer to implementing humanity. 
This is the source of the binary rhetoric of 'bombing for peace' and 
'destroying the village to save it'. 
 
The frequently occurring words capacity and capability are abstract and 
subordinate terms that may mean anything from having financial or human 
resources to operate to meaning the quality of weapons systems, planning, 
or the mass of the actual weapons. These are everyday terms in strategy and 
operations discussed in public and allow the speaker to carry out the tactic 
of neutrality through vagueness. 
 
T
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 deterrence. As Joint Operational Environment 2010 (United States Joint 
orces Command, 2010) concludes, the task of deterrence will be 
logy is 
unimportant in this type of conflict. While it is certainly correct 
trategies change, but the discourses (and the weapons used) 
main the same. The deterrence the West imposes means smaller and 
ratives" the role of 
e "strategic corporal whose acts might have strategic consequences if 
rted" is big. By press-briefing the media and embedding 
urnalists in 'liberation operations', the military leadership is creating 
 be supervised and controlled by 
e system and as part of the system - not as an individual. In the words of 
be aggressively 
mployed" to "obtain local, regional, and international support for COIN 
ogy and narrative". 
F
increasingly important. This, although, evokes the question whether the 
asymmetric and irregular enemy the report described can be deterred and if 
so, whether technology as a deterrence will work. Insurgents use 
inexpensive and asymmetric forms of combat, to which the U.S. responds 
with expensive counter measures. According to 2008 National Defense 
Strategy, deterrence must include both military and non-military tools, and 
that "changes in capabilities, especially new technologies" help to create a 
credible deterrence. Metz (2007: 65) elaborates on the logic of fighting 
insurgency with technology: 
 
Counterinsurgency experts long have argued that techno
that technology designed to find and destroy a conventional 
enemy military force had limited application, other types such as 
nonlethal weapons and robotics do hold promise for difficult 
tasks such as securing populated areas, preventing infiltration, 
and avoiding civilian casualties. 
 
While the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy emphasizes the integration of 
military and non-military means, the military still turns to technology for 
answers. EBO, once justified with the promise of new technologies, has 
been abandoned and replaced with the 'Comprehensive Approach' (CA). 
These new strategies are justified as they promise 'even less' collateral 
damage and 'even better' precision - enabled by technology. The name of 
the applied s
re
smaller missiles (yet more lethal than ever), satellites and stealth drones 
(that both observe us and guide missiles) and cyberspace. Virilio (2009) 
calls this "aesthetics of disappearance". The collective Western outlook no 
longer tolerates alternatives that would make war visible. At the same time, 
we fear the unseen. The Joint Operating Environment 2010 (ibid.) also 
remarks that individual soldiers are increasingly "global communication 
producers". According to the report, in the "battle of nar
th
widely repo
jo
strategic communication that is convincing enough to appeal not only to the 
public, but also to the soldier that has to
th
the COIN Field Manual: "Information operations (IO) must 
e
operations" and "discredit insurgent propaganda and provide a more 
compelling alternative to the insurgent ideol
120 
  
5. Conclusion 
 
The Revolution in Military Affairs presents the new identity of war as a 
ch as EBO, has created the 
emand for both internal and external control in the Western military force. 
e led to strategic 
ommunication, which contains the Grand Military Narrative. According to 
e, war is removed from the battle fields into the virtual. 
th
assumption that the 
surgent will die in the process, the West distances itself from the 
entally (distance 
nd simulation) and tolerate no losses. 'We' cling onto everything we have, 
re. This makes the discourse on the 
reats of asymmetric enemies interesting. Is it not the RMA that distanced 
t be deterred) with weapons (that cannot be seen) and 
ay more than we can afford to in order to do so (while the enemy pays 
, but the one who tolerates the biggest losses. 
al Grammar. Revised 
system of technologies, an ideology which manifests itself in military 
discourse. In addition, system thinking, su
d
This combination of strategically significant military contractors, techno-
faith and the need to dominate and control hav
c
this Grand Narrative, technology executes, with precision, reliability and 
from a distance, the duties determined by analytical, rational and morally 
virtuous humans. The public role of the military is to 'do good'. In this 
narrativ
 
The binary roles of the military result in binary rhetoric, and this is very 
visible in e analysis introduced in this article. Whereas the adversary, the 
insurgents, conduct hands-on warfare based on the 
in
discomfort both physically (drones and missiles) and m
a
whereas 'they' have little to lose. 'We' fight the enemy with the exact 
opposite way than they fight 'us': the US is portrayed as evolved and 
scientific, while the majority of the militaries in the rest of the world 
employ very different methods of warfa
th
'us' from the enemy and created asymmetry, the Frankenstein we are now 
terrified of? 
 
The Grand Military Narrative is full of paradoxes. Rhetoric, strategy and 
reality do not meet. The result is that we are deterring an asymmetric 
enemy (that canno
p
close to nothing). The paradox here is that in an arms race against 
asymmetric enemies, the winner is not the one who has the highest 
technology
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KILL, CAPTURE… OR WHAT? HOW OPERATIONAL 
PLANNING CHANGES THE LANGUAGE OF 
COMMUNICATING STRATEGY IN WAR (ARTICLE III) 
 
ABSTRACT 
The doctrine of warfare influences the way language is used. The reporting 
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that the Effects-centric 
doctrines have started to transform the grammatical and lexical patterning 
of discourse. During the war in Iraq, both military experts and linguists 
have criticized the language of the Effects Based Operations as complex 
and confusing. This article provides a cross-disciplinary perspective to the 
study of war discourses by discussing the linguistic characteristics of the 
1st century Strategic Communication as a reflection of current m2 ilitary 
suggests that the perceived 
omplexity is a consequence of Effects-thinking, which has introduced the 
irtu ain 
lexic  to 
two y, 
opera s means that we are witnessing a shift from 
e tr ents to the tradition of reporting identity. Also, 
1. In
 
This the 
lingu inal 
deve stic 
doctrine and operation planning. The analysis 
c
taxonomy of Effects into discourse, where they have begun to replace 
Action descriptions in clauses. This results in abstract descriptions of 
strategy, operational art, and tactics, where the information value of the 
clause becomes impaired. The analysis also suggests that this marks the 
birth of a new genre in war discourse. In addition to the traditional 
good/bad and legitimate/illegitimate parameters of war discourse, 
evaluation can be expressed covertly. The inclusive/exclusive parameter 
efines action descriptions that, unlike the previous parameters, appear d
v ally neutral.  However, it has a culture-ideological basis: a cert
on is associated with certain actors only, which will eventually lead
separate lexicons to describe and contrast 'our' and 'their' strateg
tional art, and tactics. Thi
adition of reporting evth
this ideological change has penetrated the language used in operation 
planning and inter-organization discourses. 
 
Keywords 
military discourse, warfare, Strategic Communication, evaluation, strategic 
planning  
 
troduction 
article aims to introduce a military scientific perspective in 
istic discussion of war discourse. Understanding the doctr
lopments of communication helps us to explain the lingui
125 
 phen egic Communication. War is one of the most 
idely discussed contexts of discourse analysis, but from the perspective of 
munication.  
on of neutrals; (4) To 
demoralize the enemy. 
omena of American Strat
w
military science, the problem is often the same: too often language is 
discussed in isolation from the actual doctrine that greatly influences the 
way language manifests. Therefore, this article attempts to bridge the gap 
between the strongly established discourse analysis tradition and the critical 
discussion of strategy and doctrine in the field of military science. After 
discussing the aims and objectives of military communication in general, 
the discussion will build on the research conducted in the field of systemic 
functional linguistics and explain the grammatical and lexical patterns that 
linguists have identified in the discourses of modern warfare. These include 
technical terms, abstraction of action, and object-less clause configurations. 
Then, these findings are considered in the framework of the modern 
military doctrines. Finally, the empirical analysis of the article approaches 
the term 'neutralize' as a lexical representative of the discourses of Strategic 
Communication. The aim is to understand the current discourses of war as 
the doctrinal consequence of Strategic Com
 
2. The evaluative dichotomies then and now  
 
Propaganda, information warfare, information operations, perception 
management and strategic communication are all communication doctrines, 
past and present, which have been designed to win support and legitimacy 
for military strategy, policy, and operations. The names of the 
communication doctrines have been under constant change in the past 
decades, but the ultimate aim, legitimation, has remained the same. 
Lasswell (1938: 195) defined propaganda as attempts  
 
(1) To mobilize hatred against the enemy; (2) To preserve the 
friendship of allies; (3) To preserve the friendship and, if 
possible, to procure the co-operati
 
This classic demonization/glorification dichotomy is alive and well.  The 
2010 Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and 
Communication Strategy (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2010: III-18) 
introduced a number of practical guidelines for reinforcing the legitimacy 
of national strategic objectives and operational practices, while instructing 
practices by which the illegitimacy of the adversary can be emphasized: 
 
(1) Improve US credibility and legitimacy. 
(2) Weaken an adversary’s credibility and legitimacy. 
(3) Convince selected audiences to take specific actions that 
support US or international objectives. 
(4) Cause a competitor or adversary to take (or refrain from 
126 
 taking) specific actions. 
 
Legitimacy is thus inarguably still the core business of military (political) 
communication.  The comparison of the aims of Strategic Communication 
and Lasswell's definition of propaganda suggests that these forms of 
communication would both lead to similar discourse patterns: 
demonization (to de-legitimize) and glorification (to legitimize). But have 
the strategies of legitimation really not evolved since the World Wars? This 
rticle approaches this question by arguing that Operation Iraqi Freedom as 
nre of war 
iscourse that has emerged to implement an ideological function of 
is, however, does not mean that it would not 
onvey significances of ideological nature. Instead, it counts as discursive 
abus ical 
Disc
 
Lass ith, 
Lass the 
frien  the 
legiti eration is the primary objective of 
ommunication efforts. For instance, in his speech after 9/11, President 
n, 2004). A form of self-glorification and legitimation, in turn, is 
e systematic presentation of one's own actions as legitimate and less 
aggressive, violent, or destructive; in the 2003 CentCom briefings reports 
of human-to-human (American to enemy) action were scarce, suggesting 
that it was mainly the buildings and infrastructure that were impacted by 
the military operation (Lukin, 2005; 2006). 
 
Whereas the discourses of war have retained many of their original 
conventions, it is the conventions of warfare that have evolved more 
dramatically since Lasswell's day. Since the 1990s, the Kosovo campaign 
and the first Gulf war being the prime examples, stability operations, civil 
support, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations have been the most 
pronounced types of military operations. These operations are conducted in 
urban areas in the presence of the civilian population, which means they 
require sophisticated precision-weaponry. The Kosovo campaign, for 
 capabilities, meaning sophisticated targeting processes 
nd weapons technology, have become the prerequisite for legitimate 
arfare. It is the exhibition of these capabilities that is one of the primary 
emes in the media presentations of the U.S. Department of Defense. 
a
well as the war in Afghanistan are characterized by a ge
d
legitimation by means of exclusion. The feature that differentiates this 
genre from the "classic" demonization and glorification is its virtual lack of 
persuasive appraisal. Th
c
e of power and is therefore significant in the framework of Crit
ourse Analysis (see Van Dijk, 2006). 
wellian, overtly evaluative propaganda (Lasswell, 1938; Sm
well & Casey, 1946) "to mobilize hatred" and "to preserve 
dship of allies" is typical during the early stages of conflict, when
macy of engagement in the op
c
Bush reported the enemy as an actor that kills, represses and brutalizes all 
people, its own citizens, and Afghanistan's people (Butt, Lukin & 
Matthiesse
th
instance, was essentially precision warfare. During the 21st century, 
precision warfare
a
w
th
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 When Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched in March, 2003, the Pentagon 
made sure that the doctrine, technological resources, and targeting were 
introduced to the media and public in layman's terms (Department of 
Defense 2003a; 2003b). The verbal negotiation of warfare is strategically 
as important as its effective execution. This is why Strategic 
Communication exists. It determines the key themes and messages that 
together form the official narrative of each war and operation (U.S. Joint 
Forces Command, 2010).  
 
3. Strategic Communication and the three levels of warfare 
 
What remains significant throughout this discussion is the definition of 
Strategic Communication. Strategic Communication as defined in the 
concept is understood as 
 
Focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand 
and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or 
preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG 
interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated 
programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized 
with the actions of all instruments of national power. 
(Department of Defense, 2009). 
 
In order to establish an understanding of the strategic dimension of the 
concept, it is necessary to consider the hierarchy of the three levels of 
warfare:  
 
Figure 1. Levels of war according to Field Manual 100-5 (Department of 
the Army, 1993) 
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 According to the U.S. Field Manual 100-5, the strategic level of war is 
oncerned with the national, alliance, or coalition objectives. It is the level 
nal power. The 
perational level functions as the link between strategic objectives and 
ld diminish the role of specific audiences, meaning, 
nd eventually enable the broadcast of one global narrative. This is more or 
mary parameter in the 
iscourses produced during the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
c
of applying the instruments and resources of natio
o
tactical employment: at this level, the military forces "attain strategic 
objectives through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and 
major operations." Finally, the tactical level consists of battles and 
engagements that are fought to achieve the goals and results determined by 
the operational level. When the definition of Strategic Communication is 
compared to this hierarchy, it becomes evident that the definition reaches 
from the strategic level to the tactical: the interests and policies of the U.S. 
Government (strategic level) are used to engage key audiences (tactical 
level) through coordinated programs and plans, themes, and messages 
(operational level). The realization of the Strategic Communication 
objectives thus requires efforts on all three levels of war.  
 
Another key term in understanding the doctrine is synchronization. The 
doctrine highlights the significance of coordination and synchronization of 
the themes and messages. According to the Joint Integrating Concept 
(Department of Defense, 2009), Strategic Communication is "a continuous 
function that occurs across the full range of military operations" and is used 
to communicate strategically "with friends, adversaries and others alike". 
Synchronized and harmonized Strategic Communication would allow the 
use of the same narrative patterns (themes and messages) across all 
audiences, which wou
a
less the direct implication of modern information society, where it is no 
longer possible to direct different information to different audiences, and 
where access to flows of information challenges all strategic planning. 
 
To summarize, Strategic Communication should be understood as an 
ongoing narrative that engages the global audiences and that consists of 
themes and messages. The aim and function of Strategic Communication 
(and the communication strategies that precede it) to generate legitimacy 
and persuasion have been widely studied and analyzed by linguists. Here 
the focus will be on the work of a number of linguists who have 
approached the 21st century discourses of war from the perspective of 
systemic functional grammar. Butt, Lukin & Matthiessen (2004), Lukin 
(2005) and Lukin (2006) have illustrated how lexical and grammatical 
patterns are constructed to persuade the audience.  According to these 
analyses, legitimacy manifests itself as the pri
d
Some of the significant grammatical and lexical properties that characterize 
the discourses of war will be discussed next. These properties are then 
discussed within the theoretical framework of current (U.S.) military 
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 doctrine. 
 
4. Grammatical and lexical patterns of war discourses 
A sed 
id eir 
an nel 
Ti and 
'th oral 
as es" 
and results in demonization of the history, culture, and religion of the 
nemy (Butt, Lukin & Matthiessen, 2004). Lukin (2005) suggests that the 
tions where 
conduct strikes), or where the second 
matical 
atterning, according to Lukin (2005), "is a central strategic resource in the 
 to demonizing evaluations of action, such as 'terrorizing', 'killing' 
nd 'brutalizing', the register of morality may manifest itself in much 
 
s Butt, Lukin & Matthiessen sum up, "[i]t is not that language can be u
eologically, it is that the very use of language is ideological." In th
alysis of the speeches of President Bush and British Lieutenant Colo
m Collins, they found that the discrimination between 'us', the moral, 
ey', the adversary, is coded in the grammar of the discourse. This "m
ymmetry" is expressed in the "consistent allocation of grammatical rol
e
grammatical patterns of representing 'self' include configura
'our' action either has no Range (i.e. 
entity impacted by 'our' action (i.e. attack) is either abstract or inanimate 
(i.e. combat systems). Lukin refers to these transitivity configurations as 
"muted action", which have served the purpose of persuading the audiences 
into interpreting the events in Iraq from the perspective of the Coalition. 
Other such grammatical resources are agent-less passive constructions, as 
well as nominalizations of the actions of war (Lukin, 2006). Gram
p
process of 'dominating the information environment.'" This type of 
transitivity concordances are what link extralinguistic experience (feelings, 
thoughts and perceptions) and linguistic, cognitive content of discourse 
(Halliday, 2009: 55).  
 
As stated above, demonization can be considered as a traditional 
characteristic of the discourses of war. Western war discourses represent the 
enemy in the moral context rather than that of adversariality (Mouffe, 
2005). According to Mouffe, this is the result of politics "played out in the 
register of morality" and therefore the 'us' versus 'them' opposition is 
construed around the categories of 'good' versus 'evil' (2005: 75-76). The 
analysis of Coalition press briefings supports this view. In Lukin's (2006) 
analysis of the press briefings from the first week of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, the grammatical and lexical patterns of the press briefings feature 
very few instances of human-to-human action and instead prefer abstract or 
specifically downgraded Goals, such as 'capacity' or 'the enemy'. In 
addition
a
subtler ways, such as distancing oneself  from the enemy not only in terms 
of lexicon and semantics, but also grammatically.  
 
The moral register is demonstrated by the shift from the descriptions of 'us' 
taking action against the rival to the description of the 'self' as an analytical 
subject, where the focus is on how 'we' act and behave in the course of war. 
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 The enemy does not have to be mentioned. References to the enemy are 
often replaced by descriptions of inanimate, legitimate targets such as 
"systems": 
 
You have to kind of work it and look at each element of that system 
and figure out what its vulnerable points are. And if you had the 
ability to do stealth and precision to give you a higher volume of 
fire, then you could go and attack this system as a system. But 
again, air defenses aren't the targets, if you had targets. Targets are 
the
De
 
5. Th
his analysis are Warden's Five Rings, Effects Based 
perations and its follower, the Comprehensive Approach. The common 
denominator to these is their focus on the causal effects of action.  
 
the Five Rings model presents the enemy as a system: the key target in the 
middle of the rings is the leadership, then organic essentials such as raw 
materials and resources, infrastructure, population and finally fielded 
military. The more central the ring, the more focal its significance (Warden, 
1995). In other words, the system attempts to predict the effects of the 
strike. The lexicon of the Effects Based Operations and the Comprehensive 
Approach has incorporated the term 'center of gravity', which stands for the 
focal points that should be influenced in order to create effects: the center 
 provides moral or physical strength, 
(Department of Defense Dictionary, 
012). In Warden's (1995) view, the centers of gravity are organizational 
oncepts and an organizational model of the enemy helps reveal which 
 question that was raised by military analysts was whether the center of 
ravity should be understood as something physical or cognitive (Davis, 
01: 13-14). As noted by Davis, the metaphor contains the assumption 
that the center of gravity is physical (for instance a critical node, command 
headquarters, army formation, etc.) and when these physical targets cease 
to exist, "the metaphor has completely failed, and it is surely better to just 
 targets, or the effects you want to create. (Department of 
fense, 2003a) 
e impact of military doctrine on the discourses of war 
 
As demonstrated in the previous citation, the U.S. military concepts and 
doctrines of the 1990s and the 2000s have revolved around the concept of 
Effects. The ones that may be considered as the most notable ones in the 
framework of t
O
of gravity is "the source of power that
freedom of action, or will to act" 
2
c
ones of them are the most likely to cause the desired effects: "The best 
place to start is normally at the center for if we can prevent the system’s 
leadership from gathering, processing, and using information we don’t 
want him to have, we have effectively paralyzed the system at a strategic 
level."  
 
A
g
20
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 talk directly about attacking the will and cohesion of the enemy" (2001: 13-
nly by providing them security and earning their trust and 
onfidence can the Afghan government and ISAF prevail" (Petraeus, 2010). 
he C
 
 
 
14). In 2010, General Petraeus stated that it is the people that are the center 
of gravity: "O
c
This statement did not kill the metaphor of the center of gravity as a 
physical target, but explicitly and successfully brought the human element 
into systems-thinking. Targeting the center of gravity now meant 
communicating:  
 
Walk.  Stop by, don’t drive by.  Patrol on foot whenever possible 
and engage the population. Take off your sunglasses.  Situational 
awareness can only be gained by interacting face-to-face, not 
separated by ballistic glass or Oakleys. (Petraeus, 2010) 
 
In other words, the methodology of creating effects officially contains the 
means of affecting the will and cohesion of not only the enemy, but all key 
audiences. Strategic Communication is therefore an element in effects-
centric warfare. 
 
Figure 2. Warden's (1995) five rings 
 
 
The result of effects-centric modeling is a lexical taxonomy of effects, 
which differentiates, for instance, between the terms 'neutralize' and 
'destroy'. According to the model, Action (concrete execution) is always 
ifferentiated from the Effect (caused influence).  This is demd
t
onstrated in 
omprehensive Approach operational design model:  
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igure 3. The NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Process (after 
scriptions of actions and events are abstract and 
highly general processes which cover for, and background, a broad range 
ns acting on humans 
nd the preference for inanimate objects of action (Lukin, 2006; also 
hnical failures (Department of Defense, 2003a). The terms 
at are needed to differentiate between the failure of systems thinking and 
ded and collateral 
amage. The failure of systems thinking is always unintended:  
F
Salar, 2012) 
 
Thus, what is relevant is the Effect of the Action, while the action itself 
simply serves the purpose of creating a desired effect. What this means in 
terms of grammatical patterning is that it is the Effect that takes the place of 
the Process - such as is the case with the term 'neutralize'. Grammatically, it 
is used as a Process, but in the campaign design model, such as 
demonstrated above, it is an Effect that can be created not by a single 
action, but a variety of them. This explains the use of abstract action 
descriptions. As found in Lukin's (2005) analysis of Central Command 
press briefings, the de
"
of more specific actions." The lexical implication of the use of Effects to 
refer to action is the increasing use of abstract hypernyms, and so the 
lexical and structural properties of war discourse can be seen as a reflection 
of the current effects-centric doctrine.  
 
In addition to the lexical properties such as abstraction of action, a 
significant characteristic in terms of grammatical patterning in the press 
briefings is the small number of references to huma
a
Jantunen & Huhtinen, 2011). Like abstraction, this is the consequence of 
doctrinal developments. Effects-centric doctrines emphasize the 
significance of controlling critical (enemy) infrastructure, which means the 
adversary is increasingly understood as a "system" - obviously another 
abstraction. Systems thinking, the analysis of causal connections and the 
continuous assessment of effects are characteristic of effects-centric 
doctrines such as Effects Based Operations (EBO) and Comprehensive 
Approach (CA). This is, according to critics, also the flaw that makes the 
doctrines vulnerable (Vego, 2006). In General Crowder's words, there will 
be intelligence failure which leads to less than perfect information, and 
there will be tec
th
the challenges of the operational environment are uninten
d
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If, however, in the course of dropping that bomb, a laser-guided 
bomb, for example, a fin breaks off the laser-guided bomb and 
the thing goes spiraling 3,000 feet away from the target, there 
was really no practical way for me to plan for that. That is not 
collateral damage; that is unintended damage, and if there are 
civilians killed, they are unintended civilian casualties. I don't 
mean to kind of draw a fine legal line between the two, but it's 
important to understand that as we plan these things, there are a 
great deal of things we can do to mitigate collateral damage and 
solve yourself of that hope because that probably is not 
a realistic expectation. (Department of Defense, 20031) 
 
EBO has since been criticized for the complexity of the planning model: 
the c  the 
impo  required by the concept), the "insertion 
of ef instead of 
predi xes 
that have been recognized (Vego, 2006). The very terminology of EBO is 
roblematic: "Operational terms are used as ornaments rather than in ways 
 the light of this discussion on the taxonomy of actions and effects 
acco s of 
warf to 
calcu
on th cts 
is de no-
in fact have potential to mitigate some unintended damage, but 
these things, again, are mechanical devices and some will fail. 
And so if somebody has a hope that we're going to go into a 
conflict and nothing is going to happen in terms of collateral 
damage, unintended damage or civilian casualties, I think you 
should ab
hallenge of predicting the effects, their duration and intensity, and
ssibility to measure them (as
fects between the objective and what they call actions" 
cting effects after the accomplishment of objective are all parado
p
that articulate their true meaning. Worse, various well understood and 
commonly accepted terms are redefined to emphasize effects in lieu of 
objectives and tasks" (Ibid.). Mattis (2008) characterizes EBO terminology 
simply as "confusing". 
 
The consequent problem of the model, according to Vego, is that as it is 
difficult to predict the effects on the tactical level, the more difficult the 
predictions become on the strategic level of war. Further, Mattis (2008) 
criticizes EBO for assuming an unachievable level of predictability and 
simplifying complex, organic systems such as leadership and imagination. 
Despite the criticism and rejection of the term EBO in the Joint Forces 
Command in 2008, the operational design model of the Comprehensive 
Approach is still essentially the same as that of EBO. 
 
In
rding to the effects-centric doctrines, it is evident that the discourse
are have undergone a lexical shift from classic demonizing 
lated, doctrine-driven description that mutes action and the its impact 
e adversary. Next, it will be argued that the very taxonomy of effe
termined by not only the doctrines discussed here, but by the tech
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 ideol tric 
doctr  of 
war and violence in its own code, which offers not only an abstract, but 
lso a dichotomizing description of the action as it is unfolding in the 
efings appear to the media and public, who have to infer 
e meanings of the terminology by the context provided by the narrator? 
 the criticisms that label the terminology as ambiguous (Lukin, 
005; 2006) and confusing (Vego, 2006; Mattis, 2008; Van Riper, 2009), 
plained in great detail at the very early stages 
f Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 (see Department of Defense, 2003a). 
1. As pertains to military operations, to render ineffective or 
unusable.  
2. To render enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering 
with a particular operation.  
3. To render safe mines, bombs, missiles, and booby traps.  
4. To make harmless anything contaminated with a chemical 
agent. 
he term is often used concurrently with the term 'destroy', a term that 
annot be found in the DoD dictionary. However, destroyed is defined as a 
condition of a target so damaged that it can neither function as intended 
or be restored to a usable condition. In the case of a building, all vertical 
supports and spanning members are damaged to such an extent that nothing 
is salvageable. In the case of bridges, all spans must have dropped and all 
piers must require replacement." The definitions come relatively close to 
each other, although the end states they create are dramatically different. In 
Crowder's press briefing (Department of Defense, 2003a) both of the terms 
were used, but as Crowder explained the EBO planning process to the 
media, the emphasis was on the non-lethal options, such as neutralizing 
electrical power or buildings and systems. To emphasize the option of non-
ogical approach to waging war the Western way. Effects-cen
ines have created a genre of discourse that allows the discussion
a
theater of war.  
 
6. Neutralize as a symbol of Effects-centric doctrines 
 
If the terminology of Effects Based Operations indeed appears as 
"ornamental" rather than articulate of their "true meaning", how does the 
language of the bri
th
Considering
2
the target audience, namely the media and the public, face a challenge in 
interpreting the narration of doctrine and subsequent action in the theater of 
war.  
 
To address this question, it is necessary to examine the use of a term 
specific to the EBO and/or CA taxonomy. One such term is 'neutralize', 
which was a term that was  ex
o
The 2012 Department of Defense dictionary definition for the term 
'neutralize' is  
 
 
T
c
"
n
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 lethal influence, Crowder jokes about the choice between neutralizing and 
destroying, where neutralizing equals to making everybody "go to sleep": 
 
And so we look at that target and we say, what do we want to do 
to that target? I want to neutralize or I want to destroy this 
bunker. And then I examine what munitions I might use to destroy 
that bunker. Ideally, if you could turn the lights off and make 
everybody go to sleep, that would be really nice. Unfortunately, 
some of our capabilities are not quite that advanced, and in many 
cases, we have to resort to physical destruction. (Department of 
Defense, 2003a) 
 
These two examples of the use of the term 'neutralize' illustrate the 
ho neutralizes and who is being neutralized? What kind of 
/transcripts), there are 43 documents that contain 
he analysis shows that the corpus consists of 56 references to neutralizing, 
the earliest from 1997.  A ap monstrates, there was a peak in 
t n both 2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ambiguity of the term that is yet central in the terminology of the specific 
doctrine being introduced. Therefore the analysis focuses on the use of the 
erm: wt
meanings does it convey in terms of Actions and Effects: is it an action 
comparable to shooting missiles or dropping bombs, or is it really used to 
denote an Effect? 
 
7. Analysis 
 
The data of the analysis consist of news and press briefing transcripts in the 
DoD transcript archive. According to an archive search 
http://www.defense.gov(
the term 'neutralize'. These documents are all included in the analysis. Only 
the references made by military personnel are considered and the 
references uttered by press representatives are excluded. Only the verb 
form 'neutralize' is included. 
 
T
s the gr hic de
he use of the term i  2003 and 006.  
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 16
18
Figure 4. The use of 'neutralize' in Pentagon pr ring the 
2000s 
his figure demonstrates that 'neutralize' is a term that is used during active 
6 
marked the beginning of the transition from U.S. Operation Enduring 
Freedom to NATO's In  Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
operation. Both instances activated the insurgents, causing them to engage 
the U.S./NATO forces in e graphic sug lize' is 
u g it to operational and tactical rather 
than strategic contexts. 
neutralize', 53 referred to actions performed by 
ess briefings du
 
T
combat operations. In 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom began, and 200
ternational
 battle. Th gests that 'neutra
sed to report about combat, linkin
 
urther, out of 56 uses of 'F
the U.S. or their friendlies and allies. Only three accounts referred to the 
'Other', out of which two were accounts where both the Actor and Goal are 
abstract and inanimate: 
 
Actor Goal Process 
Iranian and North 
issiles 
the advantag ilitary has 
enjoyed since the en
War  
Korean m
neutralize es the U.S. m
d of the Cold 
potential adversaries  our advantagneutralize es 
technical development neutralize our qualitative advantages  
 
 
Table 1. Actors and Goals in accounts of the adversary 
 
In the accounts of U.S. (and friendlies/allies) actions, the uses of 'neutralize' 
can be categorized into three sets: human, abstract, and inanimate Goal. 
Abstract Goals are ambiguous in whether the Goal is human or not. The 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 12
8
14
0
2
4
6
10
12
2009 2010 2011 20
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 category of inanimate Goals contains accounts of (sometimes abstract) 
concepts that are understood as non-human. 
 
Out of all 53 references, 17 have a human Goal, 14 an inanimate Goal and 
22 an abstract Goal. Human Goals are typically negatively evaluative 
descriptions of the enemy: 
 
Actor Process Goal 
U.S. Forces neutralize terrorists 
we  neutralize  insurgent forces 
we neutralize  those people that are 
preying on these 
innocent Iraqi 
civilians 
Table 2. Human Goal 
 
Inanimate Goals include references to buildings, vehicles and explosives: 
Actor Process Goal 
-  neutralize air defenses 
I neutralize electrical power 
explosive ordnance neutralize IEDs 
disposal teams 
Table 3. Inanimate Goal 
 
Clauses with an abstract Goal are the largest category. It contains several 
particularly vague references that could be interpreted as human, but that 
re nominalized into concepts: a
 
Actor Process Goal 
we neutralize insurgency 
I neutralize the threat 
operations neutralize the forward 
accelerants 
Table 4. Abstract Goal 
 
To summarize, the data contains several references to human-to-human 
action. Equally common are the descriptions of action on inanimate Goals. 
The legitimacy of the human Goals is realized by lexical choice that 
emphasizes the illegitimacy of the enemy as "insurgents" and "terrorists". 
However, the emergence of abstract Goals and especially the repetitive 
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 phrasing such as "neutralize insurgency" and "neutralize threats" is 
oteworthy. The category of abstract Goals is moderately larger than the 
xtract 1 
Our that 
was that 
were se, 
2003
 
Extr
You g en 
you his 
indiv at? 
(Dep
 
ften 'neutralize' is used rather interchangeably with descriptions of Action 
. Because it signifies 
rocesses associated with the Western doctrine, it is rarely applied in the 
f enemy action. Despite its seemingly neutral and 
onventional sound, the term has become symbolic of Western (high-tech, 
n
other two discussed here, but more importantly, this is the category where 
both the Process and the Goal of the clause are abstract. This means that the 
typical clause configuration containing the term 'neutralize' does not 
indicate what exactly is done to who/what exactly, as an abstract Process 
has an abstract Target. 
 
To address the interchangeability of 'neutralize' as an action and 'neutralize’ 
as an Effect, it is necessary to look at the contexts where these descriptions 
appear: 
 
E
mission is to find, kill or capture. In this case, we had an enemy 
defending, it was barricaded, and we had to take the measures 
 necessary in order to neutralize the target. (Department of Defen
c) 
act 2 
o on him, you fight him, you kill him, or you neutralize him, but th
think, in effect, and ask the question: What influence does t
idual have, and what will be the outcome if I do that or that or th
artment of Defense, 2006a) 
O
(fight, kill, capture). In addition, the actual Process in the production of the 
Effect remains unclear. At the same time, 'neutralize' may appear in strategy 
discourses that clearly refer to the execution of economic and security 
policy rather than the context of combat: 
 
Extract 3 
But military means alone cannot neutralize the insurgency and stop the 
sectarian violence. Political and economic interests are also critical to this 
effort. (Department of Defense, 2006b) 
 
In terms of the Action/Effect paradox from the lexical and grammatical 
perspectives, the vagueness of Process/Goal patterning and the contextual 
blurriness of the use of 'neutralize' use to describe Processes on the three 
levels of warfare, the abstract nature of the Process 'neutralize' makes it 
applicable for the genre of Strategic Communication
P
descriptions o
c
counter-insurgency, anti-terrorist, and pro-democracy) way of warfare. Its 
use has become ideological rather than descriptive. It often does not 
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 describe what has been done, but that something has been done. 
 
This discussion has essentially centered on the self-evaluative patterns of 
Strategic Communication, where evaluation is directly linked to 
legitimatory purposes. Van Leeuwen (2007) recognizes three types of moral 
evaluation that are applied to create legitimacy. Naturalization encourages 
the audience to ignore the signals of illegitimacy or of something being 
"not right", and to accept what is presented as 'normal' or 'natural'. 
Abstraction expresses moral evaluations in a manner that 'moralizes' them 
by distilling from them a quality that links them to discourses of moral 
f force. The function of this type of 
rminology is to naturalize the descriptions of the use of force and to 
"
values". Third, analogies, according to Van Leeuwen, always tend to have a 
legitimatory or a de-legitimatory function: 
 
Here the implicit answer to the question ‘Why must I do this?’ or 
‘Why must I do this in this way?’ is not, ‘because it is good’, but 
‘because it is like another activity which is associated with 
positive values’ (or, in the case of negative comparison, ‘because 
it is not like another activity which is associated with negative 
values’). Sometimes the comparison is implicit. An activity that 
belongs to one social practice is described by a term which, 
literally, refers to an activity belonging to another social 
practice, and the positive or negative values which, in the given 
socio-cultural context, are attached to that other activity, are 
then transferred to the original activity. (Van Leeuwen, 2007) 
 
It is clear that practices of naturalization, abstraction, and analogization are 
all dimensions in the descriptions of 'neutralizing'. 'Neutralizing' is 
associated with the   social practice of instrumental warfare, which is the 
only politically correct attitude towards war: military operations must 
produce 'effects' that serve military objectives. The vagueness of the term 
'neutralize' and its presentation as a morally acceptable "Effect" is an 
example of the "moral asymmetry" in discourses of war and adversariality. 
According to these discourses, neutralizing denotes situational 
consideration: 'neutralizing' is an analytical process, which realizes as the 
least invasive method of use o
te
abstract them. Neutralizing is the lesser of the two evils (neutralizing vs. 
destruction) and therefore an integral, legitimate, and natural part of the 
doctrine that focuses much of the efforts in the announcements about 
avoiding "damage" - both unintended and collateral. 
 
8. Discussion 
 
This article has discussed a number of lexical and grammatical 
characteristics of the discourses of war. Some discourses can be understood 
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 as "classic", overt legitimation such as the demonization of the enemy and 
the glorification of the 'self'. In addition, this article has argued that there is 
a genre of war discourse that has evolved side by side with effects-centric 
military doctrines. This genre contains covert legitimation much subtler in 
its evaluation and, as done here, requires some discussion of the theoretical 
background of strategic communication and current military doctrine in 
order to be understood. What defines this type of communication is its 
conventions of legitimation: they allow the speaker to report the strategic 
aims as well as the tactical decision without getting into their specifics. 
 
In this article, the term 'neutralize' represents this type of legitimatory 
discourses. From the perspective of strategic planning, it is one of the 
Effects in the taxonomy of the effects-centric doctrines. From the 
perspective of discourse analysis, it is an abstract Process. This term 
emonstrates how social change is "discourse-led" (Fairclough, 2010: 77). 
hem in an irrigation 
itch with a grenade. The scene appeared sarcastic precisely because of this 
 The use of this abstract word to describe what was essentially 
 firefight followed by the soldiers' scornful inspection of the bodies. 
e. 
 always excludes the "Other". Exclusive taxonomies construct a hierarchy 
ic ideology and its 
bjectives can participate in this specific action. This is where abstraction 
; Lukin, 2006; Butt, Lukin & 
atthiessen, 2004), the third parameter of legitimation is exclusion. It often 
s 
neutralizing contained several reports of 
uman-on-human use of force, which is typically not perceived as 'good' or 
d
It shows how the ideological need to differentiate between 'our' and 'their' 
actions has penetrated the strategic planning process, and how this 
dichotomy has resulted in the construction of vocabularies and hierarchies 
that encode actor-specific experience or action. Social change takes place, 
when these doctrinal conventions become naturalized in the vocabulary of 
talking about war. In the 2010 documentary film Armadillo, "neutralize" 
was the specific term used by the Danish soldiers when they engaged a 
number of Taleban fighters in close combat and killed t
d
word choice.
a
Despite the original significance that derives from the taxonomy of the 
doctrine, the word has become to symbolize Western/American dominanc
It
of meaning where actions, effects and outcomes are in a linear relationship, 
which means that only actors who share that specif
o
turns into asymmetry: "neutralize" has no counterpart in our taxonomy, in 
the sense that "attack" has "defense". Perhaps "Jihad" is equally exclusive 
in terms of purpose and practice? 
 
The analysis suggests that in addition to the good/bad and 
legitimate/illegitimate parameters that are often used to make evaluations 
of the 'self' and the enemy (as in Lukin, 2005
M
operates covertly: it does not automatically reveal itself as 'good', 'bad', 
'legitimate' or 'illegitimate', but its exclusive meaning may be coded in the 
patterns instead of the semantics of the word. The transitivity analysi
shows that the references to 
h
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 'legitimate' - quite the contrary. However, the term is characterized by 
covert evaluative power, which stems from its ideological use: the 
seemingly dispassionate 'neutralize' is a term that is associated with 'our' 
actions and behaviors. As the Western military doctrines evolve and 
ecome more and more technologically asymmetric compared to the 
cally defined 'end state', which can only be reached on our terms. 
ith the linguistic strategies of distancing and abstraction, Strategic 
: 18).  Strategic Communication is 
 design for the linguistic exclusion of the 'other'. This third parameter is 
s presented as a 
ystem, but the variety of enemy action descriptions tends to be limited and 
most of the analytical resources. The structures and semantics of 
trategic Communication are a mere reflection of this.  
 & Society, Vol 15(2–3), pp. 267–290. 
epartment of Defense, 2003a. Effects Based Operations briefing. [Online] 
ember 2012]. 
ts/transcript.aspx?transc 
ptid=2007> [Accessed 27 December 2012]. 
on 
f the Deaths of Uday and Qusay Hussein. [Online] Available at: 
b
enemy, the bigger the semantic difference is between 'our' actions and 
'theirs'. The outcome is that what 'we' do can no longer be described by the 
same words as 'they'. Attacking is no longer attacking, but aiming at a 
strategi
W
Communication demonstrates that "[e]very order is political and based on 
some form of exclusion" (Mouffe, 2005
a
another linguistic method to reinforce the order of moral asymmetry.  
 
The irony of effects-centric thinking is that the enemy i
s
repetitive. Instead, Strategic Communication is focused on analytical 
assessments and representations of the actions and effects of the Self. The 
criticism of Effects Based Operations as a complex and confusing model 
speaks to the fact that it is the actions and behaviors of the self that seem to 
absorb 
S
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FROM POWER TO A PUDDLE OF BLOOD: RITUALS 
AND EVALUATION IN THE IMAGES OF CAPTURE AND 
DEATH OF SADDAM HUSSEIN, OSAMA BIN LADEN 
AND MUAMMAR GADDAFI (ARTICLE IV) 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article approaches the interplay of the representations of expressive 
ures that 
mphasize the humanitarian nature of conflict management, the media 
 and Gaddafi resulted in 
e celebration and ritualization of expressive violence. 
and instrumental violence, rituals and ideological evaluation in the imagery 
that was produced when the 21st century archenemies, Saddam Hussein, 
Osama bin Laden and Muammar Gaddafi, were captured and killed. The 
discussion draws from the linguistic tradition of agency and transitivity 
analysis and thereby aims to approach the communicative parallels between 
the theory of media rituals and the American Grand Narrative of 
humanitarian agency. This multimodal take on media representations of the 
archenemies is used to argue that despite the instrumental rhetoric of 
conflict and warfare, it is expressive violence that forms the core of the 
narratives that eventually create unity and reason among the Western 
audiences. Although open participation in violent political acts is 
problematic and typically illegitimate in the Western cult
e
images of the violent deaths of Hussein, bin Laden
th
 
1. Introduction 
 
The pictures of capture and death of the 21st century archenemies were 
media spectacles. Typically, significant enemies are portrayed in images 
that are used to illustrate news articles and to prove the reality of the 
capture. This was the case also with Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden 
and Muammar Gaddafi. Each of them represented absolute evil, and each 
of them served as the face of the absolute enemy. The war in Iraq was 
justified with Hussein's refusal to co-operate with the United Nations 
inspections, which led to the launch of the operation, as Hussein refused to 
comply with President Bush's ultimatum to leave the country (American 
Forces Press Service, 17.3.2003). In the war in Afghanistan, the face of the 
enemy was Osama bin Laden, whose search operations were prominent in 
the media representations of the war. The Libya operation centered upon 
the hunt for Muammar Gaddafi, whose death was announced as the start of 
a "new era" (The Telegraph, 21 October, 2011).  
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The extensive military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya have been 
demonstrations of the Western concept of humanitarian warfare. In the 
official argumentation they were given a humanitarian objective. The 
political objectives, such as the human rights, the restoration or 
reinforcement of democracy in Islamic dictatorships, the civil rights of the 
citizens and the toppling of the dictators and oligarchy, have been the key 
themes in the discourses about the operation. It is therefore possible to 
observe the mediatized captures and deaths of each iconic enemy as the 
ictory of the Western narrative of justice - or as its representations. In 
 the world and relate it to one's political 
eology. The rituals discussion will be followed by an analysis of agency 
rything but solely military. In the narratives of 
umanitarian action the primary objectives contain the concepts of 
v
these narratives the dictators and terrorists slip from the heights of their 
authority to a puddle of blood - a process that the Western nations refer to 
as the dawn of democracy.  
The following section will discuss the role division of instrumental and 
expressive violence during the 21st century. It will be argued that this 
division influences the conventions used to represent war in the media. 
After this, the images of Hussein's, bin Laden's and Gaddafi's capture and 
death will be scrutinized from the perspective of media rituals. These 
captures and deaths are media events and spectacles that consist of rituals. 
These rituals help make sense of
id
as a means of evaluation. Finally, rituals and evaluations are compared to 
and contrasted with the Western master term, democracy (see Appadurai, 
1990). The aim is to understand the conventions of representing enmity 
both as a political process as well as a means of communication.  
 
2. Instrumentalism as the prerequisite of virtue 
 
Virtue and evil as the basic parameters of security are visible in the 
weapons technology as well as media discourses. In the media, these 
parameters foster spectacles. The Shock and Awe doctrine was based on 
impressive and highly visual use of force, which, however, was presented 
as a careful and conscientious method to minimize both human and 
material losses. The possible losses were unavoidable, unintended and yet 
necessary side effects in the quest for achieving the strategic objectives. In 
these discourses the technological use of force leaves the context of warfare 
and violence and becomes part of the virtuous, humanitarian action, the 
objectives of which are eve
h
freedom, peace and human rights, not the annihilation of the enemy. This is 
the rhetorical hook of the Western Grand Narrative: more force means less 
destruction, as problems become efficiently and precisely erased (see 
Department of Defense, 2003a; 2003b). General McChrystal took time to 
explain to the media that Shock and Awe has falsely been understood as 
enormous firepower and capacity to generate physical destruction. It aims, 
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instead, to result in the least possible amount of damage by influencing 
carefully selected critical targets: "In fact, a perfect shock and awe would 
hit as few as possible to create those effects" (Department of Defense, 
2003c). The context of the precision weapon discussion at the beginning of 
the war in Iraq was thus paradoxical. It highlighted the sophistication, 
efficiency and precision of weaponry, but argued that casualties and 
damages are an unavoidable part of even virtuous warfare where violence 
does not manifest as violence, but as a necessary sacrifice.  
 
Violence as a sacrifice for the sake of progress is a theme that joins 21st 
century Strategic Communication to the tradition the Enlightenment 
rhetoric. As McChrystal's interpretation of the nature of the Shock and Awe 
campaign suggests, use of force as a sign of power and dominance is 
problematic. Asymmetric capabilities, in this case the demonstration of 
firepower, is still one of the basic methods of psychological influence. 
However, the Western interpretation of these demonstrations is 
unpredictable, making the communicative impact of expressive violence 
difficult to manage. Contrary to the practices of Shock and Awe, the 
Western concept of just war recognizes the principle of proportionate cause 
(Gutherie & Quinlan; 2007: 20).  
 
The demand for instrumental ideology and practices results in the demand 
for distance. The lack of distance would suggest the kind of intimacy 
between the soldier and the enemy that violence would automatically 
receive an expressive nuance. In instances like these, warfare stops being a 
collective and therefore legitimate effort, and becomes something personal 
and violent. In the West, legitimacy is easier to achieve when actions and 
efforts can be represented as physically and emotionally distant practices, 
hich reduces its expressive signification. This results in the demand for 
 because of its 
recision and consequent ethicalness, but because it allows a rational, 
w
technologization: war must be precision warfare not only
p
impersonal experience of warfare (Andersen, 2007: 260). The precision 
weapon can be seen as a 21st century guillotine that executes its duty 
according to the instrumental norms of society. Whereas the guillotine as a 
method of quick and therefore egalitarian slaughter symbolizes the 
downturn of torture and revenge, the precision weapon presents warfare as 
a conscientious and well-advised process, where there is no place for affect 
(see Foucault, 2011: 101).  
 
The names of military operations reflect this Enlightenment ideology: 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation New Dawn (Iraq), Operation 
Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), as well as Operation Odyssey Dawn and 
Operation Unified Protector (Libya) do not signify offensives, but the 
ideological landscape of progress and humanitarian ideals. Appadurai uses 
the term "ideoscape" to refer to ideological concatenations that comprise 
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the Enlightenment world view: these are manifested by terms such as 
"freedom", "welfare", "rights", "representation" and the master term 
"democracy" (Appadurai, 1990). According to Appadurai, the Grand 
Narrative of the Enlightenment was based on a certain internal logic and 
still structures around certain key words, although their conceptualizations 
epend on the interpreter as well as the context. The captures of Hussein, 
 do not communicate the actual experience of 
ar. Expressive violence is a taboo, but still present in the actuality of 
d
bin Laden and Gaddafi were part of the Western Grand Narrative, where 
the roles of agency as representations of good and evil are paramount. 
Unlike "us", "they" are never represented in the context of democracy, and 
the average attributes of humanity are never applicable to "them". Instead, 
the domain of humanity belongs to "us" who operate in the name of 
democracy (Mouffe, 2005: 78). The images of capture get their meaning in 
the context of this ideology: who is who, what is one entitled to do and to 
whom, and with what justification or consequence. The agency in the 
images embodies not only power relations but propriety.  What is proper 
and what is right? The evaluation of action and agency is the domain of 
comparison, subjectivity and social sanction (Thompson & Hunston, 2003: 
13). In the narratives of war, agency and action are the basic elements of 
identity, which makes the evaluation of action the mechanism for 
categorization and evaluation of the actor. In this article the narrative-visual 
representations of the evil, the toppled and killed men, are approached 
through the evaluations of action. In this discussion the concepts of 
ideology and narrative have central roles: here the actors' identity is defined 
as an actoral state and permanence of mood (see Tarasti, 2004: 173). 
Identity determines the representation of our actions: "good" people engage 
in "good" actions and "evil" entities engage in "evil" actions (Malrieu, 
2002: 48). This means that the conceptions of identity are the resource for 
both evaluations and rituals. 
 
3. Media rituals and the production of cultural imagery 
 
In the captures and deaths of Hussein, bin Laden and Gaddafi, and in the 
media representations that followed, it is possible to observe the reflections 
of both expressive and instrumental violence as well as the significances 
they produce. Because of the instrumental narratives, Western warfare has 
not only lost much of its communication resources, but it has been forced 
to generate narratives that
w
warfare. When the Abu Ghraib photos (Wired, 28.2.2008) and the video of 
U.S. soldiers urinating on dead Taleban fighters (Huffington Post, 
15.2.2011) became public, the U.S. military's image suffered a blow. These 
media representations contains the symbolic type of expressive violence 
that the U.S. Public Relations machinery has always denounced. Posing for 
the camera amidst prisoners and corpses has developed into a ritual of war, 
although on the political level actions like these are officially condemned. 
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It can still be argued that the fact that these practices happen repeatedly has 
come to show that there is a fundamental need or a reason for expressive 
hostility. Such expressive violence is present also in Hussein's, bin Laden's 
and Gaddafi's images of capture and death. This speaks for their ritual 
nction in the construction of unity. 
he unofficial imagery of warfare contradicts the 
ore narrative with its fascination with the homogeneous Otherness. In 
hock, vigor and power are the forces 
at create cohesion within society (Heinämäki, 2008: 54-63).  This world 
roper kind of deceased 
rough the practices of certain rituals that bring the heterogeneous notion 
 the scandalous Abu Ghraib photos can be 
terpreted as a ritual that reinforces and maintains unity and togetherness 
ithin the community of the soldiers (Sumiala, 2010; 68). These pictures 
arrate the experience of war and adversariality, which are narratives that 
deviate from the official, humanitarian narrative. The "light" as well as the 
fu
 
In communication research ritual is a concept the definition of which has 
been subject to much debate (see. Ehrlich, 1996; Couldry and 
Rothenbuhler, 1990). According to Sumiala, the simplest way to define 
ritual is to see it as recurrent, symbolic behavior that has to do with 
constructing a community, either an imaginary or an actual one (Sumiala, 
2010: 97). In the images of Hussein, bin Laden and Gaddafi, the concepts 
of sacred, profane, homogeneous and heterogeneous have an essential role, 
as rituals construct and construe unity through the conception of the 
forbidden and the taboo (see Sumiala, 2010; Heinämäki, 2008). Official 
strategic communication focuses on reputation management, where identity 
and ideology are founded on the Enlightenment values such as democracy 
and human rights, while t
c
Bataille's understanding the world of s
th
is represented by not only the profane, but by the origin of the 
heterogeneous sacred that gains its momentum from the representations of 
Otherness. According to Heinämäki, Bataille understands the origin of the 
sacred as a communally shared, ambivalent taboo that both repulses and yet 
attracts the public, and which the public constantly keeps renegotiating its 
relationship to. For instance, a corpse becomes the p
th
of death to the sacred core of the public and sanctifies the death into 
heroism, martyrdom or sacrifice (Heinämäki, 2008: 61-62). Sacredness can 
thus emerge from the homogeneous, "light" and commensurate world, or be 
born within the heterogeneous, "dark" and unmanageable world. This 
means that these two worlds and the experiences that are associated with 
them are not exclusive, but essentially related. According to Heinämäki 
(2005: 62), Bataille is interested specifically in the transformations of the 
sacred, and the different means of harnessing the heterogeneous in the 
service of the community. 
 
This article brings out the tension between the official, "light" and sacred 
strategic narrative and the unofficial, heterogeneous, "dark" and sacred 
narrative. For instance,
in
w
n
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"dark" world both have th s
to which  is in relati o. This polarity is 
cial the sacred core, while the unofficial 
credness within the negative core. 
rve rit at have been constructed over the media. 
proaches rituals from the perspectives of consumption 
's and Gaddafi
ews 
lished conventions of communication that influence 
e's interpretation and understanding of the media event 
 106; Ell 982). It is the news rituals that are used to 
ves of "us" and "them" (Sumiala, 2010: 107). News rituals thus 
o e "dark" and "l  they typically 
uction of unity and togetherness by bringing the 
en g a certain type of v , the role of the 
 e images of capture and death is clear (see 
10: 109-110). 
d discourses rituals and evaluation share a common 
ation. The representations of agency convey the ideology of the 
eir sacred core that is es entially the center of all 
behavior, and 
manifested in the offi
narrative construes sa
all behavior
imagery of 
on t
 
We shall here obse
Sumiala (2010) ap
uals th
and production. Hussein's, bin Laden 's images of capture and 
death are treated here as rituals of production and more specifically as n
rituals, which are estab
the audienc
(Sumiala, 2010:
build narrati
iot 1
contribute to the dichot
participate in the prod
my of th ight". As
private to publicity and 
rituals in the production
ablin
of th
oyerism
Sumiala, 20
 
4. Agency, ideology and evaluation  
 
In media images an
purpose, i.e. to define the boundary between the Self and the Other. Rituals 
are essentially behavior and action, and therefore a means of transmitting 
value
narrator: this is essentially the argument that functional language theory 
makes (see Halliday, 2004; Martin & White, 2005). 
 
The core function of political narratives is to transmit information about the 
agency of the Self and the Other. Narratives need heroes, villains and 
people to be rescued (Castells, 2009: 202). A narrative always requires an 
actor and an initiator, who induces the actions and events that make up the 
narrative arc. This brings us to the concept of transitivity, which is 
fundamental not only in terms of grammar, but in terms of narration: it 
defines the actor and the object and how much the object is impacted. In 
language the structures and grammar of discourse reflect this process and 
thereby expose the relationship between the actor and the object. (Halliday, 
2004: 170-171; Butt & al., 2000: 46-47). Hopper and Thompson captured 
this in their descriptions of the parameters of transitivity, which can be 
applied to the analysis of images as well as text (Haddington & 
Kärkkäinen, 2010: 134): 
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 High level of transitivity Low level of transitivity 
A. How many 
participants does the 
clause contain?  
two or more one 
B. Does the clause 
represent action? 
action non-action 
C. Has the action ended? yes (finite) no (infinite) 
D. Does the action have yes 
a clear beginning and 
no 
end point?  
E. Is the action 
volitional? 
yes no 
F. Is the clause positive 
or negative? 
positive negative 
G. Modus of the clause real unreal 
H. Agency high impact low impact 
I. Impact on the object high impact low impact 
of action  
J. Individualization of 
the object of action 
explicitly set out not set out 
Table 1: The parameters of transitivity (Haddington & Kärkkäinen, 2010: 
134) 
 
In Critical Discourse Analysis, the starting point to analysis is recognizing 
the relationship between ideology and communication. According to Van 
Dijk, ideologies are the underlying systems of socio-political cognition 
(Van Dijk, 1995: 138). In Van Dijk's (Ibid.) discourse analysis ideology can 
be seen to consist of descriptions of identity, action, aims and objectives, 
norms and values, position, status and resources. Ideology, narratives and 
evaluation cannot thus be treated as separate concepts: if a narrative 
contains no evaluation, it is only a report (Cortazzi & Jin, 2003: 108). In 
the narratives of war and conflict, the identity of an actor is typically 
evaluated through descriptions of action. This makes agency the most 
central concept in the analysis of ideology. What the actor does or does not 
do defines the actor's role either as a subject or an object. The images of 
capture of death discussed here are an example of this. They form a 
narrative of agency, both as individual images and as a series of images. 
Each image is interconnected to the other: each image evaluates and 
endorses the previous and, finally, this chain of evaluation forms an 
overarching narrative (Cortazzi & Jin, 2003: 108). In this article the 
captures and deaths are understood as narratives of enmity that together 
form the overarching narrative, referred to as the Grand Narrative.  
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This function of this narrative framework is to make the story coherent and 
logical. Ideological claims are met with ideological interpretations, 
according to which the claim either is or is not consistent with the 
interpreter's ideology (Malrieu, 2002: 29). According to Malrieu, the 
efficiency of discourse is entirely dependent on its capacity to influence 
nd persuade, which means that the claims of the narrative must be 
ttitude, which describes what 
ind of attitudes the text or image conveys. How are events and behaviors 
 not have much information value, but they 
re used to reinforce the overarching narrative in order to evaluate the 
a
internally coherent. What the roles of agency and their ritual representation 
do is produce this coherence.  
 
5. Narratives as evaluations 
 
In discourse analysis, the types of evaluation can be divided into three main 
categories: Judgment evaluates the actions and behaviors of the actor, 
Appreciation the appearance, and Affect emotional reactions (Martin & 
White, 2005). These parameters make up A
k
represented? What kind of actors and objects participate in the actions and 
behaviors and how? What kind of roles have they been given? 
 
Thompson & Hunston (2003: 5) define evaluation as the attitude, 
perception or emotion expressed by the writer or speaker toward an entity 
or an event. Evaluation can be treated in two different ways. It may mean 
the process of evaluation within the narrative, or, as is the case in this 
article, evaluation can be evaluated. (Cortazzi & Jin, 2003: 104). Costazzi 
and Jin refer to the three layers of evaluation, the in, of and through, where 
both the narrator's as well as the audience's interpretation of the narrative is 
significant. Strategic and political communication typically produce direct 
evaluation, as the adversary is rarely given the turn to speak. When this 
happens, it is possible to select those messages for presentation that support 
the narrative framework. For instance the videos of bin Laden criticizing 
the United States or Europe do
a
speaker and his socio-political ideology.  
 
Evaluation has an important role in creating cohesion. By answering the 
question "why?" it reflects the values and attitudes of the narrator or the 
community, constructs and maintains the relationship between the narrator 
and the audience, and organizes discourse (Thompson & Hunston, 2003: 
6). Evaluation that both organizes discourse and indicates its significance, 
also determines the center of the discourse (Thompson & Hunston, 2003: 
12). Failing to create meaning destroys the narrative, as the purpose of the 
narrative is to make the question "so what?" redundant. Therefore 
evaluations include descriptions of causes and effects and a certain logic of 
justification. We are willing to accept even unlawful actions as long as the 
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paradoxes are dispelled with evaluation: killing is wrong, but sometimes 
we have to "destroy the village to save it". This mechanism results in 
concepts such as securitization. When an entity can be associated with 
enough negative evaluation, we will accept extraordinary measures such as 
censorship (see Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998). Evaluation is thus the key 
mechanism of legitimation.  
 
The parameters that regulate evaluation are goodness/badness, certainty, 
expectedness and importance. According to Thompson & Hunston (2003: 
24) the first two are real world-oriented and express the evaluator's 
erception of the situation. These parameters have been developed for text 
dia 
rituals present as the subject or the object? How does one create a 
p
analysis, but can be applied to the analysis of images: it is not unclear 
whether Hussein's, bin Laden's or Gaddafi's appearance is evaluated 
negatively or not. The images of capture and death contain all of the 
parameters mentioned here, and are therefore an important element of both 
news reports and Strategic Communication.  
 
The ability to exercise power and dominance depends on the actor's ability 
to network and share common objectives, resources and do strategic 
collaboration (Castells, 2009: 45). An example of this is NATO alliance. 
Dominance and hegemony allow the merge of political, religious and 
cultural identities, which means that the core values can be presented as 
global, legitimate and just. Without this framing process there are no shared 
meanings: in order for globalization to actualize, it must be able to create a 
discourse to frame that specific culture (Castells, 2009: 52). In order to 
present the Western way of warfare as an effort for democracy, it must 
create a discourse to frame the practices of warfare. This is precisely what 
the Grand Narrative does, as it frames the ritual practices of violence. Next, 
evaluation will be discussed in the context of media rituals. Who do me
distinction between the two? What kind of a narrative frame do the images 
of capture and death produce? 
 
6. The images of capture and death in the media 
 
It is important to note that not all images of Hussein's, bin Laden's and 
Gaddafi's capture and death are official U.S. Strategic Communication. 
Images of Saddam Hussein at the location of capture, the "spider hole", as 
well as the pictures of Hussein's medical examination were taken and 
published by U.S. military officials. However, the Department of Defense 
has denounced all material that was produced at the moment of Hussein's 
execution (CNN, 29.12.2006). Also the first images of bin Laden's capture, 
i.e. the pictures of bin Laden's secret hideaway and the room where he was 
allegedly captured, have been taken and published by the U.S. officials. 
However, the images and videos of Gaddafi's capture and death were, at 
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least according to general knowledge, produced and published by the 
Libyan rebels. In these images the West had a side role as the supporters of 
the uprising: Gaddafi's capture was the peak of a long campaign against 
addafi that was realized by the means of information and kinetic warfare, 
s of capture, pictures of Hussein undergoing a medical 
xamination followed (Chicago Tribune). The publication of these images 
G
and which made the West an essential audience of the military campaign. 
The claim here is that the images and videos of Gaddafi were integrated in 
the official U.S. Strategic Communication. However, instead of analyzing 
this official Strategic Communication only, the purpose is to discuss the 
tradition of the creation, publication and consumption of violence which 
the Western liberal democracies have participated in. 
 
Saddam Hussein's capture was an event in the operation that was long and 
important for the United States. When the capture finally happened, it was 
the physical realization of George W. Bush's announcement "We're going to 
smoke them out" at the very beginning of the Iraqi war. The roles of agency 
in the images are very traditional. The U.S. soldiers who acted as the 
capturers represented Western ideology of democracy: the images show 
Hussein pushed on the ground, as a dirty and physically subjugated former 
dictator (see International Business Times, 22.10.2011). He is surrounded 
by a number of soldiers who look down on him, while one of the soldiers is 
posing next to him as a lion hunter would pose next to his prey. The power 
relations are very clear and the transitivity of the image is high: there are 
several capturers and Hussein is placed in the middle as the target of the 
soldier's deliberate actions. The culmination and end point of the roles of 
agency are clearly visible: the roles of agency emphasize the finality of the 
circumstance. Here evaluation tells the story of the actors. The image is an 
image to finality: it represents the end of the U.S. armed forces' search 
efforts as well as that of Hussein's might and flight. His hanging, instead, 
announced the beginning of a new era (Department of Defense, 2003d). 
 
After the first image
e
served the purpose of ideological rather than political needs. In the images 
Hussein has opened his mouth for the doctor, who is inspecting his mouth 
with a light. This is another metaphor for subjugation. The doctor 
represents the American/Western ideal of moral and progress, where even 
dictators receive medical care before their death sentence. Hussein has to 
submit to the inspection of his body cavity and allow a member of his 
enemy to illuminate his mouth from within - a direct reference to the 
Enlightenment? The images point out that the dictator is now himself in 
need of help, while the U.S. authorities appear as gracious and just 
benefactors who, despite past hostilities, are ready to respect their 
prisoner's human rights. The West "saves" Husein before his death in the 
hands of his own people. In the news article on Hussein's hanging, CNN 
(29.12.2006) included a specific quote saying that Americans were not 
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"even in the building" at the time of Hussein's execution. These official 
images and narratives are very different than the unofficial ones from Abu 
Ghraib. 
ppear strongly ideological. In this narrative, the 
gency was reserved for the U.S. forces, but only in the verbal narrative of 
 
In Osama bin Laden's case, there were no images of the capture or death. 
These events were demonstrated with images of empty space, namely the 
building and the room where bin Laden was hiding at the moment of his 
capture (see The Guardian, 4.5.2011). The only published image of bin 
Laden was a still image taken from a video that was found in his hideout. 
In this image bin Laden was alive (see The Guardian, 3.5.2012). The 
capturers muted their agency by publishing an image of the victim still 
alive. As such, the images are different than those of Saddam Hussein. 
They present bin Laden as an old, strange man who was simply removed 
from existence. This follows the pattern of terrorism reporting. Terrorists 
are not physically portrayed in the Western media imagery, but their 
presence is narrated with images of the consequences of their action, such 
as blood stains on the streets, severely injured children and signs of 
explosion (Kotilainen, 2011). Images of Bin Laden's capture follow this 
same tradition and appear even sardonic. Politicians do not negotiate with 
terrorists and terrorists are not given a voice in the media, because 
according to the media rituals, the media defines the actor's visibility, i.e. 
significance or exclusion (see Sumiala, 2012: 57). The man who caused the 
puddles of blood on the streets of Kabul was himself a victim of the same 
destiny, leaving behind only a bloodied room for the world to see. 
Removing agency from the images of bin Laden's capture was a political 
choice, and yet the images a
a
the event. The visualization of the capture was considered too provocative 
due to its expressive reading, and so President Obama announced that there 
would be no image of the body to prove bin Laden's death (The Wall Street 
Journal, 4.5.2011). 
 
Images of Muammar Gaddafi's capture continue the established tradition of 
dirty "rats" who have slipped from the height of their might to misery. 
There are both parallels and differences to Hussein's and bin Laden's 
images. Instead of being strategically selected, the images and videos of the 
dying Gaddafi flooded the media, broadcasting the last moments of the 
feared dictator. In the videos, Gaddafi is being escorted to a pick-up truck, 
bleeding and surrounded by a large, aggressive crowd. The still-images 
focus on Gaddafi's gunshot wound. Many images of the event show 
celebrating citizens and especially a young boy who showcases Gaddafi's 
notorious golden pistol. The third category of Gaddafi images consists of 
the pictures taken in the cold room of the slaughterhouse where the body 
was kept on display. In the images people are gathering and celebrating 
around Gaddafi, taking pictures of the body with their mobile phones. The 
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Daily Mail (21.10.2011) published a comprehensive compilation of these 
ages on their website, presenting the capture as a visual narrative. 
His death was celebrated by displaying the body, and so the 
ublic was able to come and "take a shot" at the mighty man turned 
th the cameras in their mobile phones. 
he mobile phones became the other symbolic weapon of the capture, 
e of news to a description of culture. It is 
orth noticing that this time expressive violence was not censored. In the 
im
 
The roles of agency in Gaddafi's images of capture denote, again, a high 
level of transitivity. The captured is shown in the middle of a crowd, but 
only this time the crowd consists of Libyan citizens. This is an essential 
difference compared to the images of Saddam Hussein. The West's absence 
from the visual narrative shifts the agency from the U.S. and NATO to the 
citizens of Libya. The air operation that led to the capture received 
relatively little attention in the narrative. In the media the attention was on 
the images of bloody Gaddafi and the celebrating nation, often placed side 
by side on the page (see The Daily Mail, 21.10.2011). Placing the picture of 
Gaddafi's golden pistol next to an image of the gunshot wound in his head 
creates an analogy to the death of King Midas. The weapon that 
symbolized the dictator's status and power turned into a symbol of his 
misfortune. 
p
miserable. Only the body was shot wi
T
allowing the masses to broadcast their victory to the rest of the world. 
During the Arab Spring, the mobile phone turned into an information 
weapon that enabled the uprising in Egypt and Tunisia (Van Niekerk, Pillay 
& Maharaj, 2011) and which was of equal, or even more, importance in 
Libya. The images of the Libyans taking pictures of Gaddafi's battered 
body signaled collective approval, and the media was filled with narratives 
of the dawn of democracy. 
 
While President Obama argued that the images of dead bin Laden were too 
provocative and graphic for publication, most mainstream media published 
the videos and images of Gaddafi's bloody and violent death. The 
difference between the photos is production: Gaddafi was not photographed 
by the Pentagon or the Western soldiers, but by the Libyans themselves. 
The death turned from a piec
w
U.S., publishing images of dying or dead people is generally frowned upon, 
as demonstrated by the scandal surrounding publishing a photograph of the 
American coffins with U.S. flags, on the way home from Iraq. The 
propriety of the images depends not on the explicitness of death itself, but 
on the representations of agency, the killer and the victim. This can be seen 
as a Western tradition of portraying death. The dead Western soldier is 
typically not visually represented before the funeral, and even then not as 
deceased. In the funeral the violent, heterogeneous concept of death is 
sanctified to celebrated heroism. The enemy, however, never undergoes this 
process. In wars waged in the name of the humanitarian ideals, the enemy 
does not have a role in the sanctifying rituals of death. The enemy's role in 
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the narrative of the sacred is to serve the role of a sacrificial victim. 
 
Western portrayals of violence have become ritualized around the concept 
ican, bin Laden's implicitly American, and 
addafi's Libyans. This forms an overarching narrative where the role of 
lly removed from the instrumentalists. In Gaddafi's 
 an ideological nature. As media events, the captures and 
eaths of the evil dictators and terrorists contain recurrent and symbolic 
h the identity, actions, objectives, norms, values and 
 do what is ritualized. This definition process is 
bviously ideological and produced by means of rituals of production. 
ce of the actions described from their 
of instrumental humanitarianism, but the captures and deaths of the 21st 
century archenemies emerge from the expressive ritualization of Otherness. 
The biggest difference between the captures of the three evil enemies 
discussed here is the agency in the narratives of their capture. Hussein's 
capturers were explicitly Amer
G
the punisher is visua
case, outsourcing the agency to the citizens of Libya was a strategic bargain 
for the U.S. armed forces. As a narrative, it was a narrative continuation for 
the demonization efforts that the U.S. and NATO had maintained during the 
Libya operation. This narrative supported the objectives of official 
American Strategic Communication without compromising American 
reputation. 
 
7. Rituals in the images of capture 
 
As stated earlier, ideology in discourse consists of descriptions of identity, 
action, aims and objectives, norms and values, position, status and 
resources (Van Dijk, 1995: 138). These very descriptions become ritualized 
in media events of
d
representation, whic
resources become ritualized: it is these descriptions that receive special 
attention in the images and narratives of capture as well. These narratives 
make sure the audience knows the evil deeds and motivations of the 
adversary and explicitly demonstrates their diminishing resources: after 
years of living in luxury and killing women and children with chemical 
weapons, Saddam found himself in a dirty "spider hole". Bin Laden's and 
Gaddafi's stories were very similar. These are examples of ritualized and 
mediatized meaning-making.  
 
In the media narratives of war and conflict the actor's identity is typically 
demonstrated by means of action descriptions: in the images, it is what 
"we" do and what "they"
o
News rituals determine the significan
perspective: violence, uprisings and lynchings can be, as argued here, 
presented as a revolution of democracy, because that makes sense in our 
ideological landscape (Appadurai, 1990). Rituals emphasize unity and 
community. This is visually explicit in the images, where the captured 
enemy is surrounded by groups and crowds of people: Hussein in the 
middle of U.S. soldiers and then on the gallows surrounded by the cheering 
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crowd, Gaddafi in the hands of the rebels and later photographed by crowds 
of triumphant Libyans. 
 
Hussein's, bin Laden's and Gaddafi's images of capture and death contain a 
number of recurrent, symbolic elements due to which the individual 
captures and deaths become a coherent narrative. The most significant ones 
of them take a stance on the physical representation of evil, as well as the 
ideological nature of the Self.  
 
The place of capture 
Without exception, the place of capture is explicitly described in every 
isual or verbal media narrative. In Hussein's case, the place of capture was 
 from power to blight and from spotlight to 
ewage. In these narratives, the physical places of capture always have 
e that establish, through recurrent representations, an 
valuative ritual.  
ed the uprising. The archenemies are 
presented as objects: they are held still and pointed at with weapons. As 
ern media the imagery of violence and the victory speeches of 
e dawn of the new age appear starkly paradoxical. For the "enlightened" 
v
depicted by the authorities and the media published images and illustrations 
of it (Department of Defense, 2003e; BBC, 15.12.2003). Bin Laden's 
images of capture were censored except for the images of the location 
where he was found and killed. Gaddafi's place of capture, the drain pipe, 
was also depicted in photographs and illustrations (The Daily Mail, 
21.10.2011). What these images have in common is the theme of dirt, 
garbage and life underground - quite literally. Each "monster" was 
portrayed as a "rat", toppled
s
symbolic valu
e
 
The roles of agency 
The roles of agency are central in the forming of rituals. In the images of 
Saddam and Gaddafi, the overt and dynamic agency is reserved mainly for 
the crowds, whereas the U.S. is portrayed as the initiators and the 
background force that enabl
re
stated, bin Laden's images are an exception here. He was not a leader of a 
nation, so there was no angry mob to celebrate his death. The agency of the 
U.S. soldiers is entirely muted and the object of their action is equally 
absent. This demonstrates the tendency of agency to become the site of 
ritualization. Recurrent, symbolic and expressive agency is reserved for the 
victims of the demonized archenemies, while the Western actor remain in 
their instrumental roles.  
 
The objectives and purpose of action 
In the media, the captures and deaths of Hussein and Gaddafi are narrated 
not only as justified revenge, but as steps towards progress and democracy. 
In the West
th
Western audience violence is a ritual of democracy, through which politics 
is conceptualized and mythologized. Appadurai (1990) argues that 
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interpretations of democracy are suggestive and pragmatic: democracy is 
both an intrinsic value and yet a concept that is flexible, subjective and 
relative enough to function as the narrative frame for Strategic 
Communication. Like democracy, also violence is relative. "Our" violence 
is different from "their" violence, and yet the only difference between them 
is the way their justification is represented. The framing of democracy is 
thus largely dependent on the representations of agency, which has made 
the imagery of violence part of the imagery of democracy. The Western 
agency is represented as striving for virtue, and this striving is always 
defined in terms of its virtuous objectives. Action and agency are struggle 
for a virtuous cause and therefore instrumental.  
 
The purpose of these recurrent methods is to illustrate the cause and effects 
of evilness. They construct a rational narrative, where repetition both 
ritualizes and ideologizes events and action. The fate of the archenemy is 
always the same: to face his nation and enemy face to face. In Hussein's, 
bin Laden's and Gaddafi's images of capture and death, evaluations and 
rituals intertwine into a whole, where individual narratives receive new 
meanings and reinforcement from each other and eventually form a 
strategic gallery of enmity.   
 
8. Discussion 
 
In this article I have argued that the roles of agency in the images of 
Hussein's, bin Laden's and Gaddafi's capture and death can be treated as 
ritualized evaluation, which represents the physical end of the enemy and 
reflects the West's paradoxical relationship to violence. The Western 
instrumental thought is founded on the kind of sacred that is unattainable 
without violence and sacrifice. 
 
The archenemies of the 21st century have represented absolute evil, which 
means that the narratives about them do not allow their representation as 
dversaries, but only as antagonists. This is the consequence of practicing a
politics in the moral register: the definition of adversariality is dependent 
on moral questions (Mouffe, 2005: 75-76). As the result of "moral register 
politics", the concepts of humanitarianism, humanism, as well as 
democracy become redefined. The conceptual highjacking of humanism 
means, according to Carl Schmitt (2007: 45), the denial of peace, justice, 
progress and civilization from the enemy. In other words, humane and 
humanitarian arguments result in inhumane practices: the enemy is 
excluded from the domain of humanity, and treated accordingly (Mouffe, 
2005: 78). 
 
When the narratives of the so-called Strategic Communication are 
observed, it is easy to argue that the enlightened rhetorics of the moral 
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register are the norm. Although official Strategic Communication has 
rejected expressive violence, it still has a function in the construction of the 
narratives of war and conflict. Expressive violence is part of the experience 
and practices of war regardless of the actor's ideology, and these 
experiences and practices continue to leak into the media. The effort to 
maintain the narratives of the "ligh" sacred is apparent in the publication of 
the images of Hussein's and bin Laden's capture. The representations of 
instrumental physical and emotional distance are displayed side by side 
with representations of othering. Although the violence of the Self is often 
muted and denied, the consumption of violence and hostility in their visual 
form is still in a significant role in the Western experience and practice of 
war. Hussein, bin Laden and Gaddafi were portrayed as the agents of pure 
profanity, who were subjects to such expressive violence that would 
otherwise have no legitimate social function. As argued by Bataille, the 
foundation for social unity and community is the "damned" and "dark" part 
of humaneness that does not integrate in the commensurate, efficient, 
composed and controlled ideal, but represents the world of shock, force and 
haos (see Arppe, 2000; Heinämäki, 2005: 62). The visual degradation of 
d there is the culture that 
jects the chaotic and uncontrollable (Arppe, 2000: 16). This is precisely 
c
the enemy in the media, such as urinating on enemy bodies or posing next 
to prisoners of war, or mediatized participation in  bloody lynching, such as 
Gaddafi's death, and the participation in the consumption of expressive 
violence can be seen as bursts of the "heterogeneous social" (see Sumiala, 
2010: 68). The images discussed here are primarily images of profanation 
and humiliation, through which the society constructs itself internally. The 
role of repulsive and emotional categories is significant in this process. In 
media rituals this manifests in the recurrent images of dirt, blood and 
violence, which are eventually associated with the concepts of the sacred 
and homogeneous narrative of democracy. This is also Bataille's 
understanding of the role of crime in society: the sacred may appear as the 
site of committing a crime, as order, norms and "light" sacred cannot exist 
without the crime that serves the homogeneous society (Heinämäki, 2008: 
62). 
 
Arppe (2000: 16) characterizes Bataille's understanding of culture as 
bipolar movement. At one end there is the breakdown that represents the 
profane, which brings in the nature and culture of "the Other": the repulsive 
and unattainable domain of death. At the other en
re
the set up in the narratives of capture discussed here. The roles of agency 
are represented in terms of bipolar movement, where the West has adopted 
the role of the controlled and composed who have to commit the crime of 
sacrifice to maintain the internal coherence of the society. The images of 
capture and death brought death and violence to the Western media for 
everyone to see and participate in, which integrated the images to the 
Western narrative of democracy and justice. Polar opposites such as "us" 
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and "them" are typical for mythologies. They are used to explicate the inner 
structures of the myth, and the distinctions between nature and culture. 
According to Kunelius (2010: 169), what is placed within the category of 
culture is what represents "us", whereas the category of nature denotes 
"Otherness". Hussein's, bin Laden's and Gaddafi's images of capture the 
representations of agency comply to this tradition. It can be said that with 
Hussein and Gaddafi, the U.S. and their allies made a bargain in terms of 
reputation and Public Relations, as agency was outsourced to Iraqis and 
ibyans. When the victims of the archenemies appeared as the executors 
the moral lesson continued without the West having to 
articipate in the violence. Due to mythologization and the right type of 
 fantasies, 
hich can only be admitted in a censored form", Žižek (2009: 86) argues. 
re.  
d Gaddafi's 
aptures were significant because of their symbolic value. This symbolic 
t also a simplification. The broadcast and 
ublication of the archenemy's death is one of the media rituals that 
n the floor. Even if death is not depicted 
xplicitly, it is present in the narrative tradition of these images. An image 
y is forced to "confess" their vulnerability 
nd weakness. If necessary, they are forced to appear as fearful, cowardly 
 dismantles the cult the 
ntagonists have constructed around themselves.  
dience the rituals of the captures appear as a part of the 
nlightenment ideology. This ideology manifests primarily in the values 
h the soldiers, the victims of the dictators and terrorists, 
s well as the Western audiences participate in. The images of capture and 
L
and killers, 
p
framing, violence finds its place in the cause and effects of the democracy 
narrative. "[T]he official (Christian, democratic) discourse is accompanied 
and sustained by a whole nest of obscene, brutal, racist, sexist
w
All these forms of fantasy are present in the imagery of antagonism 
discussed he
 
The demonization of the enemy is a classic process that takes place in 
every discourse of war or conflict. Hussein's, bin Laden's an
c
value brings the captures to the domain of ritual. In the media, the deaths of 
these people symbolize the beginning of a new era, although in reality war 
and violence continue like the captures never happened. The killing of the 
evil is not only symbolic, bu
p
legitimize the practices and finalize the narrative: without images of death 
there is no victory or power. An image of capture is a symbol, even if it 
only depicts a blood stain o
e
of capture has become a symbol that predicts death and its ideological 
representation - and their subsequent approval. In the images of capture and 
death discussed here, the enem
a
and in all possible ways contrary to their identity, thus limited by their 
humanity despite their monstrousness. This ritual
a
 
For the Western au
E
reflected by the media and the authorities. The conventions of 
representation give out that expressive violence is a taboo in the Western 
Grand Narrative, but also an integral part of mediatized experience of war 
and conflict in whic
a
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death are not important because of their information value, but because 
they have invited the audience to share meaning before the representations 
of violence. After the publication of the images nobody asked "So what?", 
as it is obvious that by abandoning the ideological norms of proper being, 
cting and behaving, the killed or executed antagonists have wished for 
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9 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
n this dissertation emancipation is understood as not only observing the 
state of social order represented in the discourses of Strategic 
Communication, but as discussing its implications. As a military 
concept, Strategic Communication is the blueprint of leadership, which ties 
it to the context of dominance and hegemony. In order to understand the 
implications of this dominance and hegemony, the analysis must take into 
ccount the 
I 
a perspective of the dominated. Critical Discourse Analysis is 
h also evaluates the 
one approach to the asymmetry of power, and it is based on the principle 
that when a hegemonic actor enjoys a hegemonic status, it is the duty of 
science and research be the watchdogs of its practices much like it is the 
duty of the media to be the watchdogs of democracy. This dissertation 
argues that critical research, be it CDA or any other approach that takes into 
account the asymmetry of power, should provide counterbalance to the 
discussion that is otherwise dominated by the hegemonic actor, and that 
this is what makes critical analysis "critical". CDA as a form of social and 
olitical analysis means that the analysis of this researcp
discourses: mere descriptions would appear as discourse analysis without 
analysis. 
 
This is the stance from which this dissertation has approached Strategic 
Communication as a theory of persuasion, as linguistic manifestations and 
as visual implications of hegemonic discourses, which all are dimensions of 
dominance. This criticality is methodologically addressed with the 
triangular model (discussed in Chapter 3), which takes the social, cognitive 
and discursive-semiotic manifestations into account. This is a way to 
provide context for the analysis, but also pursue the aim of Critical 
Discourse Analysis: the information provided by the analysis is applied in 
the context of power and dominance. Therefore, this final chapter contains 
a section for the discussion of each of the three perspectives.   
 
This dissertation consists of several rather independent units. Chapter 1 
introduced the paradigmatic choices and established the theoretical 
framework for the research. The key question was how to combine 
discourse analysis as a method of analyzing leadership in the 
methodological selection of Military Science, where discourse analysis 
does not yet have an established role. This question was addressed with the 
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discussion on the linguistic/discursive turn in social science, which 
arguably contains many aspects of military scientific research, such as the 
study of leadership as organization research, concluding Critical Discourse 
Analysis is a natural approach to study hegemonic organizations such as 
the U.S. military force.  
 
Chapter 2 provided background and context for the empirical discussion. It 
Chapter 3 provided the methodology to support the theoretical framework. 
course from the 
erspective of Critical Discourse Analysis and uses the concept of 
g some of the basic concepts of communication 
search, such as (a)symmetry of communication and the debate on transfer 
argued that the tradition of political narration, of which Strategic 
Communication is an example of, stems from the Enlightenment narratives. 
The Enlightenment narratives as well as the Grand Narrative of modern 
military policy maintain many of the same key themes, which are visible in 
the discourses of Strategic Communication - as further argued in the 
empirical part of the research. The most important of these themes is 
democracy, which has been the mantra of all of the 21st century military 
operations. 
 
This chapter put together a framework that approaches dis
p
transitivity to map the social relations represented in discourse. Transitivity 
analysis makes the concept of agency especially central. In order to expand 
agency from the textual to the visual setting and allow the analysis of visual 
representations of action, the theoretical discussion is expanded to rituals 
and their significance in the analysis of social practice. 
 
The methods discussion is followed by five independent essays and 
articles.  These five texts provide two types of discussion: Chapter 4 
reviews the discussion and debate on Strategic Communication in the U.S. 
military community. This review is integral for Chapter 5, which is a 
theoretical discussion on the communication theoretical aspects of the 
military doctrine. Chapter 5 is not empirical, but instead attempts to 
understand the foundations of Strategic Communication from the 
perspective of communication research outside the military community. 
This is done by addressin
re
vs. sharing of meaning. This theoretical discussion helps us observe, 
understand and analyze the problems and paradoxes of the practices of 
Strategic Communication in the empirical articles that follow.  
 
The empirical part of the research reveals that there are recurring 
ideological mechanisms in the discourses of Strategic Communication. 
Next, the sections that follow will combine these three key mechanisms 
(the discourses of instrumentalism and exclusion) of the Grand Narrative of 
Strategic Communication to the three levels of discourse (discourse as 
social, cognitive and discursive-semiotic phenomena), although the lines 
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between the three modes are obviously blurry at times. Combining these 
perspectives is an attempt to track down the correlations of theory 
discussed in the Methods Chapter and the theory and empiricism that 
springs from the case studies on Strategic Communication, namely the 
discussion on the theoretical basis of the concept (Chapters 4 and 5) and the 
empirical analysis of the discursive practices of Strategic Communication.  
 
In this chapter we will return to the concepts of agency, exclusion and 
ommunication revolve around the 
oncept of leadership. These documents suggest that for the military 
instrumentalism. These are the key concepts of this dissertation, as they are 
central both in terms of both contents and structures of the discourses of 
Strategic Communication. In the data agency operates textually, visually 
and socially, which has implications on the representations of the Self. 
Exclusion and instrumentalism are thus the ideological manifestations of 
agency in the social and cognitive domains of discourse. Textual agency 
codes this social reality. 
 
9.1 The social implications of Strategic Communication 
 
In the context of the analysis, the social significances of discourse are 
clearly the most pronounced. The basic concepts of the analysis, discourse 
and narrative, have a clear social function in construing and expressing 
meaning. This level of discourse is the domain of social power. As argued 
in Chapter 1, in this dissertation discourse is understood in its broad 
meaning as the domain of internal and external relations between objects 
(Fairclough, 2010: 3) and provides a window to observing the dynamics of 
the social reality of a given society or culture. It is precisely this definition 
of discourse that highlights the social dimension of the analysis. Discourses 
are used to the social practices of negotiating, confirming and sharing 
meaning. In terms of the narrative, it has been argued that it merges 
ideology and language for the exercise of social power. Narratives as 
concatenations of discourses are political tools, as the discussions on the 
Enlightenment as a narrative and the Grand Narrative of Strategic 
Communication suggest.  
 
From the perspective of Military Science, a pivotal discursive phenomenon 
of a social significance is the definition process of Strategic 
Communication. The argumentation of the key documents, the Strategic 
Communication Joint Integrating Concept and the Commander's Handbook 
on Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy as well as much 
of the literature discussed in Chapter 4, demonstrate that the focus of the 
development efforts of Strategic C
c
community, it is not the messages, themes and narratives of Strategic 
Communication that are of great concern, but the hierarchies and 
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responsibilities within the organization. This means that the concept, as 
well as the discussion that concerns it, focus less on what is being said than 
it does on the organizational, operational model. At the same time, what is 
explicitly stated about the agenda of the organization is vague and abstract. 
Official objectives such as 'supporting democracy' and 'fighting terror' are 
something that most Western liberal democracies claim to do. But what is 
strategic about communicating something this self-evident?  
 
The so-called "unity of action" means, according to the Commander's 
Handbook on Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy (U.S. 
Joint Forces Command, 2010: I-1-2), the synchronization, coordination and 
integration of activities of different actors, governmental and non-
governmental, to achieve "unity of effort". According to the Handbook, this 
is one of the major challenges of Strategic Communication: "The key 
activities that contribute to unified action are assignment of responsibilities, 
organizing, establishing relationships, and collaboration. Unified action is a 
comprehensive approach to achieve unity of effort" (p. I-2). The heavy 
mphasis on organization and responsibilities suggests that the genuine 
require dialogue on the core values of the society, which is a 
rocess that is traditionally alien to any organization whose core function 
e
purpose of Strategic Communication is not as much to enable effective 
communication, but to restrict it. This is especially apparent in the 
discussion on the importance of synchronization. Synchronization, in this 
contexts, implies more control and censorship than getting a certain 
message out there. The fact that the concept of Strategic Communication 
was abandoned in favor of "communication synchronization" suggests that 
the focus of communication is shifting more and more towards 
transmission of messages instead of symmetrical, two-way flow of 
communication. This means that military communication is actually 
moving to the opposite direction than communication outside the military 
community, where the imperative has been to improve dialogue and 
interaction with the stakeholders. If the effects-centric ideology does not 
get alternatives, communication strategies are destined to be troubled by 
the question what not to communicate, when the question should be the 
opposite: what should we do and say? The claim that this dissertation 
makes is that if the focus was brought to the questions of content instead of 
organization, military communication would have a better chance at 
developing past the problems that have plagued it this far. This would, 
however, 
p
has been to advance (national) political interests. It is therefore not 
surprising that instead of dialogue, Strategic Communication has started to 
move towards standardized, official narratives, meaning the 
"synchronization" of communication. 
 
The challenge of synchronization in terms of the social dimension of 
discourse is the human need to communicate ambivalently and self-
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contradictorily. This can be seen as a reflection of Bataille's notions of the 
dark sacred, the domain of a profound social significance. While the 
ideoscapes of warfare are supported by the manifestations of the 
ommensurate, homogenous world, the realities of warfare are everything 
but. ous 
ideal  of 
the r us, 
asym is a 
proce ensorship model. Its 
ole function is to maintain the impersonal, instrumental facade, behind 
e soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the audiences in the home front. 
Wha ous 
is tra site 
of th ate, 
accep of 
virtu ing 
it in rve 
sacre  we 
may  rituals and 
acrifice. 
l" is sacrificed (1992: 49). Before sacrifice, however, the animal 
ust be made a "thing" before it is eaten, alter it by killing, cutting and 
c
The official Grand Narrative conveys verification of the homogen
s of justice, democracy and end of all things evil, but in the hands
eal actors, the soldiers, the ideals are executed with heterogeneo
metrical action. The practice and the narrative diverge. This 
ss that turns Strategic Communication into a c
s
which the reality of a private, intimate experience unfolds. As a result, the 
narratives of humanitarian action and human rights do not result in "social 
openness, social solidarity, and harmonious practices resulting from respect 
for the heterogeneity of cultures and social groups" as Alkopher (2007) 
suggests could be the result of embedding human rights in the international 
social structure. Instead, the asymmetrical narratives of morality produce a 
very different world view. 
 
The emergence of expressive violence despite the commitment to reason 
and consideration indicates, in Bataille's terms, the existence of two 
separate social realms, the heterogeneous and the homogenous (Bataille, 
1992; 2008). Expressive violence belongs in the domain of the 
heterogeneous, which is the dark side of the sacred (Heinämäki, 2008). As 
the images of capture and death of Hussein, bin Laden and Gaddafi 
demonstrate, the "enlightened" audience, which demands virtuous warfare 
and respect of human rights, is captivated by the violence. At the same 
time, it is the humiliation of the enemy that attracts celebration both among 
th
t thus happens in the interface of the heterogeneous and homogen
nscendence in the form of a ritual. The homogenous social is the 
e instrumental reason that forms the framework of appropri
table social reality. Grabbing the adversary with the pinchers 
e, i.e. letting technology "neutralize" it from a distance and sacrific
 the altar of democracy, allows us to make heterogeneity se
dness and confirm our righteousness. In terms of communication
call this framing, but in terms of behavior it is known as
s
 
In his discussion on the sacrifice of animals, Bataille argues that only "what 
is usefu
m
cooking (Bataille, 1992: 39).  Death reduces the body to "thinghood" and it 
is the "things" that are sacrificed (Bataille, 1992: 50). In the verbal and 
visual processes of demonization, marginalization and delegitimatization, 
the adversary is reduced to a thing and then sacrificed. The display of the 
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heterogeneous, the blood and violence and intimacy, is part of the sacrifice. 
"Intimacy is violence", writes Bataille, and it is intimacy that cannot be 
expressed discursively alone (Bataille, 1992: 50-51): 
 
The swelling of the bursting point, the malice that breaks out with 
clenched teeth and weeps; the sinking feeling that doesn't know 
where it comes from or what it's about; the fear that sings its 
head off in the dark; the white-eyed pallor, the sweet sadness, the 
rage and the vomiting... are so many evasions.   
 
The difficulty of expressing heterogeneous intimacy may explain the 
fascination with the imagery of expressive violence. In the images of Abu 
Ghraib, a captured Saddam Hussein, the blood stains of bin Laden, the 
death of Muammar Gaddafi and the dead Taleban fighters being urinated 
on, the enemy is made a "thing" and his intimacy is revealed. There is no 
other way to convey the experience but capture it in images which later 
represent the center of the dark sacred. The origin of the sacred is thus in 
the forbidden taboo, the shared conception of something horrible that both 
repulses and attracts us (Heinämäki, 2008). It is this reality that the Grand 
arrative denies and represses. The Grand Narrative, the core of the 
Western civilization has never had a strong hold on the oppressed 
N
narratives of Strategic Communication, are the communally shared domain 
of the appropriate sacred, which are designed to maintain the dichotomy of 
the good and the evil, the homogeneous and the heterogeneous. The 
representations of the profane become absorbed into the domain of the dark 
sacred, fueling and intensifying the experience of the shared social reality. 
At the same time, despite the ideals promoted by the Grand Narrative, there 
is little that separates the Western civilization from the lynchers of Gaddafi:  
 
masses. Indeed, recent events demonstrate that when a crisis 
occurs, culture can count on few of its self-proclaimed devotees 
to stand out for its ideals. For one man who is able to 
differentiate between truth and reality, as the chief religious and 
philosophical systems have always done, there are thousands 
who have never been able to overcome the tendency to regress to 
their mimetic and atavistic urges. (Horkheimer, 2013: 84). 
 
The repression of the dark sacred is part of Western culture, but this 
repression results in bursts that contradict the official, light sacred social 
realm. 
 
The doctrinization of legitimacy and virtue means that the soldier no longer 
is a moral agent by default. The need for doctrinization reveals that the 
concept of "natural aristocracy" no longer exists: virtue is no longer a 
natural characteristic of the Self, so it has to be specifically commanded. At 
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the same time, doctrinization forces the soldier into conformity, where the 
soldier no longer needs to evaluate between right and wrong or good and 
evil, but only execute as instructed. This model takes the agency out of the 
agent and prevents the soldiers from making choices - from using "reason". 
Strategic corporals such as Bradley Manning who act out their moral and, 
in Kantian terms, practice "public reason", are condemned by the system. 
These strategic corporals are the moral agents of the information age, only 
their moral or agency is not welcome. As argued by Andén-Papadopoulos 
009), the first-hand testimonials of soldiers who share their war 
miotic 
vel of discourse analysis. However, exclusion is also of social 
(2
experience provide the public insights of the uncensored and violent face of 
warfare and thereby provide a basis for the critical perspectives necessary 
for an open, democratic debate of the practices and execution of warfare. 
The problem is that the soldiers break the boundaries of taboos, and expose 
myths by portraying warfare as excessive violence and showing what the 
highly technological, "virtuous" weaponry can do - or rather, destroy 
(Andén-Papadopoulos, 2009). The soldiers live the reality of expressive 
violence while they should be broadcasting instrumental agency. This 
‘propagandistic dissonance’ as phrased by Christensen (2008) is of strategic 
significance, but simply too truthful. 
 
The second important element of social significance is directly connected 
to the concepts of homogeneous and heterogeneous. Social exclusion 
manifests textually and visually in the data of this research, and some of its 
aspects will be discussed later in the context of the discursive-se
le
significance. As a social phenomenon, it is part of the Enlightenment 
legacy to the Grand Narrative of U.S. military policy, much contrary to the 
rhetoric of rights and equality.  
 
The Enlightenment legacy to Strategic Communication are the discourses 
of democracy and progress. This means to say that Strategic 
Communication is an ideoscape: it fuses images, narratives and ideology 
for purposes of power and politics. However, this process of meaning-
making contradicts the basic objective of the Enlightenment. As argued in 
Chapter 2, the Enlightenment narratives emphasized a certain ideal of free, 
objective reason and reasoning that would be refined into right kind of 
moral and justice. This in turn would lead to the separation of reason and 
culture. However, as Smith (2006) addresses in his criticism, truth is 
embedded in culture. The empiricism of this dissertation indicates namely 
this. "Truth" is treated specifically as a product of a certain culture. 
Obviously this culture, according to the rules of classic self-glorification, is 
associated inclusively with the Self. This matter is however deeper than a 
mere question of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. The 
contradictions between the discursive practices and the physical realization 
of warfare and conflict (i.e. textual and social agency) imply the use of 
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Enlightenment values as a core narration for a political agenda. The 
Enlightenment, as a thematic framework, is a rhetorical device that allows 
the practice of politics in a moral register. This is the very practice that the 
Enlightenment, in its preference for reason over culture, rose to oppose. 
This contradiction may be used as an introduction to the final discussion on 
the interpretation of the research and analysis in this dissertation. As will be 
argued, it is the concepts of paradox and contradiction in terms of agency 
that rise to define the mechanisms of Strategic Communication.  
 
These contradictions may lead to the constructivist interpretation that in 
Strategic Communication the overt and topmost narrative is not the most 
sincere one. Strategic Communication is strategic in the sense that it 
conveys covert meanings in its overt manifestations. However, as will be 
argued, this covertness is not always synonymous to being hidden or even 
suppressed, but rather to being subliminal. Its interpretation is a matter of 
recognizing and reading the different layers of narratives. From the 
structuralist perspective, these narratives are products of the social and 
cultural history of individual and collective identities. The emergence of 
paradoxes in the analysis is a natural result for a critical approach, and 
leads to the "inversion" of the themes that make up the core structure of the 
narrative. This inversion does not change the narrative, but opens it for 
terpretation in different contexts. What essentially constitutes the tension 
nouncement of contradictory motives. The problem with 
e moral register is that it limits the leeway of expression, as the 
sonate with the given context: 
arfare is the context of violence, and narrating it as an endeavor for 
demo s. It 
appe ctly 
contr w 
phen the 
in
in the interpretation of practice and presentation is their emergence as 
binaries: violence narrated as democracy and firepower as progress.  
 
In this dissertation, the critical approach means analysis by means of 
functional language theory, leading to the empirical analysis of action. This 
has led to the observation that in Strategic Communication, action 
manifests itself in terms of binaries. The actions associated with the Self 
typically carry the opposite significance compared to the actions of the 
Other. The moral register of these discourses forces the Self to associate its 
actions with the themes of virtue, progress, reason and rationality, leading 
to the denial and re
th
expression of the Self becomes limited to the undynamic themes that 
resonate with the given virtuous representation of the Self. This is exactly 
what creates the tension between representation and practice in the 
discourses analyzed in this dissertation. The tension starts to build when the 
negotiation of meaning unfolds in the semantic context of legitimacy. The 
semantics of practice simply do not re
w
cracy will result in contradictory themes, messages and narrative
ars that the practical manifestation of many concepts is exa
ary to how the concept is generally understood. This is not a ne
omenon in the discourses of war: the famous statement of 
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nece s 
repea d, the most significant themes that define Strategic 
ommunication can be seen as themes that get their paradoxical dimension 
propriety and sacredness as the epicenter of 
culture and community, while the transmission of meaning becomes 
paral gic 
Com
what ian 
actio tical 
exec ity 
simp s to the binary narratives of 
arfare: the official narratives of democracy and liberation, and the 
llages be saved without 
estroying them? 
 
struction. In 
errida's reconstruction the claim is that people tend to categorize and 
ssity "to destroy the town to save it" is only one example. A
tedly state
C
from the tension between their conceptual and practical realizations. The 
historic and modern conceptualizations of the Enlightenment and virtue and 
their outcome in violence; the narratives of natural legitimacy and freedom 
and their execution by means of artificial control, management and 
hierarchy; the claim of moral, humanitarian responsibility and agency on 
one hand, the shift of agency away from the human actors on the other; the 
narrative identification of 
yzed without the dark and the profane. The problem of Strate
munication may just be that it has evolved to limit itself in terms of 
 is perceived as appropriate and legitimate (democracy, humanitar
n, etc.), while it is clear that these values cannot explain the prac
ution of warfare (violence, control and censorship). Ideals and real
ly do not meet. This tension ultimately lead
w
unofficial, or even unintentional narratives of violence and profane. Most 
importantly, it can be explained as the clash of the instrumental objectives 
and the expressive needs of the actor. 
 
The emergence of binary manifestations as the result of critical analysis is 
what I call inversion. Basically this means the critical approach to the 
discourses and narratives of Strategic Communication that led to the 
discovery of the paradox between the conceptual and practical realizations 
of warfare. Here, inversion means applying the opposite reading to a given 
message. In practice this could mean asking how the use of a binary value 
would change the practice: when the claim is that the sacrifice leads to 
democracy, could the claim also be that democracy calls for sacrifice? Are 
our objectives procurable without the application of their anti-value? Is 
rationality separable from emotion? Can vi
d
This approach could be understood in the context of recon
D
define their experience in terms of binary opposites. The data of this 
research suggest that identity is always narrated in terms of opposites: 
inclusion and exclusion, morality and immorality, progress and 
primitivism. As Hansen (2006: 6) states,  
 
Poststructuralism's relational conception of identity implies that 
identity is always given through reference to something it is not. 
To speak of the 'American', 'European', 'barbaric' or 
'underdeveloped' is to constitute another identity or set of 
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identities as non-American, non-European, civilized or 
developed. 
 
This is clear in the semantics of Strategic Communication too. With the 
action descriptions understood as identity descriptions, the emphasis on 
rational, instrumental, moral and progressed Self implies the adversary's 
opposite existence. As stated before, delegitimatory practices have been 
doctrinized, meaning that the commitment to the human rights is 
announced contemporaneously with the antagonist's perceived immorality, 
i.e. the killing of civilians. 
 
You've heard us say many times that we strike only military 
da, 1988). Inversion, 
s used in this research, refers thus to the deconstruction of a meaning, 
targets while taking extraordinary care to avoid unnecessary 
civilian casualties and to minimize collateral damage. Saddam 
Hussein, on the other hand, flaunts the laws of war and co-
locates military and civilian facilities, and employs human 
shields. (Department of Defense, 2003d). 
 
Derrida states that the general strategy of deconstruction should avoid the 
neutralization of these binaries or movement "beyond" them, but attempt to 
remain within them (1988: 48). The meaning is given by the absent 
attributes, by "what is not". Derrida argues that the dichotomies of binaries 
are always asymmetrical and violent: the juxtaposition of terms, such as 
democracy/terrorism, implies that one is the dominant and the other the 
subordinate concept, and the deconstruction of this juxtapositioning 
requires the inversion of this violent hierarchy (Derri
a
significance, or myth in terms other than the given hierarchy. In Derrida's 
terms, the subordinate concept is placed above the dominant one to see how 
it changes the interpretation. In the framework of the American ideoscape, 
this has meant the inversion of the significances of the Grand Narrative, i.e. 
the textual and visual representations of agency. 
 
9.2 The cognitive implications of strategic communication  
 
The Methods Chapter referred to the role of cognition in Critical Discourse 
Analysis. Mental models are, according to Van Dijk (2008a: 220) "the basis 
of our future memories, as well as the basis of further learning". Human 
cognition generates experiential cognitive models even if the mind was 
empty to start with, and as these cognitions become structured and 
organized, the process of conceptualization can begin in the social and 
abstract dimensions of cognition. This means that language becomes an 
essential part of the process as soon as the experiential cognitions have 
become structured. (Larjavaara 2007, 30). Lakoff's example of the 
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categorization process that result in idealized cognitive models illustrates 
the role of cognitive models in semantics: Tuesday is a word relative to an 
idealized model that posits the understanding of time as a seven-day cycle 
(a week), organized in a linear sequence of 24-hour time periods, the third 
of which is Tuesday. Lakoff calls this model idealized: "Seven-day weeks 
do not exist in nature. They are created by human beings." (Lakoff, 1990: 
68-69). This means to say that any given "thing" can be turned into an 
ealized model, which eventually appears as a self-evident, natural fact 
sociocultural knowledge (Van Dijk, 
006b). 
 
In S ve 
mode ed. 
An e rai 
(199 h, 
this " and 
beha ble 
conc ains 
the i erm 
that al) 
objec in a 
cons ery 
diffe atus 
as a tion 
it is c
 
Dem the core of American (and Western) 
arratives of identity, and its multifaceted significance has evolved parallel 
ct: freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, representation. 
ccording to Appadurai, these ideoscapes are directly political and they are 
id
that we fail to recognize as a cultural product. Yet, (cognitive) mental 
models feature large amounts of 
2
trategic Communication, the narratives contain idealized cogniti
ls (ICMs) that are or are in the process of becoming conceptualiz
xample of such model may be democracy. As argued by Appadu
0), presented in Chapter 2 and suggested by the data of this researc
master term" is elementary in the Western narratives being, doing 
ving, and can therefore serve as an example of a politically exploita
ept. Treated as an intrinsic value and a legitimatory concept, it cont
dealized understanding of a certain social order. Democracy is a t
has become basic strategic vocabulary: it is a military (politic
tive of Western warfare. At the same time, it appears to be 
tant semantic change. Democracy in Libya means something v
rent than democracy in the United States or Europe. Despite its st
symbol of rights, welfare and representation, in political argumenta
onstantly represented in the context of violence. 
ocracy has been a key concept in 
n
to the political turbulences in history. The pragmatic nature of democracy 
makes it difficult to define: like pragmatic meanings, democracy as a 
concept is contextual (Castells, 2009: 296). When the context affects the 
meaning of the word, its semantic representation becomes complicated. 
What is its signified concept? This has made democracy the resilient key 
word of legitimatory discourses. It is also an example of an idealized 
cognitive model in the sense that its meaning is culturally coded and based 
on an agreement, but also a graded category: an ICM may fit one's 
understanding of, for instance, democracy perfectly, very well, somewhat, 
very poorly or not at all (see Lakoff, 1990: 70). In light of this, the use of 
abstract notions and concepts is convenient in strategic narratives, as they 
allow the pragmatic redefinition of meaning and interpretation. In fact, all 
of the key concepts Appadurai (1997: 36) lists as elementary in ideoscapes, 
all are abstra
A
oriented toward capturing state power. Ideoscapes are not limited to verbal 
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entities, but may also take the form of a visual image, as suggested in the 
analysis of the images of the capture of Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden 
and Saddam Hussein earlier. In these images, it is the context that 
determined the interpretation of action: the context of violence was used to 
frame violent actions, which dramatically influenced their interpretation. 
Instead of delegitimatory discourses, the context was framed, which proved 
a powerful tactic. 
 
However, pragmatic redefinition of meaning may lead to conceptual 
paradoxes, if not misrepresentation: 
 
The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington were the first 
strikes on continental America since the British razed 
Washington to the ground in 1812. The insecurity that this new 
attack generated prompted an isolationist-inclined Bush Jr 
administration to declare a new doctrine that marked a 
fundamental change in US foreign policy. This so-called Bush 
Doctrine had three essential strands – to hunt down terrorists 
wherever they are, including in those rogue states now dubbed an 
'axis of evil’, to wage pre-emptive war to prevent further strikes 
or to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into 
r, 2006). 
terrorist hands, and the aggressive promotion of democracy, US-
style (Bush, 2002). Despite NATO’s historic invocation of Article 
V of its Charter on 12 September, the fear was that the US would 
pursue these goals unilaterally without recourse to its traditional 
allies or the United Nations. The problem was that the first two 
doctrinal strands jeopardized, and perhaps even contradicted, 
the third. (Snow & Taylo
 
Due to its pragmatic representation, democracy has no prototype, as 
prototype theory cannot offer a model that could induce complex meanings 
from more simple meanings, such as elections or (see Rusanen, 2010: 232). 
Without prototype, the semantic meanings (signifier, signified) become 
difficult, if not impossible to determine. However, knowing 'what's going 
on' in interaction is more than merely understanding the semantic meanings 
of discourse (Van Dijk, 2006b). In the framework of Strategic 
Communication, its use for asymmetric influence and the nature of the 
modern information environment, it is clear that pragmatism has its 
benefits: the pragmatic interpretations are impacted by their context, which 
obviously is easier to influence than cognition processes. We do not have 
direct access to the cognition process, or "states of mind" as Van Dijk 
(2006b) argues. However, in this process it may be possible to use context 
as a medium. 
 
The problem with the concept of Strategic Communication is its practical 
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and theoretical incoherence. It presents communication as a cognitive 
process, but yet understands communication as sending out signals that 
"trigger the desired interpretation" (Department of Defense, 2009: 6). This 
view suggests that the "desired interpretations" are mental models coded in 
the minds of the audience, waiting for retrieval by a triggering stimulus. As 
stated in the concept (Department of Defense, 2009: 6), "it is the receiver 
who actually provides the ultimate meaning, which may or may not be the 
eaning the source intended." In other words, the approach is such that the 
pporting themes and 
emes supporting messages fails short when the understanding of the 
mess rist 
stimu  the 
proce nce 
desp the 
comm s is 
insuf s unlikely that it will provide a functional 
asis for the construction of themes and narratives. Contextualization takes 
m
focus should be on message and audience selection rather than 
contextualization. However, interpretation is precisely the domain of 
context: as stated in the Methods Chapter, context models are the basis of 
knowing how to engage in discourse in a socially acceptable way, how to 
interpret messages and relate their meaning in specific environments (Van 
Dijk, 2006b; 2009). Instead of influencing interpretation, the concept of 
Strategic Communication focuses on mere messaging. If context is not 
provided, this type of communicative practice easily results in aimless 
shooting. With limited capacity (or tolerance) for feedback and therefore 
limited stakeholder and key audience knowledge, it becomes impossible to 
predict which messages may be accepted by the heterogeneous, global 
audiences.  
 
One step towards more engaging communication is Key Leader 
Engagement, where the so-called "key leaders" engage each other on the 
leadership level. According to Hirvelä, Huhtinen & Kangasmaa 
(Forthcoming), the prerequisite for successful engagement is that mutual 
respect is established between the key leaders. This calls for reputation 
management and synchronization of messages, which, again, is an issue of 
leadership and management. 
 
Clearly, the communicative function of the legitimatory practices such as 
the "Battle of the Narrative" is to contextualize the communication process. 
The concept explicitly introduces themes and narratives as essential 
elements, but fails to model this process much further than the practice and 
challenges of messaging. The hierarchy of messages su
th
aging process is unrealistic and based on simplified, behavio
lus-response modeling and audience selection. It fails to address
ss of interpretation as an essential dimension of cognitive influe
ite the fact that themes and narratives are explicit elements of 
unication model. If the understanding of messaging as a proces
ficient or even distorted, it i
b
more than repetitive catchphrases and key words, but the concept fails to 
provide much else.  As stated, the Grand Narrative and its Enlightenment 
themes form the themes and narratives for Strategic Communication, but 
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the problem described here is that the theoretical understanding of 
communication as mechanical transmission of messages is in dissonance 
with the need for interactive, two-way communication that recognizes the 
importance of interpretation over mere acceptance of messages. As de la 
Ville & Mounoud (2010: 185) state, storytelling is a powerful and deep 
social activity and in order to be efficient, it must include the 
interpretations of its audience. 
 
The problem identified thus far in terms of the cognitive dimension of 
discourse is the lack of focus in the contextualization of Strategic 
Communication, despite the existing method for cognitive influence, "the 
Battle of the Narrative". It is obvious that the understanding of 
communication as mechanical message transmission is in profound 
dissonance with the view that communication is interpretation. In practice, 
the messages become redundant if there is no context (narrative) within 
which its interpretation can take place. The focus should shift from effects 
(acceptance of message) to interpretation, but this would obviously 
contradict the doctrinal congruence of effects-centricness. This is however 
 development that took place in communication research during the 1960s, 
but is still waiting for actualization in Military Science.   
he concept of Strategic Communication clearly 
uffers from the same symptoms as the behaviorist communication research 
tell good 
storieswhich must be coherent to gain credibility and stimulating 
a
 
The claim here is that as t
s
in the 1960s, the paradigmatic shift from transmission of messages to a 
narrative-based doctrine would solve at least some of the problems. 
However, this would mean that the behaviorist conception of influence is 
abandoned in favor of a more interactional, contextualizing approach. As 
Schramm (1963: 7) postulated upon replacing the concept of linear 
transmission with active interpretation, communication is a relationship and 
an act of sharing, not "something someone does to someone else." One 
methodological option for this is narrativity. Stories and narratives organize 
events and actors into an acceptable and comprehensive framework (de la 
Ville & Mounoud, 2010: 185). According to de la Ville & Mounoud, stories 
contribute to the preserving and continuity of actions: 
 
Leaders need to be good storytellers, i.e. be able to 
to facilitate its perception and implementation. In a functionalist 
view, the construction of a good story supposes an overall 
intentionality, meaning total control of the plot through to its 
final outcome. (2010: 185). 
 
As stated, the concept of Strategic Communication needs to further develop 
the concepts of themes and narratives as the domains of contextualization 
and interpretation. The focus on messages at the expense of the narrative 
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makes the "Battle of the Narrative" redundant. In the framework of 
leadership this is problematic. Contextualization can be seen as the link 
between leadership and constructing reality: controlling the context, 
defining the situation and finally interpretation and response are the basic 
steps of framing (Fairhurst, 2011: 2-9). From the perspective of leadership, 
it is precisely the contexts that are significant. According to Fairhurst 
(2011: 2) "[l]eaders often cannot control events, but they can control the 
context under which events are seen if they recognize a framing 
portunity." In other words, the development of contextualization would 
uncontrollable, negative asymmetries in 
 
information management and 
ontrol. Contextualization would provide a bumper and leverage against 
Lang this 
disse iew 
that l ent 
(sem y and phonetics) 
atthiessen, 2009: 23-24). The contents of language have been 
(2009: 19) this perspective "complements that of cognitive 
cience, providing an account of the social construction of meaning." This 
is to s of 
Strat ess 
their the 
trian eir 
inter courses addressed in this dissertation. 
 
op
provide resilience for communication and reputation management for the 
communicator in case of 
communication. The focus on the resilience of communication would be
advisable, considering the impossibility of 
c
the asymmetries of communication. The obvious benefit of this type of 
practice would be that it would not demand efforts unnatural for a military 
organization, i.e. excessive transparency, such as is demanded from civilian 
organizations.  
 
9.3 The discursive-semiotic manifestations of Strategic Communication 
(and the visual paradox) 
 
uage is cognitive structure. The methodological approach of 
rtation has been that of functional language theory, based on the v
anguage is a higher-order semiotic system that is stratified into cont
antics and lexicogrammar) and expression (phonolog
(M
approached as a social semiotic, as both a system and behavior. According 
to Matthiessen 
s
say that since the social and cognitive perspectives to the discourse
egic Communication have been addressed, this section will addr
 textual manifestations and attempt to close the circle, or rather 
gle, of the social/cognitive/discursive-semiotic dimensions and th
twining in the dis
The focus in the empirical part of this dissertation has been on the analysis 
of agency through action descriptions. These descriptions are textual action 
and behavior, which give an identity to the entity being described. Agency 
in discourse has been mapped with transitivity analysis, which is one way 
of observing and explaining participant roles in language structures. Here 
these structures are understood as reflections of certain social order. As 
Thompson argues, the analysis of transitivity choices "is one of the most 
effective ways of exploring the ideological assumptions that inform and are 
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construed by the texts" (2010: 17). Halliday (2009: 55) relates transitivity 
to cognition, arguing that in essence, it is "the set of options relating to 
cognitive content, the linguistic representation extralinguistic experience", 
 the triangular 
pproach to discourse in this analysis, the line of argument presented in the 
  
i) d 
iscursive-semiotic domains,  
rse. 
he empirical case studies approached a number of phenomena through the 
nguage. This means to say that agency 
only a matter of semantics: 
generalizations to be drawn about 
p
 
Fur
conco
 
[...] it is possible to identify transitivity templates, i.e. schematic 
of transitivity structures in which there are 
oles or 
Th es of this dissertation. The 
tudies that apply the method of transitivity analysis contain data from a 
i.e. the external, physical world, or the inner world of feelings, thoughts 
and perceptions. This was the argument for applying functional language 
theory in the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis. In
a
Methods Chapter was that  
discourse is determined by the interplay of the social, cognitive an
d
ii) discourse is influenced by ideology (cognitive and social structure) and  
iii) this ideology has textual manifestations. 
 
This approach ties together textual/visual, cognitive and social structure, 
which are all manifested, as stated, in the transitivity patterns of discou
T
analysis of transitivity. The transitivity patterns revealed that social order 
really is coded in the structures of la
in discourse is always politically motivated and ideological and this 
manifests not only in the semantics of discourse, but also in its structures. 
Ideology in language is not 
 
Transitivity concordances, especially when derived from a group 
of texts of the same type, allow 
the ways in which significance entities are represented in a 
articular register or genre. (Thompson, 2010: 19). 
ther, according to Thompson (2010: 19), upon bringing together these 
rdances: 
representations 
recurrent patterns of one or more of the entities appearing in 
complementary distribution, in particular participant r
circumstances.  
 
is has been the practice in the case studi
s
number of transcribed texts. As a conclusion, these concordances are now 
abstracted into transitivity templates, which allow us to analyze these 
experiential representations as a social construction of meaning. According 
to Thompson (2010: 39), the dynamics attributed to the entities in discourse 
can provide insight into the values that are embedded in the discourse. We 
are thus not interested in the configurations of language structure in 
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isolation, but as a representation of social reality and its cognitive 
interpretation. 
 
The transitivity analysis in the case studies have shown different 
concordances that, when put together, manifest as patterns of legitimacy 
and Otherness. These include transitivity templates such as  
 
 action of the Self without any target 
 action of the Self with an inanimate/abstract (i.e. legitimate) target 
 action of the Other with an animate/human (i.e. illegitimate) target 
 
It is obviously difficult, at times, to differentiate between legitimation and 
othering, but these can be understood as parallel manifestations: the 
emand for legitimacy actualizes in different patterns of inclusion and 
te targets: the targets of the Self are 
typically inanimate, abstract objects, i.e. air defenses, systems, IEDs, 
ctural layer of meaning appears to be in concordance 
d
exclusion that the transitivity analysis reveals. If these patterns are 
interpreted as a representation of social reality, it appears that the Self, 
 
 acts strategically: the Self takes abstract action which is typically 
reported in subordinate terms 
 is addressed in the context of positive social esteem: evaluation 
focuses on ethics, which is reported terms of behavior (capacity, 
tenacity) 
 kills and influences legitima
etc. 
 kills and influences legitimate adversaries: human targets are 
evaluated negatively and therefore legitimate (insurgents, terrorists, 
etc.) 
 is often replaced, as an actor, by technology: in the action 
descriptions of the Self, technology is given agency and the Self 
muted as an actor 
 
The Other, however,  
 is described in the context of negative social sanction and affect 
(veracity, propriety and negative attributes of the actor) 
 is the target of collective action both textually and visually 
 is represented as individuals and small groups 
 kills and influences illegitimate targets  
 
The conclusions on the data here demonstrate that Strategic 
Communication is a site of exclusion. This exclusion manifests not only 
thematically in the visualizations and semantic patterning of discourse, but 
on the very clause level. The first layer of meaning is the social dimension 
discussed in the previous section. However, this level resonates with the 
second layer. This stru
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with the instrumental representation of warfare and strategy: systems and 
iate neutralizing with certain types of actors and certain 
pes of contexts: the Self with virtuous war and technological (i.e. 
cts from the 
iscourses of war. What is however significant in this, is the formation of a 
. 
infrastructure are being neutralized and human targets of action, apart from 
"insurgency" and "terrorists", are excluded from the transitivity patterns of 
discourse. This exclusion is best demonstrated in the analysis of the term 
'neutralize', which was used as an example of the the language patterns of 
Strategic Communication. New terminology emerges around the 
conceptions of the Self and the Other, leading to mutually exclusive 
patterns: the enemy does not neutralize, but kills and destroys. This type of 
patterning may further contribute to the formation of mental and contextual 
models which assoc
ty
instrumental) agency, and the Other with terror and other forms of 
illegitimate, expressive action.  
 
As this chapter illustrates, exclusion can be traced in all three dimensions 
of analysis. It is evident that these three modes are all interdependent. It is 
difficult to imagine social exclusion would appear without textual or visual 
(discursive-semiotic) such, and vice versa.  The fact that exclusion 
manifests textually suggests that exclusion also has cognitive as well as 
social modes. Further, the traceability of exclusion and Otherness in all of 
these three dimensions shows that methodologically, the triangle of social, 
cognitive and discursive-semiotic modes is well suited for the critical 
analysis of hegemonic discourses.  
 
Obviously, the exclusion of the Other is what one expe
d
new kind of a taxonomy for strategic, tactical and operational action that 
builds around the instrumental conception of warfare that the Other can 
have no part in. In other words, the ideology of exclusion has penetrated all 
layers of strategic planning, leading into a new vocabulary that can rarely 
be applied to the adversary. Warfare can no longer be described in terms of 
attack and defense, but these concepts have received new subordinate 
labels that contain the information on who defends and who attacks, which 
determines whether the description should have a reading of legitimacy or 
illegitimacy. This new vocabulary contains the American experience of 
instrumental warfare. It is also the vocabulary that the media will 
broadcast, as the messages of the "terrorists" and "insurgents" are rarely 
given publicity. This is why the construction of a new lexicon of 
instrumental warfare is significant not only as a textual phenomenon of 
discourse, but demonstrates how the social, cognitive and discursive-
semiotic dimensions are interdependent. 'Neutralize', for instance, suggests 
not only physical action, but contains a cognitive model that associates the 
action of neutralizing with the domain of the Self, which automatically 
excludes the Other and reinforces the interpretation of the action as 
something legitimate
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According to Fairclough, in contemporary life social transformations are 
ality of war and to attempt to mask the 
eterogeneous force of warfare. In discourse this shows in the 
rds" or as "unattractive [...] 
desperate,” “cowardly,” “impotent,” or “inept.” (US Joint Forces 
'discourse-led': "it is discourses which change first" (Fairclough, 2005: 77). 
In this case Strategic Communication has started to transmit the discourses 
of strategic planning and doctrine. By controlling the strategic planning and 
leadership process, the organization in question also has control over 
strategic communication - the language of strategic leadership. In the press 
briefings, this language turns into descriptions of the reality of warfare and 
provides the vocabulary for conceptualizing it: in other words, attempts to 
lead the discourse.  
 
However, there is a paradox between the official discourses and the 
practices of exclusion. Whereas the discourses transmit instrumental 
representations of distance, such as the prerequisite of high-technological, 
humanitarian warfare where the use of weaponry is well planned and 
assessed, the unofficial and visual narratives convey an image of the war 
that is expressive in its violence. It seems that the narratives of expressive 
violence are particularly visual: this dissertation has referred to the imagery 
of torture and physical abuse in Abu Ghraib, YouTube- and WikiLeaks-
videos that reveal the hostile and antagonistic face of the Self. This is the 
face that Strategic Communication is intended to hide, and which has 
forced the military leadership to develop Strategic Communication to the 
direction of comprehensive synchronization of communication. 
Communication synchronization is thus an instrumental reaction to the 
expressive communication behavior within the organization. 
 
Just like in the 18th century political discourse, Strategic Communication 
has invoked the ideoscapes of the Enlightenment to denote a certain moral 
superiority. This type of moral register has, however, proved more 
restrictive than restorative. It has led to the need for denial and suppression: 
to deny the violent, expressive re
h
manifestations of agency in the discourse structure, which are essential, 
ideological references to the dynamics of action in the social realm where 
collectives fight the fallen individuals. It also surfaces in the negotiation of 
meaning, for instance in the renouncement of manipulation and in the 
doctrinization of key themes and terms that represent moral and legitimacy: 
cooperation, stability and democracy (see US Joint Forces Command, 
2010). At the same time, also adversariality is doctrinized as "inconsistent 
with moral, religious, or social standa
“
Command, 2010). This type of marginalization and delegitimation both 
manifest not only in the semantics of Strategic Communication, but in its 
transitivity templates that resonate in the dynamic, instrumentally distanced 
agency of the Self.  
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9.4 The "end state" 
 
A politically relevant perspective introduced in Chapter 2 is the role of 
future in the strategic narratives of ideology and warfare. The legacy of the 
Enlightenment is the attitude towards interim suffering, waiting for the 
world to undergo changes for the better. In these narratives, familiar to us 
in the narratives of Iraq and Afghanistan also, the focus is on the future: the 
future of the nation, the future of the civilized world, and the future only 
democracy can bring. These narratives of the interim proclaim sacrifices, 
such as tolerating temporary violence and the loss of basic rights due to 
surveillance and measures of security, until the enemy, often an invisible 
such, has been defeated (see Rantapelkonen, 2006: 185). Eventually each 
interim underlays the next, making security policy an eternal wait. The 
concept of "pre-emptive war" resonates with this future-orientation. As 
Rantapelkonen (2006: 205) argues, the United States "is not only waging 
"war on terror" but preparing now and forever for  future wars", which is 
dubious: usually leaders do not focus on improvisation and ignorance - 
which is obviously the only options when planning pre-emption. The 
narratives of pre-emption and liberation, which call for warfare "based on 
virtual reality or dreaming of the future" (Rantapelkonen, 2006: 310). This 
exactly is the business of narrative leadership, which is called forth by the 
narrative identity. Narrative identity, as argued in Chapter 2, is the product 
of the discourses intended to lead and manage the perceptions and identities 
of the audience. This is to say that narrative leadership and narrative 
identity are essentially counterparts. The characteristic of American 
narrative identity has been its emphasis of what Americans are going to 
become and how this is going to be achieved by means of democracy and 
technology. These themes have remained, although the means have been 
redefined. To contrast this with Finland, for instance, the difference is clear. 
Upon determining its national narratives, Finland, as with many other 
nations, looks back to its history.  
 
Throughout this dissertation, the concept of agency has been an important 
element of the discussion. Especially in the analysis of the social and 
iscursive-semiotic levels of discourse, agency has been an important d
conceptual tool: it mediates between the two levels. Social agency becomes 
coded in the textual and visual discourses of Strategic Communication, and 
textual and visual agency empowers social agency by recording and 
preserving norms and representations. Textual agency participates in 
producing a 'certain kind' of social agency. 
 
The concept of agency has also been addressed in the context of ideologies, 
namely those of instrumental and expressive violence. Agency cannot be 
differentiated from responsibility in warfare: moral control extends to all 
actions over which the actor has influence or control, making control and 
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consent the precondition of the attribution of moral responsibility (Fisher, 
2012). Fisher concludes that the moral responsibility of the combatants 
extends only to how the war is conducted, which is something they have 
influence or control over, whereas the strategic and political responsibility 
lies elsewhere. Moral responsibility is an inherent concept in the Western 
notion of "just war" that sets a number of preconditions to warfare: warfare 
has to have a just as well as a sufficient and proportionate cause, the right 
intention, the right authority, it must have a reasonable prospect of success 
and it has to be the last resort (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007). The moral 
responsibility does not end here. Since the Middle Ages, the just conduct of 
war has been thought to require virtues: practical wisdom, courage, self-
control and justice (Fisher, 2012). Now, after discussing the theoretical and 
practical implications of Strategic Communication, it has become apparent 
that the aim of all attempts to influence is to reinforce the concept of 
legitimacy from precisely this point of view. The Enlightenment themes are 
particularly applicable for this purpose, as democracy, equality and liberty 
re perceived as unquestionable values. As Evans (2011) notes, since 9/11, 
the c  in 
some r of 
the d lly 
addre ge 
appe ice 
are ask 
whet and 
justic t is 
techn r to 
deliv nt of force, and when this is done from 
e distance, how much courage is necessary? Maybe it is precisely 
ecause of their moral agency, soldiers are the weakest link. Their 
e of 21st century 
symmetrical warfare" (Goodman, 2011). Because the soldiers are the 
sile. The 
a
oncept of ‘just war’ has been "intimately or even exclusively related
 way to ‘democracy’." As manifested in the semantics and gramma
ata in this dissertation, the consequence is that legitimation typica
sses these four themes. The virtues of practical wisdom and coura
ar in the discourses that are self-glorifying, but self-control and just
virtues that are outsourced to technology. One may however 
her practical wisdom and courage can be genuine, if self-control 
e are outsourced to technology and instrumental ideology. When i
ology whose moral judgment we trust more than that of the soldie
er justice with the right amou
th
technology that keeps war from being "just" or soldiers from acting 
"morally" - quite contrary to how the neo-Enlightenment narratives 
perceive the role of mechanized justice. Despite this, during the age of 
instrumental ideology, there are few alternatives to waging war in a moral 
way without technology, and this is precisely what we see in the discourses 
of Strategic Communication.  
 
B
experience produces the incoherence of the narrative and the say-do gap. 
Those who express hostility cause scandals like that of Abu Ghraib: those 
who judge the reality of warfare as immoral cause other kinds of scandals. 
Such moral agent was Bradley Manning, who claimed that by leaking 
secret documents, he was "revealing the true natur
a
weakest link due to their moral, the role and development of technology 
must strive to replace them. The problem this far has been that it takes a 
human to do the targeting, watch the target and launch the mis
187 
                                                                                         
2012 Pentagon directive (Department of Defense, 2012b) established a 
polic
funct s", 
whic es 
to sh eel 
adeq that 
is deeply frustrating in the framework of morality. Unmanned platforms 
olved the problem of distance years ago, but next they will also carry 
ce appears more moral than 
strumental such. It allows transparent agency and a real choice between 
y "for the development and use of autonomous and semi-autonomous 
ions in weapon systems, including manned and unmanned platform
h reduces the role of the human to that of a "supervisor". This com
ow that it is not the mere distance that we need in order to f
uately detached from the violence we produce, but it is the agency 
s
some of the responsibility in decision making. This is why one must be 
aware of the social reality that language reflects. The manifestations of 
today's technologization in the transitivity patterns of language discussed in 
this research would not even change dramatically if the weapon launched 
itself rather than having a human launcher. Technology already is an actor 
and an "enabler" in the instrumental discourses of Strategic 
Communication. As Conor Friedersdorf (2012) comments in his Atlantic 
article:  
 
It's no wonder that some military leaders are so eager for the 
advent of autonomous weapons. At present, if WikiLeaks gets a 
hold of a video that shows innocents being fired upon, the 
incident in question can be traced back to an individual 
triggerman, an officer who gave him orders, and perhaps 
particular people who provided them with faulty intelligence. But 
an innocent who dies at the handlessness of an automated killing 
machine? How easy to phrase the obligatory apology in the 
passive voice! How implausible that any individual would be 
held culpable for the failure!  
 
In light of this, it seems expressive violen
in
participation and refraining from it. Strategic Communication, as it is, is a 
system that maintains the mechanisms of denial and suppression. It 
displays the light, virtuous side of the Self, but fails to recognize that it is 
the violence, not virtue, that generates our vigor. In Bataille's terms, it is 
that violence that we merge to virtue.  
 
Is technological progress the only possible course of advancement for 
human kind? After seeing how the ambitions of the Enlightenment failed to 
transform the humankind into the new standard of morality and goodness, 
is the only conceivable kind of progress now a question of creating more 
means and capabilities to assist the execution of virtue? 
 
All in all, the problem of communication cannot be solved with leadership 
alone. The military community will have to do what is unpleasant and 
evaluate its means and motivations. Language is always violence: 
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[L]anguage, not primitive egoistic interest, is the first and 
 
This ing one's way into 
eace and mutual understanding. Žižek (2009: 52) notes that "maybe 
ethics, 
alues and motivations its communication is based on. This is one of the 
ost crucial reasons to integrate the critical study of language and 
iscourses into the core of Military Science. 
he Enlightenment with its positivist ideology is central in the study of 
omination as the instrument of social order. In the narratives of the 
nlightenment, science and reason emancipated the human beings, but at 
e same time, they created new means for their oppression. "The history of 
man's efforts to subjugate nature is also the history of man's subjugation by 
man", writes Horkheimer (2013:  74): "The principle of domination has 
become the idol to which everything is sacrificed" (2013:74). The 
domination of the nature extended to the domination of the structures of 
society: imperialism was enabled by technological innovation that made the 
world smaller, but this innovation was a mere instrument in the pursuit of 
political power. Seafaring and geographic exploration quickly became to 
signify new forms of social domination rather than science. Science was 
politicized. Horkheimer argues that the development of the concept of the 
ego reflects this "twofold history" of domination and that it is this growth 
of the ego that created the principle of domination: it manifests as 
greatest divider, it is because of language that we and our 
neighbours (can) 'live in different worlds' even if we live on the 
same street. What this means is that verbal violence is not a 
secondary distortion, but the ultimate resort of every specifically 
human violence. (Žižek, 2009: 56-57).  
is a strange paradox with the idea of communicat
p
humans exceed animals in their capability for violence precisely because 
they speak". Communicating one's thought always means conflict. "Peace 
is made only in a certain silence", argues Derrida (1978: 185), "which is 
determined and protected by the violence of speech." This is why the 
'trinity' of language, the Enlightenment narratives and military discourse 
should be studied thoroughly. Language is, after all, a weapon. It can be 
used to liberate, bless, and attack injustices, but it can also be tied to an 
ideology that is used to carry out an agenda, either overtly or covertly. The 
study of the language and discourses of war has long been polarized: 
military organizations have always looked for ways to harness language in 
the service of warfare, while the responsibility to interpret and reclaim it 
has fallen on the outsiders of the military (political) communities. Because 
Critical Discourse Analysis approaches discourses from the outside and 
takes an explicit position to expose and resist hegemonic power and control 
(Van Dijk, 2001), a hegemonic organization cannot review and develop its 
communication unless it is ready to critically question the actions, 
v
m
d
 
T
d
E
th
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190 
hierarchical arrangements of social concepts.  
French sociology has taught that the hierarchical arrangement of 
primitive general concepts reflected the organization of the tribe 
and its power over the individual. It has shown that the whole 
nd the marking out of 
their respective domains and boundaries, mirror social relations 
mmunication narratives 
 terms of the agency and categorization of the Self and the Other. It 
tivist philosophy that has 
eveloped into full-blown instrumentalist ideology what underlies the logic 
le of what Horkheimer refers to as the "transformation of the 
orld into a world of means rather than of ends" (see Horkheimer, 
nication and the 
epresentations of sacred violence is natural. What should however be 
 
logical order, the ranking of concepts according to priority and 
posteriority, inferiority and superiority, a
and the division of labor" (Horkheimer, 2013: 75). 
 
This argument explains the logic of the Strategic Co
in
explains the motivations behind the representations of technological 
agency and the ritualistic representations of enmity in the images of the 
archenemies. And not only is this, but the posi
d
of not only the verbal and visual grammar of domination, but the 
naturalization of control. Concepts such as communication synchronization 
are an examp
w
2013:72). Emancipation turns into the opposite means once it becomes 
politicized. In this light the union of Strategic Commu
r
remembered is that this violence does not extend to the enemy only. 
Strategic Communication is a means to naturalize power not only in order 
to reject Otherness, but to dominate the people it claims to represent 
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There are no moral phenomena at all, but only moral interpretation of 
phenomena. 
 
– Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Defence University
The Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy
P.O. BOX 7, FI-00861
Helsinki   Finland
Tel. +358 299 800
www.mpkk.fi
ISSN 1798-0399
ISBN 978-951-25-2488-4 (pbk.)
ISBN 978-951-25-2489-1 (PDF)
National Defence University
The Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy
Publication Series 1, No. 11
Strategic Communication: 
practice, ideology and dissonance
Saara Jantunen
Saara Jantunen
Publication Series 1, N
o. 11
Strategic C
om
m
unication: practice, ideology and dissonance
